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ExposureAzure · SaaS
11 min read

Microsoft AI research storage exposed by an Account SAS token

Owner
Microsoft
When
Jul 20, 2020 – Jun 24, 2023Disclosed Sep 18, 2023
Entry
A URL for a private Azure Storage account, carrying a SAS token that granted full control over the entire account (an Account SAS, per Wiz), committed to a public GitHub repository in July 2020 and valid, after a 2021 change, until 2051.

On July 20, 2020 a URL carrying a SAS token for a private Azure Storage account was committed to Microsoft's public robust-models-transfer repository on GitHub; per Wiz it was an Account SAS with full control over the entire account, and a commit on October 6, 2021 moved its expiry to 2051. Wiz Research found it while scanning the internet for exposed storage and reported it to MSRC on June 22, 2023, and Microsoft revoked the token and blocked external access on June 24: for 1,069 days anyone with the URL could read, overwrite and delete the 38TB beside the models, among them workstation backups, passwords, keys and over 30,000 internal Teams messages. Microsoft said its investigation did not identify any other unintended access and that no customer data was exposed.

What was exposed

External Parties
Wiz Research
GitHub
Internet
Azure Storage endpointSAS signed with the account key
+ robust-models-transfer
+ storage URL, SAS token
+ expiry commit, 2021
Public Repository · GitHub
AI Research Data · Azure Storage
Storage Account · private
AI Models · pickle files
Workstation Backups
Passwords + Keys
Teams Messages · 30,000+

Replaying the Microsoft July 2020 exposure

  1. 1

    Configured: an account-wide token in a public repository

    Jul 20, 2020 and Oct 6, 2021

    A URL carrying a SAS token with full control over the entire storage account, per Wiz, is committed to the public repository; a later commit moves its expiry from 2021 to 2051.

  2. 2

    Reachable: open to the internet for 1,069 days

    Jul 20, 2020 to Jun 24, 2023

    Anyone with the URL can list, read, overwrite and delete the models and the 38TB beside them through the Azure Storage endpoint; the account itself is private.

  3. 3

    Found and closed: two days to revoke, after 1,069 days open

    Jun 22–24, 2023

    Wiz Research finds the URL while scanning for exposed storage, reads the account with it and reports it to MSRC; two days later Microsoft revokes the token and blocks external access.

Impact

38TB of data beside the AI models, among them backups of two former employees' workstation profiles, passwords to Microsoft services, secret and private keys and over 30,000 internal Teams messages from 359 employees, open for 1,069 days to anyone with the URL, with full control per Wiz, until Microsoft revoked the token on June 24, 2023; no customer data was exposed per Microsoft, and its investigation identified no other unintended access.

Outcome

Where cloud-provider controls fit

Shared Key access disallowed on the storage account, and kept off by an Azure Policy Deny, would have refused every request signed with the account key, so the URL in the repository would have opened nothing. A SAS expiration policy with the Block action would have denied every request made with a token signed past its limit, so a leaked URL could live hours, not until 2051, and with the models in a storage account of their own for public sharing, network rules would have kept the internal data off the internet. On AWS, Google Cloud and Oracle Cloud the counterparts are analogs, since the incident ran on Azure: a service control policy that denies long-lived access keys, an IAM policy that withholds PAR_MANAGE and the storage.restrictAuthTypes constraint, whose page names requests signed by HMAC or RSA keys and not signed URLs, bound the step, and a resource control policy and VPC Service Controls refuse a leaked key or link from outside your networks, while Oracle Cloud documents no network control for a pre-authenticated request. The commit to a public repository and its discovery stay with source control: your secret scanning reports a leaked URL after the fact, and no provider control refuses the commit.

Could this have been prevented?

In hindsight, not as a whole. 3 controls would have refused a step outright, and 8 controls would have limited one. 2 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.

3
Prevented
8
Contained
2
Not covered

How it could have been prevented

The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.

