What was exposed
Replaying the Octoly January 2018 exposure
- 1
Configured: an operations bucket opened beyond the company
Not stated; before January 4, 2018An Octoly S3 bucket is configured for public access, open to any AWS account holder in one news report; which setting, who set it and when are not stated.
- 2
Reachable: a database backup and 12,000+ creator records
Backup until January 12, spreadsheets until February 1, 2018With no credential of Octoly's, the bucket can be read: a full backup of the production database and spreadsheets with personal data on more than 12,000 creators, with employee and brand records and bcrypt password hashes.
- 3
Found and closed: 28 days from the first notice
January 4 to February 1, 2018An UpGuard researcher finds the bucket on January 4 and emails Octoly the same day; the backup is deleted by January 12, and the spreadsheets stay open until February 1.
A full backup of the production database until January 12, 2018, and regularly updated spreadsheets with personal data on more than 12,000 creators until February 1, 2018, with records of employees and about 600 brands and bcrypt password hashes, were readable from outside the company; when the bucket was opened is not stated, Octoly says there were no signs of download or use, and the finder says it cannot be known.
Where cloud-provider controls fit
Amazon S3 Block Public Access on the account, or set for every account by an organization policy, would have refused the opening whether an ACL or a bucket policy carried it, and Object Ownership would have closed the ACL path, which reaches the grant only if an ACL carried it. While the grant stood, a resource control policy that keeps your buckets to your organization's principals, or the IgnorePublicAcls and RestrictPublicBuckets settings of the same block, would have kept outside readers out. Each of these, in the form described, dates from after this exposure. Google Cloud refuses a grant to everyone or to every account holder with the public access prevention constraint. Azure and Oracle Cloud bound the opening: an account setting refuses anonymous access and a Security Zone refuses a public bucket, but neither names a grant to holders of another account, the form one news report describes. Finding an open bucket and closing it stay the owner's job: here the backup went in eight days and the spreadsheets in 28, and the provider's checks report such a bucket rather than refuse it.
Could this have been prevented?
In hindsight, not as a whole. 1 control would have refused a step outright, and 3 controls would have limited one. 2 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.
- 1
- Prevented
- 3
- Contained
- 2
- Not covered
How it could have been prevented
The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.
Replaying the Octoly January 2018 exposure
1 · Configured: an operations bucket opened beyond the company
1 Prevented1 Contained3 on other clouds2 · Reachable: a database backup and 12,000+ creator records
2 Contained3 on other clouds3 · Found and closed: 28 days from the first notice
2 Not coveredKey facts
- An Amazon S3 bucket of Octoly was configured for public access, which the finder called an erroneous configuration; one news report said, in its own words, that anyone with an AWS account could read it, and which setting carried the grant was not stated
- Octoly's head of corporate communications blamed an internal restructuring; who set the access and when were not stated
- The bucket held a full backup of the production database and regularly updated spreadsheets with personal data on more than 12,000 creators, records of employees and about 600 client brands, bcrypt password hashes and links to more than 12,000 Deep Social reports
- An UpGuard researcher discovered the bucket on January 4, 2018, downloaded many files from it, the database backup among them, and emailed Octoly the same day; one news report dated the discovery to January 8
- The database backup was deleted by January 12, 2018; the spreadsheets were secured on February 1, 2018, weeks after Octoly assured UpGuard that the breach was closed, and what changed that day was not stated
- Octoly said on February 5, 2018, that there were no signs any information had been downloaded or used; the finder said it was impossible to know whether others had accessed the data
Sources
Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.
- 1.Bad Influence: How A Marketing Startup Exposed Thousands of Social Media StarsUpGuard · Feb 5, 2018 · Researchdiscovery on January 4, 2018, configuration for public access, bucket contents and counts, repeated notification, backup deleted by January 12, 2018, spreadsheets secured on February 1, 2018, Octoly's earlier assurance that the breach was closed
- 2.For YouTube Stars, Influencers: More Risk of Hacks after Octoly BreachThe Security Ledger · Feb 6, 2018 · Newsaccess setting open to any AWS account holder, first email on January 4, 2018, phone and direct message attempts, founder's reply on January 14, 2018, data fully removed on February 1, 2018, Octoly tweet of February 5, 2018, customers not notified first
- 3.Leaky Amazon S3 Bucket Exposes Personal Data of 12,000 Social Media InfluencersThreatpost · Feb 6, 2018 · Newsfinder downloaded files including the database backup, default settings remark, Octoly tweet quote, discovery date given as January 8
- 4.French marketing firm publicly exposes sensitive data of over 12,000 clientsCyberScoop · Feb 5, 2018 · NewsOctoly's statement on the cause, discovery on January 4, 2018, and securing on February 1, 2018, as UpGuard gives them
The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of the exposure; the owner's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the data is exposed. They are not an assessment of the owner's security program.