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IntrusionOn-premises · Microsoft Entra · SaaS
11 min read

Storm-0501 hybrid cloud ransomware, from on-premises to Entra ID

Victim
US organizations in government, manufacturing, transportation and law enforcement (unnamed)
When
not statedDisclosed Sep 26, 2024
Entry
Access brokers with credentials Microsoft says were possibly stolen, or known flaws in unpatched internet-facing servers; then Domain Admin on-premises, the credentials of the Entra Connect Sync accounts, and a Domain Admin's Microsoft Entra ID account that held Global Administrator with MFA disabled.

Microsoft Threat Intelligence reported on September 26, 2024 that Storm-0501 moved from on-premises networks into Microsoft Entra ID at unnamed US organizations in government, manufacturing, transportation and law enforcement. With Domain Admin access, the actor extracted the credentials of the Entra Connect Sync accounts, which Microsoft assesses with high confidence, used, in some cases, a Domain Admin's cloud account that held Global Administrator with MFA disabled, kept a new federated domain as a backdoor, signed in to Office 365 with a SAML token and, in some cases, deployed Embargo ransomware on-premises. Microsoft gives no date for any step, no count of victims and no outcome.

What happened

Internet
Microsoft Entra IDpasswords, SAML tokens
On-premises AD
Entra ID Tenant
+ Office 365 apps
+ SAML sign-ins
+ activity not stated
Office 365
Internet-Facing Servers
Domain Devices
Domain Controllers
Entra Connect Server
Global Administrator
Cloud Sync Account
Federated Domains

Replaying Storm-0501 intrusions reported in September 2024

  1. 1

    On-premises compromise

    Not stated · before Sep 26, 2024

    Through an access broker or an unpatched internet-facing server, the actor enters the network, runs discovery, takes credentials up to Domain Admin, copies data to public cloud storage and tampers with security products.

  2. 2

    Hybrid identity pivot

    Not stated · before Sep 26, 2024

    Microsoft assesses with high confidence that the actor extracts the Entra Connect Sync credentials; the cloud sync account can reset hybrid users' passwords, which Microsoft does not say happened; a Domain Admin's cloud account with Global Administrator and MFA disabled opens the tenant.

  3. 3

    Federated backdoor

    Not stated · before Sep 26, 2024

    With Global Administrator access, the actor creates a new federated domain in the tenant as a persistent backdoor, and Microsoft observes a SAML token from it signing in to Office 365.

  4. 4

    Ransomware on-premises

    Not stated · before Sep 26, 2024

    In some cases the actor deploys Embargo ransomware across the organization through Group Policy; in others it only keeps backdoor access to the network.

Impact

On-premises, credentials taken across many devices, data copied to public cloud storage, security products tampered with and, in some cases, Embargo ransomware deployed across the organization; in the cloud, a Global Administrator account with MFA disabled, a new federated domain kept as a backdoor and a SAML sign-in to Office 365. The post describes no read, deletion or encryption of Office 365 data or Azure resources, and gives no counts, no dates and no outcome.

Outcome

Where cloud-provider controls fit

In your Microsoft Entra tenant, Conditional Access that requires a phishing-resistant authentication strength for every directory role would have refused the Global Administrator sign-in with a password alone, and Privileged Identity Management with no standing Global Administrator makes the new federated domain wait on an approved activation of the role. The token validation policy the post recommends caps who a backdoor domain can sign in as, and a compliant-device requirement bounds its SAML sign-ins to compliant devices. Entra Connect application-based authentication, released in public preview in May 2025, replaces the sync account's password with a certificate once the legacy account is removed. On AWS, a service control policy bounds the matching identity-provider change to the approved administrators, and on Google Cloud, 2-Step Verification with security keys refuses a super administrator's password alone. The internet-facing servers, the domain, the Entra Connect Sync server and the ransomware stay with your own on-premises and endpoint layers.

