Skip to main content
Back
ExposureAWS
6 min read

ES&S Chicago voter backups in a public S3 bucket

Owner
Election Systems & Software (Chicago voter data)
When
Not stated; for months before August 11, 2017, per news – Aug 12, 2017Disclosed Aug 17, 2017
Entry
An Amazon S3 bucket that held Election Systems & Software backups of the Chicago voter database was configured for public access; which setting opened it and who set it are not stated.

Election Systems & Software (ES&S), the electronic poll book vendor of the Chicago Board of Election Commissioners, kept backups of the Chicago voter database in an Amazon S3 bucket that its finder describes as configured for public access: about 1.8 million voters with names, addresses, dates of birth, partial Social Security numbers and, for many, driver's license or state ID numbers. An UpGuard researcher found it on August 11, 2017 (ES&S dates the find to August 12), UpGuard notified election officials, and ES&S secured the files that evening, about four hours after it was alerted. How long the files were public is not determined, news reports say months, and ES&S says its investigation found no evidence of misuse.

What was exposed

External Parties
UpGuard
Election officials
Internet
ES&S Backups · Amazon S3
Voter Backup Bucket
Voter Database Copies
Database File · 12 GB
Encrypted Passwords

Replaying the ES&S August 2017 exposure

  1. 1

    Configured: voter backups open to the internet

    Not stated; before August 11, 2017

    ES&S keeps backups of the Chicago voter database in an S3 bucket configured for public access; which setting opened it, who set it and when are not stated.

  2. 2

    Reachable: 1.8 million voter records at a public address

    Until the evening of August 12, 2017; start not stated

    Anyone with the bucket's web address can download almost all of its contents with no credential: copies of a voter database of about 1.8 million Chicago voters.

  3. 3

    Found and closed: secured hours after the alert

    August 11–12, 2017

    An UpGuard researcher finds the bucket and downloads the backups; election officials pass the notice to ES&S, which secures the files that evening.

Impact

Backups covering about 1.8 million Chicago voters, with names, addresses, dates of birth, the last four digits of Social Security numbers and, for many, driver's license or state ID numbers, were downloadable by anyone with the bucket's web address until the evening of August 12, 2017; how long they were public is not determined, and whether anyone other than the finder read them is not stated, with ES&S saying it found no evidence of misuse.

Outcome

Where cloud-provider controls fit

Amazon S3 Block Public Access on the account, or set for every account by an organization policy, would have refused the ACL or bucket policy that opened the bucket. Object Ownership would have closed the ACL path only, and the sources do not say whether an ACL opened it; a service control policy would have kept the write to approved administrators. While the grant stood, a resource control policy or the same block would have refused the anonymous download. Each of these controls, in the form described, came after this exposure. Azure and Google Cloud refuse the same opening with the anonymous-access setting and the public access prevention constraint, and Oracle Cloud with a Security Zone. Finding a public bucket and closing it stay your job: the provider's checks report a public bucket rather than refuse it.

Could this have been prevented?

In hindsight, not as a whole. 1 control would have refused a step outright, and 4 controls would have limited one. 2 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.

1
Prevented
4
Contained
2
Not covered

How it could have been prevented

The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.

External Parties
UpGuard
Election officials
Internet
ES&S Backups · Amazon S3
Voter Backup Bucket
Voter Database Copies
Database File · 12 GB
Encrypted Passwords

Replaying the ES&S August 2017 exposure

1 · Configured: voter backups open to the internet

1 Prevented2 Contained3 on other clouds

2 · Reachable: 1.8 million voter records at a public address

2 Contained3 on other clouds

3 · Found and closed: secured hours after the alert

2 Not covered

Key facts

  • The bucket's backup files were downloadable by anyone with its web address and no credential; which setting opened it, who set it and when were not stated, and ES&S's chief executive later said the data was placed with incorrect security settings
  • The files included a 12 GB database file and, in each of two backup folders, a 2.6 GB and a 1.3 GB copy of the same voter database, whose voters table listed about 1.864 million Chicago voters
  • The last four digits of Social Security numbers appeared for all voters in the table, and driver's license and phone numbers for most; ES&S said the files held no ballot information or vote totals
  • AP reported a year later that the files also held roughly a dozen encrypted passwords for ES&S employee accounts; ES&S said they opened only its Amazon cloud account and that there was no unauthorized access
  • An UpGuard researcher found the bucket on August 11, 2017, and ES&S's notice dated the find to August 12; on August 12 UpGuard notified election officials, who passed the notice to ES&S, and ES&S secured the files and shut down the AWS server that evening, about four hours after it was alerted
  • How long the files were public was not determined: CBS Chicago said about six months and AP said months, neither naming the source; ES&S said its investigation and two Dark Web searches found no evidence of misuse

Sources

Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.

  1. 1.
    The Chicago Way: An Electronic Voting Firm Exposes 1.8M ChicagoansUpGuard · Aug 17, 2017 · ResearchPublic access by the bucket's web address, the bucket's owner, the backup folders and files with their sizes, the voters table and its fields, the row count, discovery on August 11, 2017, the notice to the municipality, the closure on the evening of August 12, 2017
  2. 2.
    ES&S Confirms Discovery of Back-Up Data by Security ResearcherElection Systems & Software (hosted by the Chicago Board of Election Commissioners) · Aug 17, 2017 · Vendor reportBackup files for electronic poll books stored on AWS, the researcher's download, the data fields and count, the notice to state and local authorities on August 12, 2017, the files secured and the server shut down that evening, the third-party forensic investigation, no ballot data
  3. 3.
    Update on Electronic Poll Book Voter Information DataElection Systems & Software (hosted by the Chicago Board of Election Commissioners) · undated · Vendor reportThe discovery date as ES&S gives it, the remedy within hours, the server taken off-line, the forensic investigation, Dark Web searches by two third-party vendors, no evidence of misuse found, the Board's systems not exposed, identity protection for one year
  4. 4.
    Don't panic, Chicago, but an AWS S3 config blunder exposed 1.8 million voter recordsThe Register · Aug 17, 2017 · NewsThe time ES&S says it was alerted on August 12, 2017, the take-down four hours later, the bucket open to the public by accident, no other cities found
  5. 5.
    Entire Chicago Voter File, Appended With SSNs & Birthdays, Left On Unsecured ServerThe Daily Line · Aug 18, 2017 · NewsThe Board notified by 5:30 p.m. and the file secured by 9:44 p.m. on Saturday, August 12, 2017, the forensic firm ES&S retained, the exposure duration not determined
  6. 6.
    2 Investigators: How The Breach In Chicago Voter Data Was FoundCBS Chicago · Oct 23, 2017 · NewsIncorrect security settings as ES&S's chief executive puts it, the error missed by managers, about six months online (not attributed), discovery on August 11, 2017, download possible with any browser
  7. 7.
    US Election Integrity Depends on Security-Challenged FirmsAssociated Press (via SecurityWeek) · Oct 29, 2018 · NewsExposed for months, roughly a dozen encrypted passwords for ES&S employee accounts, which ES&S says were used only for its Amazon cloud account, no unauthorized access as ES&S states it

The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of the exposure; the owner's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the data is exposed. They are not an assessment of the owner's security program.

More cloud attack breakdowns

All breakdowns