External Parties
Wiz Research
GitHub
Internet
Azure Storage endpointSAS signed with the account key
+ robust-models-transfer
+ storage URL, SAS token
+ expiry commit, 2021
Public Repository · GitHub
AI Research Data · Azure Storage
Storage Account · private
AI Models · pickle files
Workstation Backups
Passwords + Keys
Teams Messages · 30,000+

Replaying the Microsoft July 2020 exposure

1 · Configured: an account-wide token in a public repository

2 Prevented5 Contained1 Not covered6 on other clouds

2 · Reachable: open to the internet for 1,069 days

1 Prevented2 Contained3 on other clouds

3 · Found and closed: two days to revoke, after 1,069 days open

1 Contained1 Not covered

Key facts

  • A URL with a SAS token for the storage account robustnessws4285631339 was first committed to the public robust-models-transfer repository on July 20, 2020 with an expiry of October 5, 2021; a commit on October 6, 2021 moved the expiry to October 6, 2051
  • Per Wiz the token was an Account SAS with full control over the entire storage account instead of read-only; Microsoft called it overly permissive and stated neither the type nor the grant
  • Besides the models the account held 38TB of data by Wiz's count: backups of two former employees' workstation profiles, passwords to Microsoft services, secret and private keys, and over 30,000 internal Teams messages from 359 Microsoft employees
  • Wiz Research found the URL while scanning the internet for misconfigured storage and reported it to MSRC on June 22, 2023; Microsoft revoked the token and blocked external access on June 24, 1,069 days after the first commit; the URL was replaced on GitHub on July 7, and Microsoft completed its investigation on August 16
  • GitHub secret scanning had flagged the SAS URL, and the finding was marked a false positive; Microsoft said it expanded the detection to any SAS token with overly permissive expirations or privileges, with no date given
  • Microsoft said no customer data was exposed and its investigation did not identify any other unintended access; no source reported misuse, and how the token was revoked was not stated

Sources

Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.

  1. 1.
    Microsoft mitigated exposure of internal information in a storage account due to overly-permissive SAS tokenMicrosoft Security Response Center (MSRC) · Sep 18, 2023 · Vendor reportStorage contents, notification, revocation, customer impact, scanning changes, SAS guidance
  2. 2.
    38TB of data accidentally exposed by Microsoft AI researchersWiz Research · Sep 18, 2023 · ResearchDiscovery, token type and scope, permissions, expiry, data inventory, counts, timeline, SAS mechanics, recommendations
  3. 3.
    Microsoft AI researchers accidentally exposed terabytes of internal sensitive dataTechCrunch · Sep 18, 2023 · NewsDisclosure time, coordinated publication, storage account not public on its own
  4. 4.
    Microsoft AI researchers mistakenly expose 38 TB of dataTechTarget (SearchSecurity) · Sep 18, 2023 · NewsMisuse statement, duration as described by Wiz
  5. 5.
    Microsoft accidentally exposed 38 terabytes of data from employee workstationsThe Record (Recorded Future News) · Sep 18, 2023 · NewsCoordinated disclosure, misuse statement, storage account private
  6. 6.
    Grant limited access to Azure Storage resources using shared access signatures (SAS)Microsoft Learn (Azure Storage documentation) · Feb 27, 2026 · Vendor reportSAS types, account SAS scope, signing, revocation, no tracking of tokens, best practices
  7. 7.
    Prevent authorization with Shared KeyMicrosoft Learn (Azure Storage documentation) · Aug 11, 2026 · Vendor reportAllowSharedKeyAccess, SAS types refused, Azure Policy, detection of SAS use
  8. 8.
    Configure an expiration policy for shared access signatures (SAS)Microsoft Learn (Azure Storage documentation) · Jul 30, 2025 · Vendor reportSAS expiration policy, Log and Block actions, user delegation SAS cap, Azure Policy

The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of the exposure; the owner's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the data is exposed. They are not an assessment of the owner's security program.

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