What was exposed
Replaying the Accenture September 2017 exposure
- 1
Configured: four buckets open to the internet
Before Sep 17, 2017; date not statedFour Amazon S3 buckets of the Accenture Cloud Platform are configured for public access; which setting opened them, who set it and when are not stated.
- 2
Reachable: cloud keys, VPN keys, database dumps
Until 18 or Sep 19, 2017; start not statedAnyone on the internet can download the four buckets: a plaintext AWS KMS master access key, VPN keys, key stores, and 137 GB of dumps in acp-software with nearly 40,000 plaintext passwords in one backup.
- 3
Found and closed: within two days
Sep 17–19, 2017UpGuard finds the four buckets and notifies Accenture, which secures them on September 19 by UpGuard's account or September 18 by Threatpost's.
Four buckets with the plaintext master access key for Accenture's AWS Key Management Service account, Identity API credentials, VPN keys, key stores and private keys, and 137 GB of database dumps in acp-software with nearly 40,000 plaintext passwords in one backup, downloadable by anyone on the internet until Accenture secured them on September 19, 2017 by UpGuard's account (September 18 by Threatpost's); Accenture said UpGuard was the only non-authorized visitor, and no source reports misuse.
Where cloud-provider controls fit
Amazon S3 Block Public Access on the account would have refused the ACL or bucket policy that opened the four buckets. Object Ownership closes the ACL path only, and a service control policy narrows who can change the grants and the block; the sources do not say which setting opened the buckets or who set it. A resource control policy would have refused the anonymous download while the grant stood. Azure, Google Cloud and Oracle Cloud refuse the same opening with the anonymous-access setting, the public access prevention constraint and a Security Zone. A service control policy that denies long-lived access keys refuses new keys of that class only: it does not reach a key that already exists, and the sources do not say what class the exposed key was. The Enstratus keys, the VPN keys, the key stores and the passwords in the database dumps stay outside the provider's controls, and so do the researcher's notice and your fix: your application and your backup jobs keep secrets out of files, and the provider's checks report a public bucket rather than refuse it.
Could this have been prevented?
In hindsight, not as a whole. 1 control would have refused a step outright, and 11 controls would have limited one. 6 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.
- 1
- Prevented
- 11
- Contained
- 6
- Not covered
How it could have been prevented
The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.
Replaying the Accenture September 2017 exposure
1 · Configured: four buckets open to the internet
1 Prevented2 Contained4 on other clouds2 · Reachable: cloud keys, VPN keys, database dumps
9 Contained4 Not covered12 on other clouds3 · Found and closed: within two days
2 Not covered3 on other cloudsKey facts
- Four Amazon S3 buckets, acp-deployment, acpcollector, acp-software and acp-ssl, were configured for public access and downloadable by anyone who entered their web addresses; which setting opened them, who set it and when were not stated
- acp-deployment held a plaintext document with the master access key for Accenture's AWS Key Management Service account, Identity API credentials and client.jks files with private signing keys
- acp-software was 137 GB; one of its database backups held nearly 40,000 plaintext passwords, and it also held Enstratus access keys and credentials for apparent Google and Azure accounts
- acpcollector held VPN keys that UpGuard said were used in production; acp-ssl held key stores, private keys and certificates
- UpGuard found the buckets on September 17, 2017; by its account an analysis on September 18 prompted the notice and the buckets were secured the next day, while Threatpost reported a notice on September 17 and a fix a day later
- Accenture said UpGuard was the only non-authorized visitor while its forensic review continued, that no active credentials were compromised and that the data was not production data; no source reported misuse
Sources
Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.
- 1.System Shock: How A Cloud Leak Exposed Accenture's BusinessUpGuard · Oct 10, 2017 · ResearchDiscovery date, finder, bucket names, contents, acp-software size, plaintext password count, notification trigger, closure
- 2.Internal Accenture Data, Customer Information Exposed in Public Amazon S3 BucketThreatpost · Oct 10, 2017 · NewsAccenture statement, notification date, closure a day after notification
- 3.Et tu Accenture? Then fall S3er: Consultancy giant leaks private keys, emails and more onlineThe Register · Oct 10, 2017 · NewsAccenture statement, discovery date, public reachability
- 4.Accenture left four servers of sensitive data completely unprotectedEngadget · Oct 10, 2017 · NewsAccenture statements to ZDNet: other access, forensic review, data age
- 5.Accenture left vast swathes of private data on exposed serversSilicon Republic · Oct 11, 2017 · NewsAccenture statement, other access as Accenture states it, discovery date
- 6.Consulting Giant Accenture Left Critical Data Exposed on Amazon S3AWS Insider · Oct 10, 2017 · NewsClosure date, Accenture confirmation, AWS reminder to review bucket configurations
The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of the exposure; the owner's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the data is exposed. They are not an assessment of the owner's security program.