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IntrusionMicrosoft Entra · On-premises
7 min read

WARP PANDA session replay into Microsoft 365 through BRICKSTORM implants

Victim
Several unnamed U.S. legal, technology and manufacturing organizations
When
late 2023 (one intrusion); Azure activity late summer 2025Disclosed Dec 4, 2025
Entry
Exploited internet-facing edge devices (CrowdStrike lists Ivanti and F5 flaws without mapping them to each intrusion), then valid credentials or vCenter flaws to reach VMware vCenter. How the actor first reached the Azure environments is not stated.

CrowdStrike reported on December 4, 2025 that an actor it calls WARP PANDA entered U.S. legal, technology and manufacturing organizations through internet-facing edge devices, reached VMware vCenter with valid credentials or vCenter flaws, and used the account vCenter manages on each host to plant implants on ESXi hosts and guest VMs, where it cloned domain controller VMs and sent out data staged from VM snapshots. In late summer 2025 it replayed user session tokens, likely taken from browser files, through those implants into Microsoft 365, downloaded SharePoint files, registered a new MFA device on one account and enumerated the directory and mail through Microsoft Graph. How it first reached the Azure environments, which identity made the Graph calls and the victims' names are not stated.

What happened

External Parties
Command infrastructure
Internet
Microsoft Entra IDsession tokens, user sign-in
VMware
On-premises VMware estate
Microsoft 365
Microsoft 365 tenant
Edge devices
vCenter servers
Domain controllers
ESXi hosts and VMs
SharePoint and OneDrive
Entra ID directory

Replaying the WARP PANDA intrusions, reported December 2025

  1. 1

    Edge devices, then vCenter

    Late 2023 in one intrusion; other dates not stated

    The actor exploits internet-facing edge devices, then reaches vCenter with valid credentials or vCenter flaws and plants web shells and BRICKSTORM there.

  2. 2

    Hypervisor control

    Not stated per intrusion; vCenter intrusions seen throughout 2025

    From vCenter the actor moves to the ESXi hosts over SSH, clones domain controller VMs and sends out archives staged from VM snapshots.

  3. 3

    Replayed sessions into Microsoft 365

    Late summer 2025

    Stolen user session tokens are replayed through BRICKSTORM tunnels to Microsoft 365, and SharePoint files of the network engineering and incident response teams are downloaded.

  4. 4

    Persistence and discovery in Entra ID

    2025; no day is stated

    A new MFA device is registered on a user account, and in another intrusion Microsoft Graph enumerates service principals, applications, users, directory roles and emails.

Impact

Per CrowdStrike, the actor cloned domain controller VMs, exfiltrated data staged from VM snapshots, accessed email accounts of employees in at least one intrusion, used access to several entities' Azure environments primarily to reach Microsoft 365 data in OneDrive, SharePoint and Exchange, and downloaded SharePoint files of one entity's network engineering and incident response teams. Victim names and counts are not given.

Outcome

Where Microsoft Entra controls fit

The first two phases ran on edge appliances and VMware systems in your own data centers, where no cloud-provider control reaches: patching the appliances, reaching vCenter only through an identity provider that requires MFA, as CrowdStrike recommends, and watching your own egress are yours to run. In Microsoft 365, a Conditional Access sign-in frequency for Office 365 and the SharePoint block on unmanaged devices would have bounded how long and how much a replayed session took, though the sources do not say how old the tokens were or which device they came from. A Conditional Access policy that requires a phishing-resistant sign-in to register security information, with only passkeys enabled, would have narrowed the MFA device registration. Turning off Read other users and scoping application mail access to a set of mailboxes would have bounded the Graph enumeration, though the identity that made the calls is not stated.

Could this have been prevented?

In hindsight, no control would have stopped it. 6 controls would have limited how far it went. 5 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.

0
Prevented
6
Contained
5
Not covered

How it could have been prevented

The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.

External Parties
Command infrastructure
Internet
Microsoft Entra IDsession tokens, user sign-in
VMware
On-premises VMware estate
Microsoft 365
Microsoft 365 tenant
Edge devices
vCenter servers
Domain controllers
ESXi hosts and VMs
SharePoint and OneDrive
Entra ID directory

Replaying the WARP PANDA intrusions, reported December 2025

1 · Edge devices, then vCenter

2 Not covered

2 · Hypervisor control

3 Not covered

3 · Replayed sessions into Microsoft 365

2 Contained

4 · Persistence and discovery in Entra ID

4 Contained6 on other clouds

Key facts

  • CrowdStrike published its report on December 4, 2025, drawn from CrowdStrike Services intrusion investigations; it named no victim and gave no count
  • In summer 2025 CrowdStrike identified several vCenter intrusions at U.S. legal, technology and manufacturing entities; in one intrusion the actor kept long-term access, with initial access in late 2023
  • The actor often gained entry by exploiting internet-facing edge devices, reached vCenter with valid credentials or vCenter flaws, and used the vCenter-managed vpxuser account over SSH to reach ESXi hosts
  • It cloned domain controller VMs, which CrowdStrike assessed was likely to collect Active Directory data, and sent archives staged from VM snapshots out over its command channel
  • In late summer 2025 it replayed user session tokens, likely taken from browser files, through BRICKSTORM implants into Microsoft 365 and downloaded SharePoint files of one entity's network engineering and incident response teams
  • In at least one case it registered a new MFA device with an Authenticator app code; in another intrusion it used Microsoft Graph to enumerate service principals, applications, users, directory roles and emails

Sources

Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.

  1. 1.
    Unveiling WARP PANDA: A New Sophisticated China-Nexus AdversaryCrowdStrike · Dec 4, 2025 · ResearchInitial access, vCenter and ESXi activity, domain controller cloning, data staging, Microsoft 365 session replay, MFA device registration, Microsoft Graph enumeration, timeframes

The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of attack stages; the victim's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the incident. They are not an assessment of the victim's security program.

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