What happened
Replaying NOBELIUM intrusions reported in October 2021
- 1
Provider accounts
Since 2020 (Mandiant) or May 2021 (Microsoft)The actor signs in as users of service providers, opens a provider's internal network through a local VPN account, and in one chain links access across four providers; how each account was taken is not stated.
- 2
Delegated access downstream
Not stated per case · reported Oct and Dec 2021DAP gives the partner's Admin Agents Global administrator in the customers' tenants, AOBO gives an account with the right role Owner on customers' Azure subscriptions, and a provider's jump hosts reach a customer by RDP.
- 3
Run Command on virtual machines
Not stated · reported Oct and Dec 2021With Run Command, the actor runs commands as SYSTEM on customers' Azure virtual machines; Mandiant saw reconnaissance, credential theft and BEACON on downstream devices, and Microsoft saw access shift from cloud to on-premises in one incident.
- 4
Persistence in the directory
Not stated · reported Oct and Dec 2021The actor creates users, consents to applications, grants roles and adds service principal credentials in Azure AD, in tenants Microsoft does not name, and takes Azure AD Connect and AD FS key material that allows forged SAML tokens.
- 5
Collection
Since Q1 2021 (Mandiant) · not stated per caseAccounts with ApplicationImpersonation harvest mail, and Mandiant saw data relevant to Russian interests taken in most instances; whether an exfiltration to Mega succeeded is unclear.
Microsoft notified more than 140 resellers and technology service providers and said as many as 14 were compromised. Through the providers' delegated admin and AOBO access, the actor reached downstream customers' Microsoft 365 tenants and Azure subscriptions, ran commands as SYSTEM on Azure virtual machines, took Azure AD Connect and AD FS key material, and took data relevant to Russian interests in most of the instances Mandiant handled. No source names a provider or a customer, or counts the downstream tenants reached.
Where cloud-provider controls fit
If you are the customer, a Conditional Access policy that includes service provider users and blocks them would have refused the partner sign-in, where Microsoft supports it for that access. GDAP in place of DAP caps what one partner account reaches to the tenants and roles you approved, for a set time. No Azure setting refuses Run Command to a principal that holds the permission, and Azure Policy does not see that action; a network security group on the virtual machines' subnet caps the BEACON callback. If you are the provider, Conditional Access with a phishing-resistant authentication strength on your partner agents narrows the sign-in to methods a password and an approved push request do not meet; a session token stolen after sign-in still works, and how the partner accounts were taken is not stated. Your VPN, jump hosts, AD FS servers and guest operating systems stay with their own layers.
Could this have been prevented?
In hindsight, not as a whole. 2 controls would have refused a step outright, and 9 controls would have limited one. 8 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.
- 2
- Prevented
- 9
- Contained
- 8
- Not covered
How it could have been prevented
The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.
Replaying NOBELIUM intrusions reported in October 2021
1 · Provider accounts
2 Contained2 Not covered3 on other clouds2 · Delegated access downstream
2 Prevented2 Contained1 Not covered3 · Run Command on virtual machines
1 Contained4 Not covered6 on other clouds4 · Persistence in the directory
3 Contained1 Not covered3 on other clouds5 · Collection
1 ContainedKey facts
- Microsoft said it began observing the campaign in May 2021, against organizations in the United States and across Europe; Mandiant reported compromises of technology, services and reseller companies since 2020
- Microsoft notified more than 140 resellers and technology service providers and said as many as 14 had been compromised, while it continued to investigate
- Under DAP, a partner's Admin Agents held Global administrator in every customer tenant that granted it, and Microsoft said DAP was often neither audited for approved use nor disabled once use had ended
- Mandiant saw a service provider's Azure AD account with the role that allows AOBO used for Owner access to customer subscriptions, and Run Command used to run commands as SYSTEM on Azure virtual machines
- In one observed chain, Microsoft said the actor linked access across four distinct providers to reach its end target
- Mandiant saw the theft of Azure AD Connect and AD FS key material, and of data relevant to Russian interests in most instances; whether an exfiltration to Mega succeeded was unclear
Sources
Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.
- 1.NOBELIUM targeting delegated administrative privileges to facilitate broader attacksMicrosoft Threat Intelligence (MSTIC) · Oct 25, 2021 · ResearchCampaign start and regions, target types, the DAP abuse path, unaudited DAP, the four-provider chain, Azure AD persistence actions, Azure RunCommand with AOBO, infrastructure and tools, recommendations and detections
- 2.New activity from Russian actor NobeliumMicrosoft (On the Issues) · Oct 24, 2021 · Vendor reportCampaign start, the counts of providers notified and compromised, password spray and phishing, Microsoft's MFA requirement for Partner Center and DAP from September 2020, and the free Azure AD Premium offer
- 3.Suspected Russian Activity Targeting Government and Business Entities Around the GlobeMandiant (Google Cloud Threat Intelligence) · Dec 6, 2021 · ResearchProvider compromises since 2020, the local VPN account, AOBO to Azure subscription Owner, Run Command as SYSTEM on Azure VMs, the provider-to-customer path by RDP, Azure AD Connect and AD FS key theft, initial access methods, mail harvesting and data theft
- 4.Microsoft partners: The Good, The Bad, or The Ugly?AADInternals · Dec 11, 2021 · ResearchDAP default roles, a partner's reach across all its customers, and customer removal of DAP
- 5.Obtain a customer's admin privilegesMicrosoft Learn (Partner Center) · Mar 1, 2024 · Vendor reportDAP role mapping, the automatic Owner assignment on CSP-provisioned Azure subscriptions, and what removing DAP does and does not remove
- 6.Granular delegated admin privileges (GDAP) introductionMicrosoft Learn (Partner Center) · Apr 28, 2026 · Vendor reportGDAP definition, customer grant, per-customer partitioning, Azure Owner through a nested security group, Global Admin no longer a default
- 7.GDAP frequently asked questionsMicrosoft Learn (Partner Center) · Mar 12, 2025 · Vendor reportGDAP duration limits, DAP and GDAP precedence, Azure access under GDAP, and customer Conditional Access for CSP access
- 8.Run scripts in a Windows VM in Azure using action Run CommandsMicrosoft Learn (Azure Virtual Machines) · Aug 18, 2025 · Vendor reportRun Command mechanism, the SYSTEM context, the required permission and the roles that hold it, and the outbound port 443 requirement
The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of attack stages; the victim's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the incident. They are not an assessment of the victim's security program.