What was exposed
Replaying the Alteryx October 2017 exposure
- 1
Configured: a bucket open to any AWS account
Not stated; before October 6, 2017An Alteryx S3 bucket grants download rights to the Authenticated Users group, any holder of a free AWS account; who set the grant and when are not stated.
- 2
Reachable: 123 million household rows for any AWS account
Until secured after the notice; start not statedAnyone with a free AWS account can download the bucket: Alteryx software releases, a 2010 Census file and a 36 GB Experian file with over 123 million household rows and 248 columns.
- 3
Found and closed: secured after UpGuard's notice
October 6, 2017; notice and closure dates not statedChris Vickery of UpGuard finds the bucket on October 6, 2017, and UpGuard notifies Alteryx, which secures the bucket and removes the file; the dates and the exact change are not stated.
A 36 GB Experian ConsumerView file with over 123 million rows, one per US household, and 248 columns of marketing data, plus Alteryx software releases and a 2010 Census file, was downloadable by any holder of an AWS account until Alteryx secured the bucket after UpGuard's notice; when the exposure began and when it ended are not stated, Experian said no Experian system was involved, and whether anyone other than the finder read the file is not stated.
Where cloud-provider controls fit
Amazon S3 Block Public Access on the account, or set for every account by an organization policy, would have refused the grant to the Authenticated Users group. Object Ownership would have closed the ACL path, and the sources do not say whether an ACL or a bucket policy carried the grant; a service control policy would have kept the ACL write to approved administrators. While the grant stood, the IgnorePublicAcls and RestrictPublicBuckets settings of the same block, or a resource control policy that keeps your buckets to your organization's principals, would have kept outside AWS accounts from reading. Each of these, in the form described, dates from after this exposure. Azure has no grant to every account holder and refuses its nearest opening, anonymous access, with an account setting; Google Cloud refuses the same grant with the public access prevention constraint, and Oracle Cloud refuses a public bucket, which is anonymous access, with a Security Zone. Finding an open bucket and closing it stay your job: the provider's checks report such a bucket rather than refuse it.
Could this have been prevented?
In hindsight, not as a whole. 1 control would have refused a step outright, and 4 controls would have limited one. 2 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.
- 1
- Prevented
- 4
- Contained
- 2
- Not covered
How it could have been prevented
The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.
Replaying the Alteryx October 2017 exposure
1 · Configured: a bucket open to any AWS account
1 Prevented2 Contained3 on other clouds2 · Reachable: 123 million household rows for any AWS account
2 Contained3 on other clouds3 · Found and closed: secured after UpGuard's notice
2 Not coveredKey facts
- An Amazon S3 bucket of Alteryx at the subdomain alteryxdownload granted download rights to the AWS Authenticated Users group; one free AWS sign-up was enough to read it
- Which object carried the grant, who set it and when were not stated, and how long the bucket stood open was not stated
- The bucket held a 36 GB Experian ConsumerView file with over 123 million rows, one per US household, 248 columns and over 3.5 billion fields, plus Alteryx software releases and a 2010 Census file
- Chris Vickery of UpGuard found the bucket on October 6, 2017; UpGuard notified Alteryx, which secured the bucket and removed the file, on dates not stated
- Alteryx said the file held no names, card numbers, Social Security numbers, bank account information or passwords; Experian said no Experian system was involved
- The finder put the AWS users who could read the bucket at over a million and said it was hard to tell whether anyone unauthorized accessed the data
Sources
Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.
- 1.Home Economics: How Life in 123 Million American Households Was Exposed OnlineUpGuard · Dec 18, 2017 · Researchdiscovery date, finder, bucket subdomain, owner, Authenticated Users permission, who could read, contents, file size and row and column counts, data origin, notification, securing, ownership confirmation
- 2.This week in 'Bungles in the AWS S3 Privacy Jungles', we present Alteryx – and 123 million households exposedThe Register · Dec 21, 2017 · NewsAlteryx CEO statement, file removal, added bucket security, free AWS sign-up as the only requirement
- 3.Data Breach Exposes 123 Million U.S. HouseholdsFortune · Dec 22, 2017 · NewsAlteryx CEO statement, data not included as Alteryx states it, Experian statement, product bundling the data, discovery date
- 4.Massive leak exposes data on 123 million U.S. householdsCBS News (from CNET) · Dec 20, 2017 · Newsdisclosure date, Alteryx statement, Experian statement, field categories
- 5.Another cloud leak shows AWS can only do so much to protect dataCyberScoop · Dec 21, 2017 · Newsother access as the finder states it, Experian statement, AWS no comment
The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of the exposure; the owner's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the data is exposed. They are not an assessment of the owner's security program.