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IntrusionAWS
8 min read

Chegg's S3 user database taken with a shared AWS key

Victim
Chegg
When
April 2018 (on or around April 29, per Chegg)Disclosed Sep 25, 2018
Entry
The FTC alleges a former contractor used an AWS access key with full administrative privileges over Chegg's S3 data, which Chegg shared among employees and outside contractors with no multi-factor authentication and no key rotation.

The FTC alleges Chegg let employees and outside contractors share one AWS access key with full administrative privileges over all data in its S3 databases, with no multi-factor authentication and no key rotation. In or around April 2018 a former contractor used the key to exfiltrate a database with personal information of about 40 million users; passwords were MD5 hashes and the other fields were in plain text. In September 2018 a threat intelligence vendor told Chegg that a file with some of the data was in an online forum, with about 25 million passwords already cracked.

What happened

External Parties
Former contractor
Online forum
Universities
+ 1 more
Internet
AWS APIone shared key
Holders of the shared key
Amazon S3
Chegg's S3 databases
Shared AWS key
Chegg employees
Outside contractors
S3 user database

Replaying the Chegg April 2018 intrusion

  1. 1

    One full-rights key, shared

    From at least 2017 to at earliest October 2018

    The FTC alleges Chegg let employees and outside contractors use one AWS access key with full administrative privileges over its S3 data, with no multi-factor authentication and no key rotation, and that the key still worked for a former contractor.

  2. 2

    The key opens S3

    In or around April 2018; on or around April 29, 2018, per Chegg

    The FTC alleges a former contractor used the shared key to access one of Chegg's S3 databases and exfiltrated a database with personal information of about 40 million users. The network and the tool used are not stated.

  3. 3

    Cracked, found and reset

    September 2018

    The FTC alleges a threat intelligence vendor told Chegg that a file with some of the data was in an online forum, with about 25 million passwords already cracked. Chegg said it learned of the access on September 19, 2018 and reset every user's password from September 26, 2018.

  4. 4

    Cracked passwords misused

    September 2019

    Cracked Chegg email and password pairs were reportedly posted online, and several universities reported malicious use of them. Whether they are the same data as the 2018 forum file is not stated.

Impact

The FTC alleges a former contractor used a shared AWS key with full rights to exfiltrate a database with personal information of about 40 million users from Chegg's S3 buckets, and that about 25 million of its passwords were cracked and found in a file in an online forum. Chegg said an unauthorized party gained access on or around April 29, 2018, that the data may have included name, email address, shipping address, username and hashed password, and reset every user's password. Cracked Chegg credentials were reportedly posted online in September 2019 and used against university accounts.

Outcome

Where cloud-provider controls fit

The FTC alleges one AWS key with full rights over Chegg's S3 data was shared by employees and contractors, with no multi-factor authentication and no rotation, and still worked for a former contractor. On your clouds you can refuse new long-lived keys with a service control policy, remove root user credentials from member accounts, refuse calls from outside your networks or without MFA, and keep data under an AWS KMS key whose policy names only your application. Offboarding, the MD5 password hashing and the detection of the copy were Chegg's own layers. The FTC alleges the former contractor took a database of about 40 million users, and that about 25 million of its passwords were cracked.

Could this have been prevented?

In hindsight, no control would have stopped it. 9 controls would have limited how far it went. 5 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.

0
Prevented
9
Contained
5
Not covered

How it could have been prevented

The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.

External Parties
Former contractor
Online forum
Universities
+ 1 more
Internet
AWS APIone shared key
Holders of the shared key
Amazon S3
Chegg's S3 databases
Shared AWS key
Chegg employees
Outside contractors
S3 user database

Replaying the Chegg April 2018 intrusion

1 · One full-rights key, shared

3 Contained2 Not covered6 on other clouds

2 · The key opens S3

6 Contained6 on other clouds

3 · Cracked, found and reset

2 Not covered

4 · Cracked passwords misused

1 Not covered

Key facts

  • The FTC alleges Chegg let employees and outside contractors use one AWS access key with full administrative privileges over all data in its S3 databases, with no multi-factor authentication and no key rotation
  • In or around April 2018 a former contractor used the key to access one of Chegg's S3 databases and exfiltrated a database with personal information of about 40 million users, per the FTC
  • The FTC alleges the passwords were MD5 hashes and the other fields were in plain text in the S3 database
  • In September 2018 a threat intelligence vendor told Chegg that a file with some of the data was in an online forum, with about 25 million passwords already cracked, per the FTC
  • Chegg said it learned of the access on September 19, 2018, filed a Form 8-K on September 25, 2018 and reset the password of every user account
  • The FTC issued its final order on January 25, 2023; Chegg neither admitted nor denied the allegations

Sources

Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.

  1. 1.
    In the Matter of Chegg, Inc.: Complaint (FTC File No. 202-3151), as released with the proposed consent orderFederal Trade Commission · Oct 31, 2022 · AdvisoryS3 as Chegg's store of user data, the shared AWS access key with full administrative privileges, the missing MFA, rotation and job-based access, the former contractor's access and exfiltration in or around April 2018, the count of about 40 million users, MD5 hashing and plain text, the forum file and about 25 million cracked passwords, the missing exfiltration monitoring and the password reset
  2. 2.
    In the Matter of Chegg, Inc.: Decision and Order (proposed)Federal Trade Commission · Oct 31, 2022 · AdvisoryChegg neither admitting nor denying the allegations, and the order's requirements on access controls, multi-factor authentication, logging and exfiltration monitoring
  3. 3.
    In the Matter of Chegg, Inc.: Decision and Order (Docket No. C-4782)Federal Trade Commission · Jan 25, 2023 · AdvisoryThe final order's issue date of January 25, 2023
  4. 4.
    Chegg, Inc. Form 8-K, Items 7.01 and 8.01 (accession 0001364954-18-000187)Chegg, Inc. (SEC Form 8-K) · Sep 25, 2018 · Vendor reportChegg's dates (access on or around April 29, 2018, learned on September 19, 2018, filed on September 25, 2018), the data types it named, the notification from September 26, 2018 and the password reset of every user account
  5. 5.
    Notice of Data Breach: Important Information About Your Chegg Account SecurityChegg, Inc. (sample notice filed with the California Attorney General) · Sep 26, 2018 · Vendor reportChegg's notice to users, the password change at login and the advice to change reused passwords on other sites
  6. 6.
    Chegg Data BreachHave I Been Pwned · Aug 16, 2019 · ResearchThe passwords being unsalted MD5 hashes
  7. 7.
    Update on Chegg Data Breach: Decrypted credentials now leading to multiple campus security attacksOn EdTech · Nov 25, 2019 · NewsThe September 2019 posting of cracked Chegg credentials and their malicious use against university accounts

The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of attack stages; the victim's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the incident. They are not an assessment of the victim's security program.

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