What was exposed
Replaying the US Army INSCOM September 2017 exposure
- 1
Configured: a bucket open to anyone with its address
Not stated; before September 27, 2017An Amazon S3 bucket under an AWS subdomain named inscom lets anyone who enters its address see its contents, with no credential; which setting opened it, who set it and when are not stated.
- 2
Reachable: a virtual disk with contractor keys
Until after the October 2017 notice; start not statedAnyone with the address can list 47 files and folders and download three, among them a virtual appliance whose disk holds private keys of contractor administrators and hashed passwords; the only reads the sources describe are the finder's.
- 3
Found and closed: secured after the finder's notice
September 27, 2017 to November 28, 2017 at the latestAn UpGuard researcher finds the bucket on September 27, 2017, and the Defense Department is notified in October 2017, per news reports; the bucket is secured after the notice, how and when not stated, and is gone from public view by November 28, 2017.
47 files and folders could be listed and three files downloaded with no credential, as of September 27, 2017, among them a virtual appliance whose disk carried partitions marked Top Secret and NOFORN, private keys of contractor administrators for distributed intelligence systems and hashed passwords, until the bucket was secured after an October 2017 notice; whether anyone other than the finder reached it is not stated, no use of the keys is reported, and the Army said an Army network was not breached.
Where cloud-provider controls fit
Amazon S3 Block Public Access on the account, or set for every account by an organization policy, would have refused the public grant, whether a bucket ACL, object ACLs or a bucket policy carried it. Object Ownership would have closed the ACL path, and the sources do not say which path opened the bucket; a service control policy would have kept ACL and bucket policy writes to approved administrators. While the grant stood, the IgnorePublicAcls and RestrictPublicBuckets settings of the same block, or a resource control policy that keeps your buckets to your organization's principals, would have kept readers on the internet from listing the bucket and downloading the virtual appliance. Each of these, in the form described, dates from after this exposure. Azure refuses the same opening with its anonymous access setting, Google Cloud with the public access prevention constraint and Oracle Cloud with a Security Zone. The private keys and hashed passwords on the disk are accepted or refused by the systems they belong to, not by a cloud API: rotating them and keeping them off a shared image stay your job, as do finding an open bucket and closing it, since the provider's checks report such a bucket rather than refuse it.
Could this have been prevented?
In hindsight, not as a whole. 1 control would have refused a step outright, and 6 controls would have limited one. 3 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.
- 1
- Prevented
- 6
- Contained
- 3
- Not covered
How it could have been prevented
The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.
Replaying the US Army INSCOM September 2017 exposure
1 · Configured: a bucket open to anyone with its address
1 Prevented2 Contained3 on other clouds2 · Reachable: a virtual disk with contractor keys
4 Contained1 Not covered6 on other clouds3 · Found and closed: secured after the finder's notice
2 Not coveredKey facts
- UpGuard found an Amazon S3 bucket under an AWS subdomain named inscom on September 27, 2017, set to let anyone who entered its address see its contents with no credential; The Register described the audience as anyone with an AWS account
- Which setting opened the bucket (a bucket ACL, object ACLs or a bucket policy), who set it, when, and who operated the AWS account were not stated; the Army called it a third-party data server
- The bucket's main repository listed 47 files and folders as of September 27, 2017, three of them downloadable: a virtual appliance, a plaintext ReadMe and a .jar that appears to be a training snapshot for labeling classified information, per UpGuard
- UpGuard's team downloaded the appliance and read its virtual disk: six partitions of 1 GB to 69 GB, some marked Top Secret and NOFORN, private keys of a defunct contractor's administrators for distributed intelligence systems, hashed passwords and Red Disk files; UpGuard said the keys could give access to internal systems if still valid, and whether they were was not stated
- The finder notified the Defense Department in October 2017, per CyberScoop and TechTarget, and the bucket was secured after the notice; how and when were not stated, and The Register found it gone from public view on November 28, 2017
- Whether anyone other than the finder reached the files was not stated and no use of the keys was reported; the Army said it was investigating and that an Army network was not breached
Sources
Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.
- 1.Black Box, Red Disk: How Top Secret NSA and Army Data Leaked OnlineUpGuard · Nov 27, 2017 · Researchdiscovery date, finder, subdomain, public access by URL, file counts, downloadable files, disk partitions and markings, contractor metadata, private keys, hashed passwords, closure after notice, finder's view of impact
- 2.US intelligence blabs classified Linux VM to world via leaky S3 siloThe Register · Nov 28, 2017 · NewsArmy statement, INSCOM no comment, partition sizes, finder's comments, closure
- 3.Classified U.S. Army Data Found on Unprotected ServerSecurityWeek · Nov 29, 2017 · NewsINSCOM-delivered Army statement, data no longer accessible, who exposed it unclear
- 4.Top secret Army, NSA data found on public internet due to misconfigured AWS serverCyberScoop · Nov 28, 2017 · Newsnotification month, Red Disk background, unknown other access
- 5.NSA data leak exposed Army INSCOM project informationTechTarget SearchSecurity · Nov 30, 2017 · Newsnotification month, closure, responsible party unclear
The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of the exposure; the owner's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the data is exposed. They are not an assessment of the owner's security program.