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ExposureAWS
6 min read

GoDaddy server and AWS pricing models in a public Amazon S3 bucket

Owner
GoDaddy (bucket created by an Amazon Web Services salesperson)
When
not stated; found public on June 19, 2018 – Jul 26, 2018Disclosed Aug 9, 2018
Entry
An Amazon S3 bucket that, by Amazon's statement, an AWS salesperson created was publicly readable from the internet with no credential; which setting opened it, which account held it and when are not stated.

An Amazon S3 bucket that, by Amazon's statement, an AWS salesperson created to store prospective pricing scenarios for GoDaddy was readable by anyone on the internet with no credential. It held revisions of a spreadsheet modelling GoDaddy's infrastructure on AWS: the latest a 17 MB workbook with 41 data points for over 24,000 unique hostnames and what appear to be the AWS discounts offered to GoDaddy, with no credentials and, per AWS, no GoDaddy customer information. An UpGuard analyst found it on June 19, 2018, UpGuard began notifying GoDaddy the next day, and the exposure was closed on July 26, the day GoDaddy replied; who closed it, and whether anyone other than the finder read the data, is not stated.

What was exposed

External Parties
UpGuard
GoDaddy
Internet
Pricing Model Bucket · Amazon S3
Public Pricing Bucket
Workbook · eight tabs
Host Data · 24,000+ names
Price List Tab

Replaying the GoDaddy June 2018 exposure

  1. 1

    Configured: a salesperson's pricing bucket open to anyone

    Not stated; before June 19, 2018

    An S3 bucket that an AWS salesperson created, per Amazon, is readable by anyone; which setting opened it, in which account and when is not stated.

  2. 2

    Reachable: data on over 24,000 hosts and AWS pricing

    Until July 26, 2018; start not stated

    Anyone who finds the bucket can read it with no credential: spreadsheet revisions with 41 data points for over 24,000 unique hostnames and what appear to be the AWS discounts offered to GoDaddy.

  3. 3

    Found and closed: 36 days from notice to closure

    June 19 to July 26, 2018

    An UpGuard analyst finds the bucket and UpGuard notifies GoDaddy from June 20; the exposure is closed on July 26, the day GoDaddy replies, and who closes it is not stated.

Impact

An Amazon S3 bucket that an AWS salesperson created was readable by anyone on the internet until July 26, 2018, and when it became public is not stated; it held revisions of a spreadsheet modelling GoDaddy's infrastructure on AWS, with 41 data points for over 24,000 unique hostnames and what appear to be the AWS discounts offered to GoDaddy, no credentials and, per AWS, no GoDaddy customer information; whether anyone other than the finder read it is not stated.

Outcome

Where cloud-provider controls fit

Amazon S3 Block Public Access on the account, or set for every account by an organization policy, would have refused the ACL or bucket policy that opened the bucket, and Object Ownership closes the ACL path only, while the sources do not say whether an ACL or a bucket policy opened the bucket; a service control policy would have kept the write to approved administrators. While the grant stood, a resource control policy or the same block would have refused the anonymous read. Each of these controls dates from after this exposure, and each had to be set in the AWS account or organization that held the bucket, which no source names; Amazon says only that its salesperson created it, and your settings do not reach a bucket that another account holds for you. Azure and Google Cloud refuse the same opening with the anonymous-access setting and the public access prevention constraint, and Oracle Cloud with a Security Zone. Finding a public bucket and closing it stay the owner's job: the provider's checks report a public bucket rather than refuse it.

Could this have been prevented?

In hindsight, not as a whole. 1 control would have refused a step outright, and 4 controls would have limited one. 2 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.

1
Prevented
4
Contained
2
Not covered

How it could have been prevented

The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.

External Parties
UpGuard
GoDaddy
Internet
Pricing Model Bucket · Amazon S3
Public Pricing Bucket
Workbook · eight tabs
Host Data · 24,000+ names
Price List Tab

Replaying the GoDaddy June 2018 exposure

1 · Configured: a salesperson's pricing bucket open to anyone

1 Prevented2 Contained3 on other clouds

2 · Reachable: data on over 24,000 hosts and AWS pricing

2 Contained3 on other clouds

3 · Found and closed: 36 days from notice to closure

2 Not covered

Key facts

  • Amazon said an AWS salesperson created the bucket to store prospective AWS pricing scenarios and did not follow AWS best practices with it; which setting made it public, which AWS account held it and when were not stated
  • The latest revision of the spreadsheet was a 17 MB Excel workbook with eight tabs; its largest tab held 41 data points for over 24,000 unique hostnames, and its price list held what appear to be the AWS discounts offered to GoDaddy
  • Engadget, citing the UpGuard report, put the systems across all file versions at over 31,000
  • The data held no credentials, and AWS said it held no GoDaddy customer information; GoDaddy called the documents speculative models from an AWS employee that did not reflect work underway with Amazon
  • An UpGuard analyst found the bucket on June 19, 2018, UpGuard began notifying GoDaddy on June 20, and the exposure was closed on July 26, the day GoDaddy replied, 36 days after the first notice
  • No source said whether anyone other than the finder read the data; SiliconANGLE reported no evidence that it was taken for malicious purposes

Sources

Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.

  1. 1.
    Public Domain: How Configuration Information For the World's Largest Domain Name Registrar Was ExposedUpGuard · Aug 9, 2018 · ResearchDiscovery on June 19, 2018, public readability of the bucket, the workbook revisions and their tabs, the hostname and data-point counts, the apparent AWS discounts, no credentials in the data, the notice to GoDaddy from June 20, 2018, the closure on July 26, 2018, Amazon's statement that an AWS salesperson created the bucket
  2. 2.
    Amazon AWS error exposes info on 31,000 GoDaddy serversEngadget · Aug 9, 2018 · NewsGoDaddy's statement that the documents were speculative models from an AWS employee, the count of over 31,000 systems across the file versions, over five weeks from notice to closure, no statement on access by others
  3. 3.
    GoDaddy Leaks 'Map of the Internet' via Amazon S3 Cloud Bucket MisconfigThreatpost · Aug 13, 2018 · NewsAWS's statement that the bucket stored prospective pricing scenarios, held no GoDaddy customer information, and that the salesperson did not follow AWS best practices with it
  4. 4.
    GoDaddy data exposed by AWS employee misconfiguring cloud instanceSiliconANGLE · Aug 9, 2018 · NewsThe AWS statement as re-reported, the data no longer publicly exposed, no evidence the data was taken for malicious purposes

The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of the exposure; the owner's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the data is exposed. They are not an assessment of the owner's security program.

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