Could this have been prevented?

In hindsight, not as a whole. 1 control would have refused a step outright, and 9 controls would have limited one. 7 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.

1
Prevented
9
Contained
7
Not covered

How it could have been prevented

The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.

Internet
Microsoft Entra IDpasswords, SAML tokens
On-premises AD
Entra ID Tenant
+ Office 365 apps
+ SAML sign-ins
+ activity not stated
Office 365
Internet-Facing Servers
Domain Devices
Domain Controllers
Entra Connect Server
Global Administrator
Cloud Sync Account
Federated Domains

Replaying Storm-0501 intrusions reported in September 2024

1 · On-premises compromise

5 Not covered

2 · Hybrid identity pivot

1 Prevented5 Contained1 Not covered8 on other clouds

3 · Federated backdoor

4 Contained6 on other clouds

4 · Ransomware on-premises

1 Not covered

Key facts

  • Microsoft said the actor got in through the access brokers Storm-0249 and Storm-0900 with possibly stolen credentials, or through known flaws in unpatched internet-facing servers: Zoho ManageEngine, Citrix NetScaler and a ColdFusion 2016 application
  • On-premises, the actor took credentials across many devices, reached Domain Admin accounts and Domain Controller access, and copied data from compromised devices to public cloud storage
  • Microsoft assessed with high confidence that the actor extracted the clear-text credentials of the Entra Connect Sync accounts; it described, as possible but not observed, that the cloud sync account can set or change hybrid users' passwords
  • In some of the cases investigated, at least one compromised Domain Admin had a Microsoft Entra ID account with MFA disabled and the Global Administrator role, and with it the actor connected to Microsoft Entra from any device
  • With Global Administrator access the actor created a new federated domain in the tenant as a persistent backdoor, and Microsoft observed it using a SAML token to sign in to Office 365
  • The actor deployed Embargo ransomware across the organization through Group Policy and in some cases only maintained backdoor access; Microsoft published its account on September 26, 2024 with no date for any step, no count of victims and no outcome

Sources

Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.

  1. 1.
    Storm-0501: Ransomware attacks expanding to hybrid cloud environmentsMicrosoft Threat Intelligence (Microsoft Security Blog) · Sep 26, 2024 · ResearchActor profile, sectors, entry routes, on-premises chain, Entra Connect Sync credential theft, Global Administrator without MFA, federated domain backdoor, SAML sign-in to Office 365, Embargo deployment, mitigations and detections
  2. 2.
    Storm-0501's evolving techniques lead to cloud-based ransomwareMicrosoft Threat Intelligence (Microsoft Security Blog) · Aug 27, 2025 · ResearchEntra Connect application-based authentication released in May 2025 (public preview)
  3. 3.
    Archive for Microsoft Entra releases and announcementsMicrosoft Learn (Microsoft Entra documentation) · Mar 5, 2026 · AdvisoryDirectory Synchronization Accounts role restriction (August 2024), mandatory MFA announcement and phases
  4. 4.
    Plan for mandatory Microsoft Entra multifactor authentication (MFA)Microsoft Learn (Microsoft Entra documentation) · Apr 3, 2026 · AdvisoryMandatory MFA phases and dates, and the sign-ins it leaves out, Microsoft Graph APIs in general among them
  5. 5.
    Despite Recent Security Hardening, Entra ID Synchronization Feature Remains Open for AbuseTenable Research · Apr 24, 2025 · ResearchSynchronization API scope limited to hybrid users, and the password reset of a hybrid user by the Directory Synchronization Accounts role
  6. 6.
    How to create a backdoor to Azure AD - part 1: Identity federationAADInternals · Aug 5, 2020 · ResearchFederation backdoor prerequisites (a Global Administrator), sign-in as any user whose ImmutableId is known, and the note that Conditional Access may still block it

The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of attack stages; the victim's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the incident. They are not an assessment of the victim's security program.

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