What happened
Replaying the LAPSUS$ pattern reported in March 2022
- 1
Bought, stolen and approved sign-ins
Not stated · described Mar 22, 2022Passwords and session tokens are stolen, bought or paid for, a SIM swap moves an employee's phone number, MFA prompts are triggered and spammed, and a system is joined to Azure AD and connected to the VPN.
- 2
Inside the network
Not stated · described Mar 22, 2022The help desk resets a target's credentials, collaboration tools are searched for high-privilege credentials, and Active Directory is enumerated and its credentials taken with DCSync.
- 3
Cloud tenant takeover
Not stated · described Mar 22, 2022Once the group holds privileged access to a cloud tenant, it creates global admin accounts, sends all mail in and out of the organization to its account with a transport rule, and then removes every other global admin.
- 4
Virtual machines, theft and deletion
Not stated · described Mar 22 and Apr 28, 2022New virtual machines in the target's cloud serve as the group's own infrastructure, sensitive data and source code are downloaded for extortion, systems and resources are deleted on-premises and in the cloud after the theft, and the group joins the crisis calls.
A described pattern, not one intrusion. When the group gained privileged access to an organization's cloud tenant, it created global admin accounts, sent all the organization's mail to one of them with an Office 365 transport rule and removed every other global admin, locking the organization out. It created virtual machines in the target's cloud, downloaded sensitive data for extortion or public release, and often deleted systems and resources on-premises and in the cloud; NCC Group saw this reach mass deletion of virtual machines, storage and configurations in cloud environments. No source names a tenant, a provider for the machines or the deleted resources, a date or a count.
Where cloud-provider controls fit
In your Microsoft Entra tenant, Conditional Access that requires a phishing-resistant authentication strength refuses the approved prompt, the code sent to a swapped phone number and a sign-in with a reset password alone, and Privileged Identity Management with eligible-only privileged roles keeps a taken-over account a standard user until an approver agrees to the activation, while a Microsoft Purview Privileged Access Management approval policy holds the mail flow rule until an approver agrees. On AWS, service control policies limit the matching IAM changes and the deletion inside a member account to the administrators you approve; on Google Cloud, IAM deny policies do the same for new owner grants, and Bucket Lock keeps locked objects from deletion. Azure Policy limits who can create virtual machines while its assignment stands, which an actor at the root scope can remove, and Azure Backup multi-user authorization with a Resource Guard in another tenant keeps backup data from deletion by anyone without a role on the guard. No source says which provider or which identity the cloud steps used, so these controls bound the pattern and do not rule it out. The infostealers and the forums, the carrier, the help desk, Active Directory, the code servers and the crisis calls stay with your own layers.
Could this have been prevented?
In hindsight, not as a whole. 2 controls would have refused a step outright, and 23 controls would have limited one. 12 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.
- 2
- Prevented
- 23
- Contained
- 12
- Not covered
How it could have been prevented
The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.
Replaying the LAPSUS$ pattern reported in March 2022
1 · Bought, stolen and approved sign-ins
2 Prevented4 Contained4 Not covered4 on other clouds2 · Inside the network
2 Contained3 Not covered3 · Cloud tenant takeover
8 Contained2 Not covered6 on other clouds4 · Virtual machines, theft and deletion
9 Contained3 Not covered6 on other cloudsKey facts
- Microsoft tracked the group as DEV-0537, also known as LAPSUS$, and described a pure extortion and destruction model without ransomware payloads; it named no tenant, no date and no count for the cloud steps
- Microsoft listed the ways in: the Redline password stealer, credentials and session tokens bought on criminal forums, employees, suppliers or business partners paid for credentials and MFA approval, SIM swapping, and MFA prompts spammed
- The Cyber Safety Review Board estimated that 40-60% of Lapsus$ compromises involved exploitation of Active Directory
- When the group gained privileged access to a cloud tenant, Microsoft said, it created global admin accounts, set an Office 365 tenant-level mail transport rule that sent all mail to the new account and then removed all other global admin accounts
- NCC Group saw the deletions reach mass deletion of virtual machines, storage and configurations in cloud environments; neither NCC Group nor Microsoft named the cloud provider
- The only victim Microsoft named was itself: a single account compromised, granting limited access, with no customer code or data involved
Sources
Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.
- 1.DEV-0537 criminal actor targeting organizations for data exfiltration and destructionMicrosoft Threat Intelligence (Microsoft Security Blog) · Mar 22, 2022 · ResearchActor profile, ways in, SIM swapping, MFA prompts, Azure AD device join and VPN, help desk resets, credential searches and DCSync, the cloud tenant takeover pattern, virtual machines in the target's cloud, exfiltration, deletion on-premises and in the cloud, crisis calls, Microsoft's own compromise, mitigations
- 2.Review of the Attacks Associated with Lapsus$ and Related Threat GroupsCyber Safety Review Board (DHS), hosted by CISA · Jul 24, 2023 · AdvisorySIM swapping through carriers and the offer to telecom insiders, the infostealer market, the 40-60% Active Directory estimate, the monitoring of incident response channels, the resilience findings on MFA and out-of-band communications, and the wider set of threat actors it reviewed
- 3.LAPSUS$: Recent techniques, tactics and proceduresNCC Group (Research and Intelligence Fusion Team) · Apr 28, 2022 · ResearchStolen authentication cookies, help desk requests from compromised mailboxes, credentials in SharePoint, source code taken from code management servers, mass deletion of virtual machines, storage and configurations in cloud environments, recommendations
The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of attack stages; the victim's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the incident. They are not an assessment of the victim's security program.