What was exposed
Replaying the CENTCOM and PACOM September 2017 exposure
- 1
Configured: three buckets open to any AWS account
Not stated; before September 2017Three S3 buckets grant browse and download rights to any AWS global authenticated user, any holder of a free AWS account; which setting carried the grant, who set it and when are not stated.
- 2
Reachable: scraped-post archives for any AWS account
Until October 1, 2017 at the latest; start not statedAny AWS account can browse and download the three buckets: scraped internet posts, at least 1.8 billion in one bucket, and a contractor's Settings table, Outpost configurations and Lucene indexes; the only read the sources describe is the finder's.
- 3
Found and closed: secured by October 1
September to October 1, 2017An UpGuard researcher finds the buckets in September 2017, downloads samples and alerts the Defense Department, which secures the data by October 1 as he tells CNN; how the buckets were secured is not stated.
Archives of scraped internet posts, at least 1.8 billion in one bucket by UpGuard's conservative estimate, and a contractor's configurations, developer list and search indexes could be browsed and downloaded by any holder of an AWS account until they were secured, by October 1, 2017 as the finder told CNN; when the exposure began is not stated, CNN reports no indication that malicious attackers accessed the data, and CENTCOM says it was accessed via unauthorized means.
Where cloud-provider controls fit
Amazon S3 Block Public Access on the account, or set for every account by an organization policy, would have refused the grant to every AWS account holder, whether an ACL or a bucket policy carried it. Object Ownership would have closed the ACL path, and the sources do not say which path the grant took; a service control policy would have kept ACL and bucket policy writes to approved administrators. While the grant stood, a resource control policy that keeps your buckets to your organization's principals, or the IgnorePublicAcls and RestrictPublicBuckets settings of the same block, would have kept outside AWS accounts from reading. Each of these, in the form described, dates from after this exposure. Azure has no grant to every account holder and refuses its nearest opening, anonymous access, with an account setting; Google Cloud refuses the same grant with the public access prevention constraint, and Oracle Cloud refuses a public bucket, which is anonymous access, with a Security Zone. Finding an open bucket and closing it stay your job as the owner: the provider's checks report such a bucket rather than refuse it.
Could this have been prevented?
In hindsight, not as a whole. 1 control would have refused a step outright, and 4 controls would have limited one. 2 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.
- 1
- Prevented
- 4
- Contained
- 2
- Not covered
How it could have been prevented
The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.
Replaying the CENTCOM and PACOM September 2017 exposure
1 · Configured: three buckets open to any AWS account
1 Prevented2 Contained3 on other clouds2 · Reachable: scraped-post archives for any AWS account
2 Contained3 on other clouds3 · Found and closed: secured by October 1
2 Not coveredKey facts
- Three Amazon S3 buckets tied to CENTCOM and PACOM were configured to allow any AWS global authenticated user to browse and download their contents; such an AWS account could be had with a free sign-up, per UpGuard
- Which setting carried the grant (a bucket ACL, object ACLs or a bucket policy), who set it and when were not stated
- The CENTCOM archive bucket held scraped internet posts in XML, conservatively at least 1.8 billion by UpGuard's estimate, from 2009 to posts collected in February 2017; the CENTCOM backup bucket held a contractor's Settings table naming developers with access, Outpost development configurations, an API and Lucene search indexes; the PACOM archive bucket was built like the CENTCOM archive, with more Southeast and East Asian posts
- An UpGuard researcher found the buckets on September 6, 2017 (September 2 in Threatpost) while scanning publicly accessible S3 buckets, downloaded 400 GB of samples and estimated dozens of terabytes in all
- The researcher said he alerted Defense Department officials in mid-September and that the data was secured by October 1, 2017; a CENTCOM statement dated the notice to October, and how the buckets were secured was not stated
- CNN reported no indication that malicious attackers accessed the data; CENTCOM said it was accessed via unauthorized means, called it raw, publicly available information that was not sensitive, and said it implemented additional security measures
Sources
Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.
- 1.Dark Cloud: Inside The Pentagon's Leaked Internet Surveillance ArchiveUpGuard · Nov 17, 2017 · Researchdiscovery on September 6, 2017, the global authenticated-user grant on three Amazon S3 buckets, free AWS sign-up, bucket contents (Settings table, Outpost configurations and API, Lucene indexes, scraped XML posts), the estimate of at least 1.8 billion posts, post dates from 2009 to February 2017, the contractor named inside the data, the notice to the Defense Department and the closure
- 2.Massive US military social media spying archive left wide open in AWS S3 bucketsThe Register · Nov 17, 2017 · Newshow the finder came on the buckets, 400 GB of samples downloaded, the finder's estimate of dozens of terabytes, the buckets locked down after the notice, CENTCOM's lack of comment
- 3.Pentagon exposed some of its data on Amazon serverCNN Money (via CBS San Francisco) · Nov 17, 2017 · Newsthe alert in mid-September 2017 and the closure by October 1, 2017 as the finder stated them, no indication of access by malicious attackers, the CENTCOM statement on access via unauthorized means and additional security measures
- 4.CENTCOM Says Massive Data Cache Found on Leaky Server is BenignThreatpost · Nov 20, 2017 · Newsthe September 2 discovery date attributed to UpGuard, CENTCOM's prepared statement dating the notice to October 2017 and calling the data raw, publicly available and not sensitive
The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of the exposure; the owner's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the data is exposed. They are not an assessment of the owner's security program.