What happened
Replaying the HubSpot form phishing, June 2024
- 1
Lure: a HubSpot form to a fake Outlook page
June to September 2024Document-signing lures lead the targets through a HubSpot Free Form Builder form to a page posing as Outlook Web Access, which collects their Microsoft sign-in details.
- 2
Sign-in with harvested credentials
Date not statedThe attacker signs in to the victims' single sign-on with the harvested credentials, through VPN proxies in the victims' own countries.
- 3
Holding the account
Date not statedThe attacker adds a device under their control to the account and starts a password reset when IT takes the account back.
- 4
Toward Azure
Date not statedThe campaign makes several attempts to connect to the victims' Azure infrastructure, and a victim's exposed hosting control panel is scanned; neither outcome is reported as access.
Unit 42 reports about 20,000 targeted users at European manufacturers, at least one compromised account whose Azure tenant credentials were exposed, account takeovers held through an added device and a password reset contest, and several attempts to connect to the victims' Azure infrastructure. The number of compromised accounts and the Azure resources reached are not stated.
Where cloud-provider controls fit
In Microsoft Entra ID, a Conditional Access policy that requires the Phishing-resistant MFA authentication strength would have refused the sign-in the attacker made with your user's harvested password, and a new password from a reset would have opened no session. Trusted named locations, restricted device registration and self-service password reset scoped away from your users cap the reach of the later steps, but only where the attacker's addresses and the paths they used fall outside them, which the source does not state. The same strength and locations on Azure management bound the connection attempts to Azure. The lure email, the HubSpot form, the fake page and the scanned control panel stay outside the provider's reach.
Could this have been prevented?
In hindsight, not as a whole. 1 control would have refused a step outright, and 7 controls would have limited one. 2 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.
- 1
- Prevented
- 7
- Contained
- 2
- Not covered
How it could have been prevented
The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.
Replaying the HubSpot form phishing, June 2024
1 · Lure: a HubSpot form to a fake Outlook page
1 Not covered2 · Sign-in with harvested credentials
1 Prevented1 Contained3 on other clouds3 · Holding the account
4 Contained6 on other clouds4 · Toward Azure
2 Contained1 Not covered3 on other cloudsKey facts
- Unit 42 identified the campaign in June 2024, when its phishing attempts peaked, and it was still active in September 2024; no end date is given
- The campaign targeted roughly 20,000 users at European companies, including in Germany and the UK, in the automotive, chemical and industrial compound manufacturing sectors; the report does not say how many accounts were compromised
- Unit 42 identified at least 17 working HubSpot Free Form Builder forms; HubSpot was not compromised, and the form links were not delivered through HubSpot's infrastructure
- The attacker signed in through VPN proxies in the victims' own countries, from an ASN not seen before for those users and with an abnormal user agent, which raised alerts at the victims
- The attacker added a device under their control to a victim's account and started a password reset when IT regained control; the report does not say what kind of object the device was or which reset path was used
- Unit 42 verified several attempts to connect to the victims' Microsoft Azure infrastructure and does not say whether they succeeded
Sources
Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.
- 1.Effective Phishing Campaign Targeting European Companies and OrganizationsPalo Alto Networks Unit 42 · Dec 19, 2024 · ResearchLure and redirection chain, credential page, sign-in evasion, persistence, password reset contest, Azure connection attempts, infrastructure, scale, dates, mitigations
- 2.Campaign abusing HubSpot targets 20,000 Microsoft Azure accountsBleepingComputer · Dec 18, 2024 · NewsRe-report of the scale and the disclosure date
The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of attack stages; the victim's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the incident. They are not an assessment of the victim's security program.