What happened
Replaying the MyEtherWallet April 2018 intrusion
- 1
Routes to Route 53 hijacked
Apr 24, 2018, 11:05–12:55 UTCAn outside network announces more-specific routes for the Route 53 name server addresses, and several peer networks pass them on for almost two hours. How the announcements were made is unconfirmed.
- 2
Forged answers for one domain
Apr 24, 2018, 11:05–12:55 UTCA server reached through the hijacked addresses answers only for MyEtherWallet's domain, with addresses at a Russian hosting provider. Public resolvers in several cities accept and serve the forged answers.
- 3
Phishing copy and theft
Apr 24, 2018Users sent to the copy of the site see a self-signed certificate for the right name. Those who click through the warning hand over their credentials or session cookies, which are used on the real site to transfer Ethereum.
Users who accepted a certificate warning lost Ethereum, reported as 215 ether; Route 53 answers for other names failed for some users during the window.
One cloud control in a chain that ran outside the cloud
No setting in your cloud account decides which routes other networks accept, and none reaches a browser warning or a wallet transfer. The one cloud control in this chain is DNSSEC signing on your public hosted zone, with the DS record at the registrar: a resolver that validates DNSSEC refuses a forged, unsigned answer, and a resolver that does not still passes it on. Route 53 added DNSSEC signing in December 2020, after this incident, and the sources do not say whether the affected resolvers validated. Whether a browser lets your users past a self-signed certificate is decided by your site's HTTP Strict Transport Security and the browser, not by the cloud.
Could this have been prevented?
In hindsight, no control would have stopped it. 1 control would have limited how far it went. 3 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.
- 0
- Prevented
- 1
- Contained
- 3
- Not covered
How it could have been prevented
The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.
Replaying the MyEtherWallet April 2018 intrusion
1 · Routes to Route 53 hijacked
1 Not covered3 on other clouds2 · Forged answers for one domain
1 Contained3 on other clouds3 · Phishing copy and theft
2 Not coveredKey facts
- More-specific routes for four Route 53 name server address ranges were visible from about 11:05 to 12:55 UTC on April 24, 2018, almost two hours, per Cloudflare and the Internet Society
- Several peer networks accepted and passed on the routes, while some large transit networks had filters that limited the spread; Dyn saw the routes at about 15% of its nodes
- The server on the hijacked addresses answered only for MyEtherWallet's domain, with addresses at a Russian hosting provider, and Cloudflare's public resolver received the forged answers in several cities
- The copy of the site carried a self-signed certificate for the right name, so victims had to click through a browser warning
- CyberScoop reported 215 ether, about $152,000 at the time, stolen; the article does not say who computed the figure
- AWS said neither AWS nor Route 53 was hacked and that an upstream internet provider was compromised by a malicious actor; no source names the actor
Sources
Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.
- 1.BGP leaks and cryptocurrenciesCloudflare · Apr 24, 2018 · ResearchRouting window, hijacked address ranges, forged DNS answers, resolver impact, self-signed certificate, credential use, mitigations
- 2.What Happened? The Amazon Route 53 BGP Hijack to Take Over Ethereum Cryptocurrency WalletsInternet Society · Apr 27, 2018 · ResearchAnnouncement and withdrawal times, propagating and filtering networks, share of Dyn nodes that saw the routes
- 3.AWS Route 53 BGP Hijack: What Kentik SawKentik · May 2, 2018 · ResearchShift of DNS traffic to the announcing network, forged answers, phishing and credential use
- 4.AWS DNS network hijack turns MyEtherWallet into ThievesEtherWalletThe Register · Apr 24, 2018 · NewsEnd time per a routing monitor, data center and network responses, MyEtherWallet's advice to users
- 5.Internet infrastructure server hijacked for $152,000 Ether theftCyberScoop · Apr 24, 2018 · NewsAWS statement, MyEtherWallet statement, amount in ether
The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of attack stages; the victim's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the incident. They are not an assessment of the victim's security program.