What was exposed
Replaying the BingBang January 2023 exposure
- 1
Configured: seven internal apps open to every Azure AD tenant
Date not statedThe Bing Trivia app registration in Microsoft's Azure AD tenant is multi-tenant, so Azure AD issues a token for the app to a user of any tenant; App Service Authentication checks only that the token is valid, and the app's code makes no tenant or user check.
- 2
Reachable: any Azure AD user, with read and write access
Jan 31, 2023A test user of Wiz's own tenant signs in to the Bing Trivia CMS, changes a Bing.com carousel entry and shows that injected script can take a signed-in Bing user's Office 365 token; six other internal apps accept sign-in the same way.
- 3
Found and closed: 48 days from the first report to the last fix
Jan 31 to Mar 20, 2023Wiz Research finds Bing Trivia in a scan of internet-facing App Service and Azure Functions endpoints and reports it; Microsoft makes an initial fix the same day, fixes the six other apps by March 20 and changes Azure AD token issuance.
While the setting stood, any user of any Azure AD tenant could sign in to seven Microsoft internal apps with read and write access; through Bing Trivia, Wiz Research changed what Bing.com showed and demonstrated a script-injection path to Bing users' Office 365 data. Microsoft states no unintended access occurred; how long the apps were open is not stated.
Where cloud-provider controls fit
An application management policy that blocks multitenant applications would have kept Bing Trivia single tenant unless it was exempted, and Microsoft Entra ID issues no token for a single-tenant app to a user of another tenant; the sources do not say whether Bing Trivia was meant to serve other tenants or who set its audience. Microsoft announced that restriction in public preview in March 2025, two years after the incident, and an app that was multitenant before the policy keeps its audience. With the app open, the tenant requirement of App Service authentication would have answered a token from another tenant with HTTP 403 before the request reached the app, options MSRC says came with its March 2023 guidance. What a signed-in user may change in the CMS, whether its content runs as script on Bing.com, and the Office 365 token Bing's own endpoint issues stay with the application's code and Microsoft's own service, and no setting closes an app that is already open to every tenant: you change its audience or add the tenant check yourself. On AWS, Google Cloud and Oracle Cloud the counterparts are analogs, since the incident ran on Azure and Microsoft Entra ID: the domain restricted sharing constraint limits new grants to your organization's principals, which Google documents for IAM policies in general without naming the grant that opens an Identity-Aware Proxy app to every Google account, and Application Load Balancer authentication, Identity-Aware Proxy and an identity domain sign-on policy bound who reaches your app, while on AWS and Oracle Cloud which accounts may sign in is set in your identity provider, not by a guardrail.
Could this have been prevented?
In hindsight, no control would have stopped it. 2 controls would have limited how far it went. 4 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.
- 0
- Prevented
- 2
- Contained
- 4
- Not covered
How it could have been prevented
The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.
Replaying the BingBang January 2023 exposure
1 · Configured: seven internal apps open to every Azure AD tenant
1 Contained3 on other clouds2 · Reachable: any Azure AD user, with read and write access
1 Contained2 Not covered3 on other clouds3 · Found and closed: 48 days from the first report to the last fix
2 Not coveredKey facts
- The Bing Trivia app registration in Microsoft's Azure AD tenant was multi-tenant, and App Service Authentication in front of the app checked only that a token was valid; when the app was set up that way is not stated
- Wiz Research signed in with a test user of its own tenant, changed one entry of a Bing search carousel, which appeared in Bing.com results and on the homepage, and reverted it; a harmless test payload showed that injected script ran in Bing users' browsers
- Injected script could request an Office 365 token for the signed-in Bing user from an endpoint of Bing's Work feature; with a test victim account Wiz showed access to Outlook mail
- Six other Microsoft internal apps accepted sign-in from any tenant the same way: Mag News, CNS API, Contact Center, PoliCheck, the Power Automate Blog admin panel and COSMOS, which Wiz put at over 4 exabytes; Wiz said about 25% of the multi-tenant apps it scanned were vulnerable, and its researcher said at Black Hat USA 2023 that most non-Microsoft ones it had found were still configured the same way
- Wiz reported Bing Trivia to MSRC on January 31, 2023 and Microsoft made an initial fix that day; Wiz reported the other six on February 25, MSRC confirmed all reported apps fixed on March 20, and Microsoft awarded a $40,000 bug bounty on March 28
- Microsoft said no unintended access had occurred and changed Azure AD to stop issuing access tokens to clients not registered in the resource tenant, which it said was disabled for more than 99% of customer applications; no source gives the date of that change
Sources
Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.
- 1.BingBang: AAD misconfiguration led to Bing.com results manipulation and account takeoverWiz Research · Mar 29, 2023 · ResearchMisconfiguration, App Service authentication behavior, discovery scan, sign-in from a foreign tenant, CMS reach, Bing.com change, script injection, Office 365 token path, other affected apps, timeline, bounty, recommendations, log guidance
- 2.Guidance on Potential Misconfiguration of Authorization of Multi-Tenant Applications that use Azure ADMicrosoft Security Response Center (MSRC) · Mar 29, 2023 · AdvisoryVictim statement, misconfiguration classes, scope (read and write), no unintended access, Azure AD platform change, App Service Authentication options, customer notifications, recommendations
- 3.Azure blunder left Bing results editable, MS 365 accounts potentially exposedThe Register · Mar 31, 2023 · NewsBounty, Microsoft statement, scan figure
- 4.Wiz warns of exposed multi-tenant apps in Azure ADTechTarget · Aug 9, 2023 · NewsScan counts, tenant setting added by Microsoft, state of non-Microsoft apps in August 2023
The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of the exposure; the owner's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the data is exposed. They are not an assessment of the owner's security program.