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IntrusionOn-premises · Microsoft Entra · SaaS
12 min read

SolarWinds Orion compromise: the cloud and identity stage

Victim
U.S. government agencies, critical-infrastructure entities and private-sector organizations
When
at least March 2020Disclosed Dec 13, 2020
Entry
A trojanized SolarWinds Orion update (SUNBURST) signed with SolarWinds' own certificate, with password guessing, password spraying and insecurely held administrative credentials as other reported entries; the cloud stage started from administrative rights in on-premises Active Directory.

Beginning in at least March 2020, by CISA's account, the actor reached the on-premises networks of U.S. government agencies, critical-infrastructure entities and private-sector organizations, frequently through a trojanized SolarWinds Orion update; the U.S. Government attributed the activity to the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) in April 2021. With Active Directory administrator rights it took the AD FS token-signing certificate and forged SAML tokens, added or changed federation trusts, added credentials to applications with mail permissions and read mail through Microsoft Graph, as Microsoft and CISA describe the techniques across many victims, not all of them in every attack. No source dates a cloud step for any victim or counts the tenants that saw one.

What happened

External Parties
SolarWinds build system
SVR, per U.S. Government
VPS provider servers
+ 1 more
Internet
Microsoft Entra IDthen Azure AD
Victim On-Premises Network
Victim Microsoft 365 Tenant
SolarWinds Orion
Active Directory
AD FS Server
Privileged Role Holders
Federated Domain Trust
Apps With Mail Access
Exchange Online Mailboxes

Replaying the SolarWinds intrusion of at least March 2020

  1. 1

    On-premises footholds

    From at least March 2020 (CISA); the trojanized updates were released March to June 2020

    A trojanized Orion update, and in some cases password guessing, password spraying or exposed administrative credentials, give the actor a foothold on premises, where it gains Active Directory administrator rights.

  2. 2

    Forged SAML tokens

    Not stated by any source

    With Active Directory rights the actor takes the AD FS token-signing certificate and forges SAML tokens that Microsoft Entra ID (then Azure AD) accepts as any user, privileged ones included.

  3. 3

    Tenant control and federation trusts

    Not stated by any source

    The actor holds Entra administrator rights, by forged token, compromised credentials or a synchronized privileged account, and adds or changes a federation trust so the tenant accepts tokens signed with certificates it owns.

  4. 4

    Backdoored applications and mail

    Not stated by any source

    The actor adds credentials to existing applications that can read mail, periodically connects from a server at a VPS provider and reads mail through Microsoft Graph, in many cases of key IT and security staff.

Impact

From on-premises footholds, frequently through the trojanized Orion update, the actor took control of victims' Microsoft cloud identity: it forged SAML tokens with the stolen AD FS signing certificate, added or changed federation trusts, added credentials to applications with mail permissions and read mail through Microsoft Graph. No source counts the tenants that saw the cloud stage or quantifies the mail read.

Outcome

Where cloud-provider controls fit

The foothold, the Active Directory escalation and the theft of the signing certificate sit on premises, outside every cloud provider's controls. If your domains use Microsoft Entra cloud authentication instead of AD FS federation, you remove the federation trust that a stolen AD FS certificate relies on, as Microsoft recommends; with rejectMfaByFederatedIdp and Conditional Access, Entra asks for its own second factor. If your privileged roles are eligible assignments behind PIM, neither a forged token nor a synchronized account carries an active administrator role until an approver grants it. An application management policy refuses new client secrets on your applications, and Conditional Access for workload identities limits your single-tenant applications to your named locations, where an added credential still works. Conditional Access for Exchange Online refuses a mail token request from a device or network you have not named, and role based access control for applications in Exchange Online limits an application to the mailboxes it serves.

Could this have been prevented?

In hindsight, not as a whole. 2 controls would have refused a step outright, and 9 controls would have limited one. 3 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.

2
Prevented
9
Contained
3
Not covered

How it could have been prevented

The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.

External Parties
SolarWinds build system
SVR, per U.S. Government
VPS provider servers
+ 1 more
Internet
Microsoft Entra IDthen Azure AD
Victim On-Premises Network
Victim Microsoft 365 Tenant
SolarWinds Orion
Active Directory
AD FS Server
Privileged Role Holders
Federated Domain Trust
Apps With Mail Access
Exchange Online Mailboxes

