What was exposed
Replaying the LocalBlox February 2018 exposure
- 1
Configured: a bucket of 48 million profiles open to the internet
Not stated; public by February 18, 2018A LocalBlox S3 bucket is set so that anyone on the internet can download from it with no password; which setting, who set it and when are not stated.
- 2
Reachable: a 151.3 GB file at a public URL
Not stated; until February 28, 2018With no password, anyone can download the bucket's one 151.3 GB compressed file: about 48 million records with names, addresses, dates of birth and scraped social profile data.
- 3
Found and closed: secured 10 days after the find
February 18 to 28, 2018The UpGuard Cyber Risk Team finds the bucket on February 18 and notifies LocalBlox on February 28; the bucket is secured later that day.
One 151.3 GB compressed file of about 48 million person records, with names, physical addresses, dates of birth and scraped LinkedIn, Facebook and Twitter data, could be downloaded from the internet with no password until February 28, 2018; since when it was public is unknown, LocalBlox believes nobody besides the finder accessed the file, The Register found no evidence either way, and LocalBlox says most records were fabricated for tests, an unverified claim.
Where cloud-provider controls fit
Amazon S3 Block Public Access on your account, or set for every account by an organization policy, would have refused the opening whether a bucket ACL, an object ACL or a bucket policy carried it. Object Ownership and a service control policy on ACL and policy writes bound the opening without refusing it: the first closes the ACL path only, and the second leaves approved administrators the write. While the grant stood, a resource control policy that denies anonymous S3 requests, or the IgnorePublicAcls and RestrictPublicBuckets settings of the same block, would have kept readers on the internet out; the first still leaves signed requests through a public ACL. Each of these, in the form described, dates from after this exposure. Azure, Google Cloud and Oracle Cloud refuse the opening with an account setting, an organization policy constraint and a Security Zone; once an Oracle Cloud bucket is public, nothing refuses the read. Finding the bucket and closing it stay your job: here it was secured on the day of the notice, 10 days after the find, and the provider's checks report such a bucket rather than refuse it.
Could this have been prevented?
In hindsight, not as a whole. 1 control would have refused a step outright, and 4 controls would have limited one. 2 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.
- 1
- Prevented
- 4
- Contained
- 2
- Not covered
How it could have been prevented
The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.
Replaying the LocalBlox February 2018 exposure
1 · Configured: a bucket of 48 million profiles open to the internet
1 Prevented2 Contained3 on other clouds2 · Reachable: a 151.3 GB file at a public URL
2 Contained3 on other clouds3 · Found and closed: secured 10 days after the find
2 Not coveredKey facts
- An Amazon S3 bucket of LocalBlox was publicly downloadable from the internet with no password; the finder called the cause a misconfiguration, and which setting opened it, who set it and when were not stated
- The bucket held one 151.3 GB compressed file that expanded to 1.2 TB of newline-delimited JSON with about 48 million records as of February 18, 2018, per UpGuard: names, physical addresses, dates of birth, scraped LinkedIn job histories, public Facebook data and Twitter handles
- The UpGuard Cyber Risk Team found the bucket on February 18, 2018; metadata in a header file pointed to LocalBlox as the owner, and a LocalBlox co-founder confirmed to UpGuard that the data belonged to the company
- UpGuard notified LocalBlox on February 28, 2018, and the bucket was secured later that day, 10 days after the find; ZDNet said its permissions were restricted and SiliconANGLE said the file was made private
- ZDNet called the bucket unlisted; the finder did not say whether its contents could be listed, and since when the bucket was public is unknown
- LocalBlox said no other individual was believed to have accessed the file and that most records were fabricated for internal tests, both unverified; The Register found no evidence that anyone else viewed the data, and no source supported LocalBlox's claim that the finder hacked in
Sources
Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.
- 1.Block Buster: How A Private Intelligence Platform Leaked 48 Million Personal Data RecordsUpGuard · Apr 17, 2018 · Researchdiscovery date, finder, public download access, compressed and uncompressed size, format, record count, data fields, data sources as the finder reads them, ownership evidence, owner confirmation, notification date, closure
- 2.Data firm leaks 48 million user profiles it scraped from Facebook, LinkedIn, othersZDNet (republished by CBS News) · Apr 18, 2018 · Newspublic but unlisted bucket, no password, closure hours after disclosure, LocalBlox statements, platform statements on scraping
- 3.Millions of scraped public social net profiles left in open AWS S3 boxThe Register · Apr 19, 2018 · Newspublic access by misconfiguration, discovery and closure dates, no evidence of other access
- 4.48M social media records exposed in latest cloud storage mishapSiliconANGLE · Apr 18, 2018 · Newsclosure as a file permission change within hours, LocalBlox hacking accusation as relayed
The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of the exposure; the owner's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the data is exposed. They are not an assessment of the owner's security program.