What happened
Replaying the telecom and BPO June 2022 intrusion
- 1
Social engineering and MFA
Not dated · from June 2022Callers posing as IT staff collect credentials or plant a remote tool, get past MFA, and enroll the actor's own MFA devices.
- 2
Azure tenant
Not dated · from June 2022A victim's credentials sign in to an Azure tenant, where the actor builds virtual machines and reaches on-premises systems; in one investigation it downloads the directory's users and groups.
- 3
OpenAM to AWS instance role
Not dated · from June 2022In another case the actor exploits a known flaw in an internet-facing OpenAM server and uses an AWS instance role to elevate privileges.
- 4
AWS federation and network
Not dated · from June 2022In AWS the actor turns CLI credentials into console sessions without MFA, and in one case opens a security group to an outside range.
Across several investigations the actor reached Azure and AWS with stolen credentials, built virtual machines, reached on-premises systems, downloaded the directory's users and groups, enrolled its own MFA devices, used an AWS instance role and opened a security group; CrowdStrike says the objective appears to be mobile carrier access, with SIM swapping in two cases.
Where Microsoft Entra, Azure and AWS controls fit
No cloud control reaches the phone call or the tool your employee installs. A Conditional Access policy that requires the phishing-resistant MFA authentication strength, for sign-in and for registering security information, refuses an approved push or a read-out code, but the sources do not name the identity provider whose prompts were abused, so it caps the step rather than stopping it. An Azure Policy deny on virtual machine creation and the Read other users setting in Microsoft Entra bound what a stolen ordinary account builds and reads. On AWS, a security group that narrows inbound sources, IMDSv2 and a permissions boundary on the instance role bound what a host compromise yields. Service control policies that deny IAM-user calls without MFA and keep ingress changes to network administrators cap the console pivot and the security group change in a member account; the sources do not say whose keys or which identity were used.
Could this have been prevented?
In hindsight, no control would have stopped it. 11 controls would have limited how far it went. 1 step has no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.
- 0
- Prevented
- 11
- Contained
- 1
- Not covered
How it could have been prevented
The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.
Replaying the telecom and BPO June 2022 intrusion
1 · Social engineering and MFA
2 Contained1 Not covered4 on other clouds2 · Azure tenant
3 Contained6 on other clouds3 · OpenAM to AWS instance role
3 Contained2 on other clouds4 · AWS federation and network
3 Contained2 on other cloudsKey facts
- CrowdStrike published the write-up on December 1, 2022, and said targeting of telecom and BPO companies had increased since June 2022; it tied the campaign to SCATTERED SPIDER with low confidence
- Callers posing as IT staff, by phone, SMS and Telegram, sent employees to a credential-harvesting site or had them install a remote management tool; where MFA was on, the actor asked for one-time passwords or sent repeated push prompts until one was approved
- The actor enrolled its own devices as trusted MFA devices through user self-enrollment with an MFA provider the source does not name
- In one case a victim's credentials signed in to the organization's Azure tenant, where the actor created virtual machines for credential theft and moved to on-premises systems; in one investigation it bulk-downloaded users and group members from Azure Active Directory, now Microsoft Entra ID
- In another case the actor exploited CVE-2021-35464, which CISA had listed as known exploited on November 3, 2021, on an internet-facing ForgeRock OpenAM server and used an AWS instance role with a compromised AWS token to elevate privileges
- In AWS the actor turned CLI credentials into console sessions without MFA, through federated credentials for non-existent IAM users, and in one case added an outside address range to a security group; how those credentials were obtained was not stated
Sources
Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.
- 1.Not a SIMulation: CrowdStrike Investigations Reveal Intrusion Campaign Targeting Telco and BPO CompaniesCrowdStrike · Dec 1, 2022 · ResearchInitial access, MFA abuse, Azure sign-in and VM creation, directory enumeration, MFA device enrollment, instance-role use, federated console sessions, security group change, attribution
- 2.CVE-2021-35464NIST National Vulnerability Database · Jul 22, 2021 · AdvisoryThe ForgeRock flaw, its publication and its known-exploited status
- 3.
The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of attack stages; the victim's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the incident. They are not an assessment of the victim's security program.