Replaying the SolarWinds intrusion of at least March 2020

1 · On-premises footholds

2 Not covered

2 · Forged SAML tokens

1 Prevented2 Contained1 Not covered4 on other clouds

3 · Tenant control and federation trusts

1 Prevented2 Contained6 on other clouds

4 · Backdoored applications and mail

5 Contained8 on other clouds

Key facts

  • SolarWinds said the vulnerable Orion updates were released between March and June 2020 through a compromise of its build system, and that fewer than 18,000 customers may have had a vulnerable installation
  • CISA said the compromises began in at least March 2020, also reported password guessing, password spraying and poorly secured administrative credentials as entries, and saw the cloud activity in cases without Orion
  • Microsoft said the actor took the SAML token-signing certificate from the federation server and forged tokens with the claims and lifetime it chose, highly privileged accounts included; such tokens can bypass MFA
  • Microsoft observed the actor adding or changing federation trusts and adding credentials to existing applications that usually held Mail.Read or Mail.ReadWrite, which gave it the ability to read mail through Microsoft Graph or Outlook REST
  • On December 17, 2020 Microsoft said it was beginning to notify more than 40 customers targeted more precisely; on February 17, 2021 the White House said nine federal agencies and about 100 private-sector companies were compromised
  • No source dated a cloud step for any victim or counted the tenants that saw one; the U.S. Government attributed the activity to the SVR on April 15, 2021

Sources

Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.

  1. 1.
    Advanced Persistent Threat Compromise of Government Agencies, Critical Infrastructure, and Private Sector Organizations (AA20-352A)Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) · Apr 15, 2021 · AdvisoryStart month, initial access vectors, SAML signing certificate theft, forged SAML tokens, credentials on service principals, Graph API use, federation trusts, targeting of IT and incident response staff, AD FS SAML configuration warning, attribution to the SVR
  2. 2.
    Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber AttacksMicrosoft Security Response Center (MSRC) · Dec 21, 2020 · Vendor reportIdentity attack chain, token-signing certificate theft, forged SAML tokens, Azure AD admin credentials, federation trust changes, credentials on applications with Mail.Read or Mail.ReadWrite, Graph and Outlook REST mail access, VPS connections, targeted IT and security staff
  3. 3.
    Using Microsoft 365 Defender to protect against SolorigateMicrosoft Threat Intelligence (Microsoft Security Blog) · Dec 28, 2020 · ResearchTwo paths to forged SAML tokens, MFA bypass by forged tokens, Azure AD audit operations, mail permissions, Graph mail access, MailItemsAccessed throttling
  4. 4.
    Advice for incident responders on recovery from systemic identity compromisesMicrosoft (Microsoft Security Blog) · Dec 21, 2020 · ResearchForged SAML tokens for privileged users, credentials on service principals, federated domain changes, recovery steps: cloud-mastered identity, cloud-only privileged accounts, MFA, Conditional Access, PIM
  5. 5.
    Detecting Post-Compromise Threat Activity in Microsoft Cloud Environments (AA21-008A)Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) · Apr 15, 2021 · AdvisoryCloud activity stages, activity without Orion, Graph mailbox access, MailItemsAccessed licensing
  6. 6.
    Remediation and Hardening Strategies for Microsoft 365 to Defend Against UNC2452Mandiant (Google Cloud Threat Intelligence blog) · Oct 28, 2021 · ResearchOn-premises to Microsoft 365 techniques in some but not all intrusions, Golden SAML, an added federated identity provider, synchronized privileged accounts, backdoored application credentials, MFA bypass
  7. 7.
    NSA warns of cloud attacks on authentication mechanismsSecurity Affairs · Dec 19, 2020 · NewsThe NSA advisory's two techniques as reported: forged SAML tokens, and credentials assigned to cloud application service principals by a global administrator
  8. 8.
    Form 8-K (December 14, 2020)SolarWinds Corporation (U.S. SEC EDGAR) · Dec 14, 2020 · Vendor reportAffected update window March to June 2020, build-system compromise, fewer than 18,000 customers possibly affected
  9. 9.
    Highly Evasive Attacker Leverages SolarWinds Supply Chain to Compromise Multiple Global Victims With SUNBURST BackdoorFireEye (now Mandiant, Google Cloud Threat Intelligence blog) · Dec 13, 2020 · ResearchSigned trojanized updates, VPS addresses in the victim's own country, first public disclosure
  10. 10.
    ED 21-01: Mitigate SolarWinds Orion Code Compromise (Closed)Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) · Dec 13, 2020 · AdvisoryOrder to disconnect or power down Orion, AD FS SAML configuration warning, no cloud identity accounts on on-premises Orion
  11. 11.
    A moment of reckoning: the need for a strong and global cybersecurity responseMicrosoft (Microsoft On the Issues blog) · Dec 17, 2020 · Vendor reportMore than 40 customers targeted more precisely, as of December 17, 2020
  12. 12.
    Press Briefing, February 17, 2021The White House (archived) · Feb 17, 2021 · AdvisoryNine federal agencies and about 100 private-sector companies compromised, as of February 17, 2021

The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of attack stages; the victim's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the incident. They are not an assessment of the victim's security program.

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