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IntrusionOn-premises · Microsoft Entra · Azure
8 min read

MERCURY and DEV-1084 destruction of a hybrid Azure environment

Victim
An unnamed organization with a hybrid on-premises and Azure AD environment
When
not statedDisclosed Apr 7, 2023
Entry
Likely the exploitation of known vulnerabilities in an unpatched internet-facing application (moderate confidence), then the plaintext credentials of the Azure AD Connector account, which held Global Administrator with single-factor authentication, taken from the Azure AD Connect server.

Microsoft Threat Intelligence reported on April 7, 2023 that MERCURY, which it links to Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security, likely worked with DEV-1084 against the hybrid environment of an unnamed organization. After a foothold that Microsoft assesses with moderate confidence came through an unpatched internet-facing application, the actors likely extracted the Azure AD Connector account's password from the Azure AD Connect server, signed in to that single-factor Global Administrator account, used a second Global Administrator through an open RDP session, deleted Azure resources within a few hours, read mailboxes through an OAuth application and deployed DARKBIT ransomware on-premises. Microsoft gives no calendar date for any step and no counts.

What happened

External Parties
MERCURY infrastructure
Outside recipients
Internet
Azure AD (Entra ID)password, open session
On-premises AD
Azure AD Tenant
+ server farms
+ virtual machines
+ storage, networks
Azure Subscriptions
Internet-Facing App
Domain Controllers
RDP Session Host
Azure AD Connect
Second Global Admin
Connector Account
OAuth Application
Exchange Mailboxes

Replaying MERCURY and DEV-1084, reported April 2023

  1. 1

    On-premises foothold

    Not stated · weeks or months before the destruction

    MERCURY likely exploits an unpatched internet-facing application; the actors then keep access with web shells and a PowerShell backdoor and move laterally with stolen credentials.

  2. 2

    The sync server's cloud password

    Not stated · about two weeks before the ransomware

    A compromised privileged account reaches the Azure AD Connect server over an SSH tunnel, and Microsoft assesses with high confidence that AADInternals extracts both connector accounts' plaintext passwords.

  3. 3

    Global Administrator in the cloud

    Not stated · shortly before the ransomware

    The single-factor connector account signs in from a known MERCURY address, a second Global Administrator is used through an open RDP session, Global Administrator is claimed through PIM, and access is elevated to the subscriptions.

  4. 4

    Destruction and mailbox access

    Not stated · deletions on the day of the ransomware

    Server farms, virtual machines, storage accounts and virtual networks are deleted within a few hours, an OAuth application with the actors' certificates reads many mailboxes, and mail goes out from a senior employee's mailbox.

  5. 5

    Ransomware on-premises

    Not stated

    From the domain controllers, the actors disable security tools through Group Policy and start DARKBIT ransomware with a GPO scheduled task.

Impact

Server farms, virtual machines, storage accounts and virtual networks in Azure were deleted within a few hours, many mailboxes were read through an OAuth application, email was sent from a senior employee's mailbox, and on-premises files were encrypted. Microsoft assessed the goal as destruction and disruption, with the ransomware as cover.

Outcome

Where cloud-provider controls fit

In your Microsoft Entra tenant, a Conditional Access policy that blocks the Azure AD Connector account from outside the sync server's named location limits the stolen password to the sync server's addresses for as long as the policy stands, and Entra Connect application-based authentication, generally available since July 2025, leaves no cloud password on the server to take. A sign-in frequency session control and Privileged Identity Management approval cap how long an open administrator session and the Global Administrator role can be used, and no Azure setting refuses the elevation that follows. In Azure, an Azure Policy assignment with the denyAction effect and locked immutability policies bound the deletions; in Exchange Online, an app management policy, Conditional Access for workload identities and Microsoft Purview privileged access management bound the mailbox access and the delegation. A Global Administrator can turn most of these off first. The internet-facing application, the domain, the Azure AD Connect server and the ransomware stay with your own on-premises and endpoint layers.

Could this have been prevented?

In hindsight, no control would have stopped it. 9 controls would have limited how far it went. 7 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.

0
Prevented
9
Contained
7
Not covered

How it could have been prevented

The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.

External Parties
MERCURY infrastructure
Outside recipients
Internet
Azure AD (Entra ID)password, open session
On-premises AD
Azure AD Tenant
+ server farms
+ virtual machines
+ storage, networks
Azure Subscriptions
Internet-Facing App
Domain Controllers
RDP Session Host
Azure AD Connect
Second Global Admin
Connector Account
OAuth Application
Exchange Mailboxes

Replaying MERCURY and DEV-1084, reported April 2023

1 · On-premises foothold

2 Not covered

2 · The sync server's cloud password

1 Contained1 Not covered

3 · Global Administrator in the cloud

3 Contained2 Not covered3 on other clouds

4 · Destruction and mailbox access

5 Contained1 Not covered3 on other clouds

5 · Ransomware on-premises

1 Not covered

Key facts

  • Microsoft assessed with moderate confidence that MERCURY likely exploited known vulnerabilities in an unpatched internet-facing application, then handed access to DEV-1084; the post names neither the application nor the flaw
  • About two weeks before the ransomware deployment, a compromised privileged account reached the Azure AD Connect server over an SSH tunnel, and Microsoft assessed with high confidence that AADInternals was used to extract the plaintext passwords of the AD DS Connector and Azure AD Connector accounts
  • The Azure AD Connector account held Global Administrator with single-factor authentication, which the post ties to an older synchronization setup, and it was signed in to from a known MERCURY IP address on the first attempt
  • A second Global Administrator account with MFA was used through an open RDP session, and the actors claimed Global Administrator through Azure Privileged Identity Management and elevated access to the management groups and subscriptions
  • With the two Global Administrator accounts the actors deleted server farms, virtual machines, storage accounts and virtual networks within a few hours, and an OAuth application given full_access_as_app read many mailboxes and ran thousands of searches
  • DARKBIT ransomware was staged in NETLOGON shares and started through a Group Policy scheduled task; Microsoft published its account on April 7, 2023 with no calendar date for any step

Sources

Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.

  1. 1.
    MERCURY and DEV-1084 - Destructive attack on hybrid environmentMicrosoft Threat Intelligence · Apr 7, 2023 · ResearchInitial access, on-premises persistence and lateral movement, Azure AD Connect credential extraction, connector account roles, cloud sign-ins, PIM activation and elevation, Azure resource deletion, OAuth application abuse in Exchange Online, Send on behalf grant, ransomware, mitigations, attribution
  2. 2.
    Iranian APT group launches destructive attacks in hybrid Azure AD environmentsCSO Online · Apr 11, 2023 · NewsAttribution context and the names of the remote access tools and the AADInternals feature from Microsoft's account

The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of attack stages; the victim's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the incident. They are not an assessment of the victim's security program.

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