What was exposed
Replaying the Verizon DVS September 2017 exposure
- 1
Configured: an engineer's bucket open to the internet
Not stated; before September 20, 2017An S3 bucket of Verizon Wireless DVS files, self-owned by an engineer, is configured so that anyone on the internet can access it; which setting opened it, who set it and when are not stated.
- 2
Reachable: about 100 MB of internal files and credentials
Until shortly after September 21, 2017; start not statedAnyone on the internet can read about 100 MB of DVS files, some with usernames and passwords for internal systems, plus 129 saved Outlook messages and infrastructure details; the finder's is the only read the sources describe.
- 3
Found and closed: taken down shortly after the notice
September 20–21, 2017; takedown date not statedKromtech finds the bucket on September 20, identifies the alleged owner from the files and emails a notice on September 21; the archive is taken down shortly after, and who acted is not stated.
About 100 MB of Verizon Wireless DVS files labeled confidential, some with usernames and passwords for internal systems, plus 129 saved Outlook messages and infrastructure details, were readable by anyone on the internet until shortly after the notice of September 21, 2017; the finder read them, whether anyone else did and whether the credentials were valid, rotated or used are not stated, and no customer data was involved, per the finder.
Where cloud-provider controls fit
Amazon S3 Block Public Access on the account or the bucket, or set for every account by an organization policy, would have refused the setting that opened this bucket, whether an ACL or a bucket policy. Object Ownership would have closed the ACL path, and a service control policy would have kept ACL and bucket policy writes to approved administrators. While the bucket stood open, a resource control policy that denies anonymous S3 requests, or the IgnorePublicAcls and RestrictPublicBuckets settings of the same block, would have kept readers on the internet out. Each of these dates from after this exposure, and the sources do not say which AWS account held the bucket: your organization policies reach a bucket only in a member account of your organization. Azure refuses the same opening with its anonymous-access account setting, Google Cloud with the public access prevention constraint, and Oracle Cloud with a Security Zone. Finding an open bucket and closing it stay the owner's job: the provider's checks report such a bucket rather than refuse it, and no source says whether the exposed credentials were rotated.
Could this have been prevented?
In hindsight, not as a whole. 1 control would have refused a step outright, and 4 controls would have limited one. 2 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.
- 1
- Prevented
- 4
- Contained
- 2
- Not covered
How it could have been prevented
The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.
Replaying the Verizon DVS September 2017 exposure
1 · Configured: an engineer's bucket open to the internet
1 Prevented2 Contained3 on other clouds2 · Reachable: about 100 MB of internal files and credentials
2 Contained3 on other clouds3 · Found and closed: taken down shortly after the notice
2 Not coveredKey facts
- Kromtech researchers at MacKeeper found a publicly accessible Amazon S3 bucket of about 100 MB on September 20, 2017; which setting opened it, who set it and when were not stated
- The bucket held files of DVS (Distributed Vision Services), an internal Verizon Wireless middleware for front-end applications that retrieve and update billing data, labeled confidential, some with usernames and passwords that, per Kromtech, could have allowed access to other parts of Verizon's internal network
- It also held a folder of 129 saved Outlook messages, admin user information, command notes and logs, B2B payment server names, internal infrastructure slides and global router hosts; Kromtech found no customer data
- Kromtech identified the alleged owner from the files and emailed a notice on September 21, 2017; the archive was taken down shortly after, or after the public disclosure of September 22 per one news report, and who acted was not stated
- Verizon's investigation found the bucket was owned and operated by one of its engineers, not the company; the engineer and Verizon said the files held nothing confidential
- Whether anyone other than Kromtech read the data, and whether the exposed credentials were valid, rotated or used, was not stated
Sources
Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.
- 1.Data Breach Reports Archive 2017: Verizon wireless employee exposed confidential data onlineMacKeeper (Kromtech Security research) · Feb 19, 2026 · Researchdiscovery on September 20, 2017, publicly accessible S3 bucket of about 100 MB, DVS files labeled confidential with usernames and passwords, 129 saved Outlook messages, admin notes, payment server names, infrastructure slides and router hosts, no customer data, owner identified from the contents, notice on September 21, 2017, takedown shortly after, bucket self-owned by a Verizon Wireless engineer
- 2.Aw, not you too, Verizon: US telco joins list of leaky AWS S3 bucketsThe Register · Sep 22, 2017 · Newsbucket open to anyone on the internet, human-error cause as the publication was told, contents, notice and takedown, no Verizon response to a request for comment
- 3.Verizon Wireless Internal Credentials, Infrastructure Details Exposed in Amazon S3 BucketThreatpost · Sep 22, 2017 · Newsarchive of about 100 MB, no customer information, private report on September 21, 2017 and takedown shortly after, bucket self-owned by a Verizon Wireless engineer
- 4.New Verizon data leak, the second one in a few monthsSecurity Affairs · Sep 22, 2017 · Newsthe employee's statement that the files were not confidential, a Verizon spokesperson's awareness of the incident, shutdown after the public disclosure
- 5.Verizon Engineer Exposes Internal System DataSecurityWeek · Sep 25, 2017 · NewsVerizon's investigation attributing the bucket to one of its engineers, Verizon's statement that it held no confidential data, notice on September 21, 2017 and access restricted shortly after
- 6.Verizon leak: 'Confidential data' exposed after employee left database unprotected onlineIBTimes UK · Sep 25, 2017 · Newsreport published on September 22, 2017, exposure duration unknown, the engineer's claim that nothing confidential was at risk
The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of the exposure; the owner's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the data is exposed. They are not an assessment of the owner's security program.