What happened
Replaying the Storm-1977 intrusion, disclosed April 2025
- 1
Password spray
Not dated; within the year before April 2025A tool submits username and password pairs to the sign-in of education-sector tenants on a target list fetched from the actor's infrastructure.
- 2
Account compromise
Not dated; within the year before April 2025One sprayed credential opens an account; the source does not say which account or whether it had MFA.
- 3
Guest in the subscription
Not dated; within the year before April 2025A guest account creates a resource group in the compromised Azure subscription; how it got rights there is not stated.
- 4
Cryptomining containers
Not dated; within the year before April 2025More than 200 containers in the new resource group mine cryptocurrency; the container service is not stated.
In one compromised tenant, more than 200 containers ran cryptomining in a resource group a guest account created; the cost and the duration are not stated.
Where cloud-provider controls fit
In your Microsoft Entra tenant, a Conditional Access policy that requires multifactor authentication for every user asks for a second factor after a sprayed password where the account already has a registered method; no source says whether this account had MFA or signed in with a password alone. Microsoft Entra Password Protection caps how many sprayed pairs can match a password. Where your guests do not manage Azure, a Conditional Access policy that blocks guest and external users from Azure management refuses the guest account's resource group, and cross-tenant access settings that block B2B collaboration by default cap which guests reach your resources. In Azure, an Azure Policy assignment at the tenant root management group that denies the resource types you do not run caps which resources a compromised account can create; the source does not name the container service, so it does not say whether the more than 200 containers were of such a type.
Could this have been prevented?
In hindsight, not as a whole. 1 control would have refused a step outright, and 4 controls would have limited one. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.
- 1
- Prevented
- 4
- Contained
- 0
- Not covered
How it could have been prevented
The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.
Replaying the Storm-1977 intrusion, disclosed April 2025
1 · Password spray
1 Contained3 on other clouds2 · Account compromise
1 Contained3 on other clouds3 · Guest in the subscription
1 Prevented1 Contained3 on other clouds4 · Cryptomining containers
1 Contained3 on other cloudsKey facts
- Microsoft Threat Intelligence said Storm-1977 ran password spray attacks against education-sector cloud tenants over the past year; no step was dated
- The actor used a command-line tool Microsoft names AzureChecker, which downloaded an encrypted target list from actor-controlled infrastructure and took a file of username and password pairs as input
- Microsoft observed one successful account compromise; it did not say which account, or whether any account had MFA
- A guest account created a resource group in the compromised Azure subscription; how it got rights there, and whether it was the sprayed account, was not stated
- The actor created more than 200 containers in that resource group and used them for cryptomining; the container service was not stated
- Microsoft published the case study on April 23, 2025 and named no victim and no count of tenants
Sources
Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.
- 1.Understanding the threat landscape for Kubernetes and containerized assetsMicrosoft Threat Intelligence (Microsoft Security Blog) · Apr 23, 2025 · Researchspray tool and its inputs, target list from actor infrastructure, password spray of education-sector tenants, observed account compromise, guest account, resource group in the compromised subscription, more than 200 containers, cryptomining, general container mitigations
- 2.Storm-1977 targets education sector with password spraying, Microsoft warnsSecurity Affairs · Apr 27, 2025 · Newssecondary restatement
The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of attack stages; the victim's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the incident. They are not an assessment of the victim's security program.