What happened
Replaying MERCURY and DEV-1084, reported April 2023
- 1
On-premises foothold
Not stated · weeks or months before the destructionMERCURY likely exploits an unpatched internet-facing application; the actors then keep access with web shells and a PowerShell backdoor and move laterally with stolen credentials.
- 2
The sync server's cloud password
Not stated · about two weeks before the ransomwareA compromised privileged account reaches the Azure AD Connect server over an SSH tunnel, and Microsoft assesses with high confidence that AADInternals extracts both connector accounts' plaintext passwords.
- 3
Global Administrator in the cloud
Not stated · shortly before the ransomwareThe single-factor connector account signs in from a known MERCURY address, a second Global Administrator is used through an open RDP session, Global Administrator is claimed through PIM, and access is elevated to the subscriptions.
- 4
Destruction and mailbox access
Not stated · deletions on the day of the ransomwareServer farms, virtual machines, storage accounts and virtual networks are deleted within a few hours, an OAuth application with the actors' certificates reads many mailboxes, and mail goes out from a senior employee's mailbox.
- 5
Ransomware on-premises
Not statedFrom the domain controllers, the actors disable security tools through Group Policy and start DARKBIT ransomware with a GPO scheduled task.
Server farms, virtual machines, storage accounts and virtual networks in Azure were deleted within a few hours, many mailboxes were read through an OAuth application, email was sent from a senior employee's mailbox, and on-premises files were encrypted. Microsoft assessed the goal as destruction and disruption, with the ransomware as cover.
Where cloud-provider controls fit
In your Microsoft Entra tenant, a Conditional Access policy that blocks the Azure AD Connector account from outside the sync server's named location limits the stolen password to the sync server's addresses for as long as the policy stands, and Entra Connect application-based authentication, generally available since July 2025, leaves no cloud password on the server to take. A sign-in frequency session control and Privileged Identity Management approval cap how long an open administrator session and the Global Administrator role can be used, and no Azure setting refuses the elevation that follows. In Azure, an Azure Policy assignment with the denyAction effect and locked immutability policies bound the deletions; in Exchange Online, an app management policy, Conditional Access for workload identities and Microsoft Purview privileged access management bound the mailbox access and the delegation. A Global Administrator can turn most of these off first. The internet-facing application, the domain, the Azure AD Connect server and the ransomware stay with your own on-premises and endpoint layers.
Could this have been prevented?
In hindsight, no control would have stopped it. 9 controls would have limited how far it went. 7 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.
- 0
- Prevented
- 9
- Contained
- 7
- Not covered
How it could have been prevented
The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.
Replaying MERCURY and DEV-1084, reported April 2023
1 · On-premises foothold
2 Not covered2 · The sync server's cloud password
1 Contained1 Not covered3 · Global Administrator in the cloud
3 Contained2 Not covered3 on other clouds4 · Destruction and mailbox access
5 Contained1 Not covered3 on other clouds5 · Ransomware on-premises
1 Not coveredKey facts
- Microsoft assessed with moderate confidence that MERCURY likely exploited known vulnerabilities in an unpatched internet-facing application, then handed access to DEV-1084; the post names neither the application nor the flaw
- About two weeks before the ransomware deployment, a compromised privileged account reached the Azure AD Connect server over an SSH tunnel, and Microsoft assessed with high confidence that AADInternals was used to extract the plaintext passwords of the AD DS Connector and Azure AD Connector accounts
- The Azure AD Connector account held Global Administrator with single-factor authentication, which the post ties to an older synchronization setup, and it was signed in to from a known MERCURY IP address on the first attempt
- A second Global Administrator account with MFA was used through an open RDP session, and the actors claimed Global Administrator through Azure Privileged Identity Management and elevated access to the management groups and subscriptions
- With the two Global Administrator accounts the actors deleted server farms, virtual machines, storage accounts and virtual networks within a few hours, and an OAuth application given full_access_as_app read many mailboxes and ran thousands of searches
- DARKBIT ransomware was staged in NETLOGON shares and started through a Group Policy scheduled task; Microsoft published its account on April 7, 2023 with no calendar date for any step
Sources
Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.
- 1.MERCURY and DEV-1084 - Destructive attack on hybrid environmentMicrosoft Threat Intelligence · Apr 7, 2023 · ResearchInitial access, on-premises persistence and lateral movement, Azure AD Connect credential extraction, connector account roles, cloud sign-ins, PIM activation and elevation, Azure resource deletion, OAuth application abuse in Exchange Online, Send on behalf grant, ransomware, mitigations, attribution
- 2.Iranian APT group launches destructive attacks in hybrid Azure AD environmentsCSO Online · Apr 11, 2023 · NewsAttribution context and the names of the remote access tools and the AADInternals feature from Microsoft's account
The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of attack stages; the victim's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the incident. They are not an assessment of the victim's security program.