What happened
Replaying the Peach Sandstorm 2023 password spray campaign
- 1
Password spray and exploits
February–July 2023 · exploit attempts not datedPasswords sprayed from TOR at thousands of environments sign in to some Microsoft Entra accounts; in a second path, public exploits are tried against on-premises Zoho ManageEngine products and Confluence servers, with no stated outcome.
- 2
Entra reconnaissance
2023, month not statedIn a small subset of successful sign-ins, AzureHound or Roadtools collect Microsoft Entra ID and Azure Resource Manager data through Microsoft Graph and Azure REST APIs.
- 3
Azure persistence
2023, month not statedThe group creates a new Azure subscription in a target's tenant to talk to its infrastructure, and connects a device in the target's environment to its own subscription with Azure Arc.
- 4
Golden SAML
March 2023In one intrusion, private keys stolen from the target's on-premises AD FS server mint SAML tokens that the target's Microsoft 365 environment trusts; how the group reached the server is not stated.
- 5
Footholds and tunnel
2023, month not statedIn a handful of environments a new VM in a compromised Azure subscription runs EagleRelay to tunnel traffic; on hosts, AnyDesk and a VMWare DLL search order hijack keep access, and an RDP lateral movement is attempted.
Password sprays from TOR tried accounts in thousands of environments; in a subset the group mapped Microsoft Entra ID, created an Azure subscription in the target's tenant, tied a device to its own subscription with Azure Arc, minted SAML tokens with AD FS keys stolen in a March 2023 intrusion, ran EagleRelay on a VM in a compromised subscription and, in a small number of intrusions, exfiltrated data. No victim and no count of accounts, tenants or subscriptions is stated.
Where Microsoft Entra and Azure controls fit
In your Microsoft Entra tenant, a Conditional Access policy that requires multifactor authentication for every user, with security information registration outside trusted locations held to an authentication strength or a compliant device, refuses a sign-in with a sprayed password; no source says whether these accounts had MFA. Microsoft Entra Password Protection caps how many guesses can match a password. Converting a federated domain to cloud authentication removes the AD FS trust, so a token minted with stolen AD FS keys signs in no one; rejecting the federated MFA claim under a Conditional Access MFA policy makes Microsoft Entra ID ask for its own second factor, so a token minted for a user with a registered method does not complete the sign-in; the sources do not say which users the tokens named. An Azure Policy assignment that denies virtual machines outside the scopes where you run them bounds where a VM such as the EagleRelay one can be created; the sources do not say whether the compromised subscription was one of those scopes. Conditional Access on Azure management caps who can use a subscription, and tenant restrictions v2 refuses an Azure Arc onboarding that signs in on the device with another tenant's identity; the sources do not say how the agent was onboarded. Creating a subscription through billing, the AD FS server itself and the target's hosts and on-premises applications stay outside these controls.
Could this have been prevented?
In hindsight, not as a whole. 2 controls would have refused a step outright, and 8 controls would have limited one. 5 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.
- 2
- Prevented
- 8
- Contained
- 5
- Not covered
How it could have been prevented
The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.
Replaying the Peach Sandstorm 2023 password spray campaign
1 · Password spray and exploits
1 Prevented1 Contained1 Not covered6 on other clouds2 · Entra reconnaissance
2 Contained3 on other clouds3 · Azure persistence
2 Contained1 Not covered3 on other clouds4 · Golden SAML
1 Prevented1 Contained1 Not covered3 on other clouds5 · Footholds and tunnel
2 Contained2 Not covered3 on other cloudsKey facts
- From February to July 2023 the group sprayed passwords from TOR IP addresses at thousands of environments; in late May and June the activity ran almost only between 9:00 and 17:00 Iran Standard Time
- In a small subset of successful sign-ins the group used AzureHound or Roadtools to collect Microsoft Entra ID and Azure Resource Manager data
- The group created a new Azure subscription in a target's tenant, and installed the Azure Arc client on a device in a compromised environment and connected it to a subscription it controlled
- In a March 2023 intrusion the group stole private keys from an on-premises AD FS server and minted SAML tokens trusted by the target's Microsoft 365 environment; how it reached the server is not stated
- In a handful of environments the group created a VM in a compromised Azure subscription and ran EagleRelay on it to tunnel traffic; in a small number of intrusions it exfiltrated data
- Microsoft published its account on September 14, 2023 and said it notifies customers the group targeted or compromised; it gave no count of compromised accounts, tenants or subscriptions
Sources
Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.
- 1.Peach Sandstorm password spray campaigns enable intelligence collection at high-value targetsMicrosoft Threat Intelligence (Microsoft Security Blog) · Sep 14, 2023 · Researchpassword spray, spray source and timing, Entra ID reconnaissance, Azure subscription creation, Azure Arc persistence, ManageEngine and Confluence exploitation attempts, AnyDesk, Golden SAML via AD FS, VMWare search order hijack, EagleRelay on a VM in a compromised subscription, RDP lateral movement attempt, data exfiltration, attribution, notification, mitigations
The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of attack stages; the victim's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the incident. They are not an assessment of the victim's security program.