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DemonstrationMicrosoft Entra · Azure
5 min read

AuthQuake: Oasis Security brute-forces Microsoft account MFA codes across parallel sessions

Environment
Microsoft accounts protected by authenticator app codes, as tested by the Oasis Security research team; the source names no company and does not say which accounts were tested
When
not stated; testing before June 24, 2024 – Oct 9, 2024Disclosed Dec 11, 2024
Entry
A known email and password, then six-digit authenticator app codes guessed across many new sign-in sessions opened in parallel with no rate limit.

Oasis Security reported that Microsoft's sign-in allowed ten failed authenticator codes per session but set no limit on opening new sessions, and accepted a code for about three minutes. With an account's known password, its researchers guessed codes across parallel sessions; after 24 sessions, about 70 minutes, the chance of a correct code passed 50%, and the sign-in completed several times in testing with no alert to the account owner. Oasis listed Outlook email, OneDrive files, Teams chats and Azure as exposed and reported no exploitation outside the research; Microsoft deployed a permanent stricter rate limit on October 9, 2024.

What the demonstration did

External Parties
Oasis Security
Internet
Microsoft sign-inEntra ID or Microsoft account
Microsoft 365 Services
+ resources the account reaches
+ none named in the source
+ same Microsoft sign-in
Azure Resources
Tested account
Outlook email
OneDrive files
Teams chats

Replaying Oasis Security's AuthQuake demonstration

  1. 1

    First factor: a known password

    Not stated

    With the account's valid email and password, the researchers sign in, are assigned a session identifier and are asked for a six-digit authenticator app code; how an attacker would get the password is assumed.

  2. 2

    Second factor: the code is guessed

    Not stated

    The researchers guess codes, ten failed attempts per session, across new sessions opened in parallel with no rate limit, until a correct code completes the sign-in with no alert to the account owner.

  3. 3

    Disclosure and fix

    June 24 to October 9, 2024

    After Oasis reports it, Microsoft acknowledges the issue on June 24, 2024, deploys a temporary fix on July 4 and a permanent stricter rate limit on October 9.

Impact

With a known password, the researchers completed sign-in to Microsoft accounts protected by authenticator app codes in about an hour, with no user interaction and no alert to the account owner; Oasis listed Outlook email, OneDrive files, Teams chats and Azure as exposed and reported no use of them and no exploitation outside the research.

Outcome

Where Microsoft Entra controls fit

A Conditional Access policy that requires the Phishing-resistant MFA authentication strength, or an Authentication methods policy that turns off authenticator app codes, would have left a guessed code unable to complete the sign-in for the work accounts it covers; the source does not say whether work or personal accounts were tested. Limiting sign-in to your trusted locations, or requiring a compliant device, would have bounded where a known password and a correct code still work. None of these settings governs the limit on new sign-in sessions, which only Microsoft could change, and did on October 9, 2024. Oasis also recommends alerting account owners to failed second-factor attempts.

Would the controls have stopped it?

In hindsight, no control would have stopped it. 4 controls would have limited how far it went. 1 step has no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.

0
Prevented
4
Contained
1
Not covered

How it could have been prevented

The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.

External Parties
Oasis Security
Internet
Microsoft sign-inEntra ID or Microsoft account
Microsoft 365 Services
+ resources the account reaches
+ none named in the source
+ same Microsoft sign-in
Azure Resources
Tested account
Outlook email
OneDrive files
Teams chats

Replaying Oasis Security's AuthQuake demonstration

1 · First factor: a known password

1 Contained3 on other clouds

2 · Second factor: the code is guessed

3 Contained3 on other clouds

3 · Disclosure and fix

1 Not covered

Key facts

  • Oasis Security reported the issue to Microsoft, which acknowledged it on June 24, 2024; Oasis published its write-up on December 11, 2024
  • Microsoft's sign-in allowed up to ten failed authenticator codes in one session but set no rate limit on opening new sessions, which the researchers opened rapidly and in parallel
  • Oasis measured a code as valid for about three minutes, against the 30-second step RFC 6238 recommends, which gave about a 3% chance of a correct guess per session
  • After 24 sessions, about 70 minutes, the chance of a valid code passed 50%; Oasis said the method succeeded several times in testing and the account owners received no alert
  • Oasis listed Outlook email, OneDrive files, Teams chats and Azure as exposed through a signed-in account and reported no use of them and no exploitation outside the research
  • Microsoft deployed a temporary fix on July 4, 2024 and a permanent one on October 9, 2024: a stricter rate limit after a number of failed attempts, lasting about half a day

Sources

Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.

  1. 1.
    Oasis Security Research Team Discovers Microsoft Azure MFA BypassOasis Security · May 1, 2026 · ResearchPrecondition (valid password), sign-in flow and session identifier, ten failed codes per session, no rate limit on new sessions, concurrent attempts, three-minute code tolerance, success odds, no alert to the owner, services exposed, disclosure timeline, Microsoft's rate limit, recommendations
  2. 2.
    Microsoft MFA Bypassed via AuthQuake AttackSecurityWeek · Dec 12, 2024 · NewsThe name AuthQuake, the disclosure timeline as reported (late June report, temporary fix, permanent fix in October)

The estate in the replay follows the researchers' description of their own test environment. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the run. They are not an assessment of any company's security program.

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