What happened
Replaying the Peach Sandstorm April 2024 intrusion
- 1
Password spray
April–May 2024Passwords sprayed with the go-http-client user agent open Microsoft Entra accounts, which the group then signs in to from commercial VPN infrastructure.
- 2
Azure in the education tenants
April–July 2024With compromised education-sector accounts the group reaches or creates Azure subscriptions, and Azure resources in them, with 16 azurewebsites.net hostnames, serve as Tickler C2; tenants the group made itself hold Azure for Students subscriptions used the same way.
- 3
Tickler in target networks
April–July 2024 · SMB and AD snapshot not datedTickler on target machines in the US and the UAE sends network information to the C2 by HTTP POST and takes commands; the group moves over SMB at a European defense organization and takes an AD snapshot at a Middle East satellite operator.
Azure subscriptions in compromised education-sector tenants, and in tenants the group made, hosted the C2 for a backdoor used against satellite, communications equipment, oil and gas and government targets in the US and the UAE, with 16 azurewebsites.net C2 hostnames; the group moved over SMB at a European defense organization and took an AD snapshot at a Middle East satellite operator. No count of accounts, tenants or subscriptions is stated.
Where cloud-provider controls fit
In your Microsoft Entra tenant, a Conditional Access policy that requires multifactor authentication for every user, with security information registration limited to trusted locations or compliant devices, refuses a sign-in with a guessed password; no source says whether these accounts had MFA. Microsoft Entra Password Protection caps how many sprayed guesses can match a password. In Azure, an Azure Policy assignment at the tenant root management group that denies the resource types you have not approved limits what a compromised account can create, even in a newly created subscription; it refuses the web app only where you have not approved App Service, and no source says whether these organizations ran it. That the C2 ran on App Service is inferred from its azurewebsites.net hostnames. A Conditional Access block on Azure management for accounts outside your administrators caps who can use an existing subscription. Creating a subscription through billing, the group's own tenants and the target networks where Tickler ran stay outside these controls.
Could this have been prevented?
In hindsight, not as a whole. 1 control would have refused a step outright, and 3 controls would have limited one. 5 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.
- 1
- Prevented
- 3
- Contained
- 5
- Not covered
How it could have been prevented
The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.
Replaying the Peach Sandstorm April 2024 intrusion
1 · Password spray
1 Prevented1 Contained6 on other clouds2 · Azure in the education tenants
2 Contained2 Not covered6 on other clouds3 · Tickler in target networks
3 Not coveredKey facts
- Microsoft said the group had sprayed passwords against thousands of organizations since at least February 2023
- In April and May 2024 the group sprayed passwords, with the go-http-client user agent, at defense, space, education and government organizations in the US and Australia, then signed in to compromised accounts from commercial VPN infrastructure
- With compromised education-sector accounts the group accessed existing Azure subscriptions or created one; it also created tenants of its own with Microsoft Outlook accounts and Azure for Students subscriptions in them
- Azure resources in those subscriptions, with 16 azurewebsites.net hostnames, served as C2 for Tickler, deployed between April and July 2024 against satellite, communications equipment, oil and gas and government targets in the US and the UAE
- At a European defense organization the group moved laterally over SMB, and at a Middle East satellite operator a ZIP file sent in a Microsoft Teams message was followed by an Active Directory snapshot; neither is dated
- Microsoft published its account on August 28, 2024, notified affected organizations and disrupted the fraudulent Azure infrastructure and accounts; it gave no count of compromised accounts, tenants or subscriptions
Sources
Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.
- 1.Peach Sandstorm deploys new custom Tickler malware in long-running intelligence gathering operationsMicrosoft Threat Intelligence (Microsoft Security Blog) · Aug 28, 2024 · Researchpassword spray, sign-in source, education-sector accounts, Azure subscription access and creation, attacker-created tenants and Azure for Students subscriptions, Azure resources as C2, C2 hostnames, Tickler samples, SMB lateral movement, AD snapshot via Teams, disruption, attribution, mitigations
- 2.Peach Sandstorm password spray campaigns enable intelligence collection at high-value targetsMicrosoft Threat Intelligence (Microsoft Security Blog) · Sep 14, 2023 · Researchearlier campaign context: password sprays from February 2023 and an Azure subscription created in a target tenant (2023)
- 3.APT33 Iranian hacking group uses new Tickler malware to backdoor US govt, defense orgsBleepingComputer · Aug 28, 2024 · Newssecondary restatement, Azure sign-in MFA requirement from October 15, 2024
The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of attack stages; the victim's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the incident. They are not an assessment of the victim's security program.