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IntrusionMicrosoft Entra · Azure · AWS · On-premises
8 min read

Callers posing as IT staff reach Azure and AWS at telecom and BPO companies

Victim
Several unnamed telecommunications and business process outsourcing companies
When
June 2022; no source dates a single stepDisclosed Dec 1, 2022
Entry
Callers posing as IT staff harvested credentials or had employees install a remote management tool, then got past MFA; in one case a known ForgeRock OpenAM flaw was exploited.

CrowdStrike reported on December 1, 2022, that since June 2022 an actor it tied with low confidence to SCATTERED SPIDER had targeted telecom and business process outsourcing companies: callers posing as IT staff collected credentials and MFA approvals, and the actor enrolled its own MFA devices. In one case it signed in to the organization's Azure tenant, created virtual machines and moved to on-premises systems; other investigations show it downloading users and group members from Azure Active Directory, now Microsoft Entra ID, exploiting a known ForgeRock OpenAM flaw to use an AWS instance role, turning AWS CLI credentials into console sessions without MFA and opening a security group to an outside range. The victims are not named, no step is dated, and CrowdStrike says the objective appears to be mobile carrier access, with SIM swapping in two cases.

What happened

External Parties
Credential-harvesting site
Remote management tool
Internet
Workforce sign-inMFA provider not named
Workforce Identity
AWS Account
+ actor-created VMs
+ credential theft
+ path to on-premises
Azure Tenant
+ internal servers
+ reached from Azure
+ details not stated
On-Premises Systems
Targeted employee
MFA devices
Users and groups
OpenAM web server
Instance role
Console sessions
Security group

Replaying the telecom and BPO June 2022 intrusion

  1. 1

    Social engineering and MFA

    Not dated · from June 2022

    Callers posing as IT staff collect credentials or plant a remote tool, get past MFA, and enroll the actor's own MFA devices.

  2. 2

    Azure tenant

    Not dated · from June 2022

    A victim's credentials sign in to an Azure tenant, where the actor builds virtual machines and reaches on-premises systems; in one investigation it downloads the directory's users and groups.

  3. 3

    OpenAM to AWS instance role

    Not dated · from June 2022

    In another case the actor exploits a known flaw in an internet-facing OpenAM server and uses an AWS instance role to elevate privileges.

  4. 4

    AWS federation and network

    Not dated · from June 2022

    In AWS the actor turns CLI credentials into console sessions without MFA, and in one case opens a security group to an outside range.

Impact

Across several investigations the actor reached Azure and AWS with stolen credentials, built virtual machines, reached on-premises systems, downloaded the directory's users and groups, enrolled its own MFA devices, used an AWS instance role and opened a security group; CrowdStrike says the objective appears to be mobile carrier access, with SIM swapping in two cases.

Outcome

Where Microsoft Entra, Azure and AWS controls fit

No cloud control reaches the phone call or the tool your employee installs. A Conditional Access policy that requires the phishing-resistant MFA authentication strength, for sign-in and for registering security information, refuses an approved push or a read-out code, but the sources do not name the identity provider whose prompts were abused, so it caps the step rather than stopping it. An Azure Policy deny on virtual machine creation and the Read other users setting in Microsoft Entra bound what a stolen ordinary account builds and reads. On AWS, a security group that narrows inbound sources, IMDSv2 and a permissions boundary on the instance role bound what a host compromise yields. Service control policies that deny IAM-user calls without MFA and keep ingress changes to network administrators cap the console pivot and the security group change in a member account; the sources do not say whose keys or which identity were used.

Could this have been prevented?

In hindsight, no control would have stopped it. 11 controls would have limited how far it went. 1 step has no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.

0
Prevented
11
Contained
1
Not covered

How it could have been prevented

The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.

External Parties
Credential-harvesting site
Remote management tool
Internet
Workforce sign-inMFA provider not named
Workforce Identity
AWS Account
+ actor-created VMs
+ credential theft
+ path to on-premises
Azure Tenant
+ internal servers
+ reached from Azure
+ details not stated
On-Premises Systems
Targeted employee
MFA devices
Users and groups
OpenAM web server
Instance role
Console sessions
Security group

Replaying the telecom and BPO June 2022 intrusion

1 · Social engineering and MFA

2 Contained1 Not covered4 on other clouds

2 · Azure tenant

3 Contained6 on other clouds

3 · OpenAM to AWS instance role

3 Contained2 on other clouds

4 · AWS federation and network

3 Contained2 on other clouds

Key facts

  • CrowdStrike published the write-up on December 1, 2022, and said targeting of telecom and BPO companies had increased since June 2022; it tied the campaign to SCATTERED SPIDER with low confidence
  • Callers posing as IT staff, by phone, SMS and Telegram, sent employees to a credential-harvesting site or had them install a remote management tool; where MFA was on, the actor asked for one-time passwords or sent repeated push prompts until one was approved
  • The actor enrolled its own devices as trusted MFA devices through user self-enrollment with an MFA provider the source does not name
  • In one case a victim's credentials signed in to the organization's Azure tenant, where the actor created virtual machines for credential theft and moved to on-premises systems; in one investigation it bulk-downloaded users and group members from Azure Active Directory, now Microsoft Entra ID
  • In another case the actor exploited CVE-2021-35464, which CISA had listed as known exploited on November 3, 2021, on an internet-facing ForgeRock OpenAM server and used an AWS instance role with a compromised AWS token to elevate privileges
  • In AWS the actor turned CLI credentials into console sessions without MFA, through federated credentials for non-existent IAM users, and in one case added an outside address range to a security group; how those credentials were obtained was not stated

Sources

Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.

  1. 1.
    Not a SIMulation: CrowdStrike Investigations Reveal Intrusion Campaign Targeting Telco and BPO CompaniesCrowdStrike · Dec 1, 2022 · ResearchInitial access, MFA abuse, Azure sign-in and VM creation, directory enumeration, MFA device enrollment, instance-role use, federated console sessions, security group change, attribution
  2. 2.
    CVE-2021-35464NIST National Vulnerability Database · Jul 22, 2021 · AdvisoryThe ForgeRock flaw, its publication and its known-exploited status
  3. 3.
    Campaign C0027MITRE ATT&CK · undated · ResearchTechnique mapping, campaign window

The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of attack stages; the victim's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the incident. They are not an assessment of the victim's security program.

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