What was exposed
Replaying the Viacom August 2017 exposure
- 1
Configured: a bucket open to the internet
Before Aug 30, 2017; date not statedAn Amazon S3 bucket at the subdomain mcs-puppet is publicly downloadable; which setting opened it, who set it and when are not stated.
- 2
Reachable: 72 backups with cloud keys
Files dated Jun to Aug 30, 2017Anyone on the internet can download the 72 backups, roughly 1 GB per one source; they carry Viacom's AWS access key and secret key, GPG decryption keys and server passwords.
- 3
Found and closed: one day
Aug 30–31, 2017An UpGuard researcher finds the bucket; after a phone call and an email the next morning, Viacom secures it within hours.
72 Puppet configuration backups, roughly 1 GB per one source, with server passwords, Viacom's AWS access key and secret access key and GPG decryption keys, downloadable by anyone on the internet until Viacom secured the bucket on August 31, 2017; no employee or customer information per Viacom, and no access by anyone other than the finder is reported.
Where cloud-provider controls fit
Amazon S3 Block Public Access on the account, kept on by a service control policy, would have refused the ACL or bucket policy that opened mcs-puppet, and Object Ownership closes the ACL path only, while the sources do not say whether an ACL or a bucket policy opened the bucket; a resource control policy would have refused the anonymous download while the grant stood. Azure, Google Cloud and Oracle Cloud refuse the same opening with the anonymous-access setting, the public access prevention constraint and a Security Zone. If the exposed key was an IAM user access key, a service control policy that denies long-lived access keys would have issued no new cloud key for the backups, and one that denies calls signed with such a key bounds what a key already in them can do, in a member account of an organization; the sources say neither which kind of key it was nor whether the account was a member account. Google Cloud, Microsoft Entra and Oracle Cloud refuse the creation of their own static credentials the same way. The passwords and GPG keys inside the archives, the researcher's notice and your fix stay outside the provider's controls: your configuration management keeps secrets out of files, and the provider's checks report a public bucket rather than refuse it.
Could this have been prevented?
In hindsight, not as a whole. 2 controls would have refused a step outright, and 7 controls would have limited one. 2 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.
- 2
- Prevented
- 7
- Contained
- 2
- Not covered
How it could have been prevented
The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.
Replaying the Viacom August 2017 exposure
1 · Configured: a bucket open to the internet
1 Prevented2 Contained4 on other clouds2 · Reachable: 72 backups with cloud keys
1 Prevented5 Contained1 Not covered6 on other clouds3 · Found and closed: one day
1 Not coveredKey facts
- The bucket held 72 .tgz backup files created at irregular intervals from June 2017 to August 30, 2017, up to five or six a day; one source put the data at roughly 1 GB
- The files held passwords and server manifests, Viacom's AWS access key and secret access key, GPG decryption keys for backups, and Ruby scripts and YAML configuration files that reveal the applications in use
- UpGuard found the bucket on August 30, 2017, phoned a Viacom executive and emailed Viacom's chief information security officer on the morning of August 31, and Viacom secured the bucket within hours
- Which setting opened the bucket, who set it and how long it stood open were not stated; the file dates bound the backups, not the setting
- No source reported access by anyone other than the finder: Gizmodo saw no evidence of an intrusion, Viacom reported no material impact, and iTnews noted that neither company said whether the data was accessed
- Viacom's statement of September 19, 2017 said the server held technical information and no employee or customer information; whether the AWS keys were rotated was not stated
Sources
Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.
- 1.Cut Cord: How Viacom's Master Controls Were Left ExposedUpGuard · Sep 19, 2017 · ResearchDiscovery, bucket contents, backup dates, notification, fix window, MCS attribution
- 2.Viacom Leak May Have Exposed Hundreds of Digital Properties—Paramount Pictures, Comedy Central, MTV, and MoreGizmodo · Sep 19, 2017 · NewsViacom statement, notification path, data size, access by others, exposure length unknown
- 3.Viacom exposes crown jewels to world+dog in AWS S3 bucket blunderThe Register · Sep 19, 2017 · NewsViacom statement, bucket contents, public reachability
- 4.AWS Bucket Leaks Viacom Critical DataSecurityWeek · Sep 20, 2017 · NewsViacom statement, bucket contents, timeline, write-up attribution
- 5.Viacom left keys to its kingdom exposed on AWSiTnews · Sep 20, 2017 · NewsAccess by others, bucket purpose unconfirmed, bucket no longer public
The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of the exposure; the owner's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the data is exposed. They are not an assessment of the owner's security program.