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IntrusionAWS · On-premises · SaaS
10 min read

LastPass S3 backups taken through an engineer's home computer

Victim
LastPass
When
August 2022 – Oct 26, 2022Disclosed Nov 30, 2022
Entry
A keylogger on a senior DevOps engineer's personal home computer, installed through a remote code execution flaw in third-party media software (Plex Media Server, CVE-2020-5741 per the ICO findings as The Register reports them), took the engineer's LastPass master password; the engineer's corporate vault held the AWS access key and the decryption key for the S3 backups, and the actor picked the engineer with information taken in incident 1.

In August 2022 an actor used a developer's compromised laptop to take source code and internal secrets from LastPass's cloud-based development environment, and LastPass later learned that this information was used to identify targets; as reported, the actor picked one of four DevOps engineers with access to the backup keys. A remote code execution flaw in media software on the engineer's home computer let the actor install a keylogger, capture the master password and export the corporate vault, which held the access and decryption keys for the AWS S3 production backups. LastPass's support page, as BleepingComputer and Security Affairs report it, gives the actor's activity in the cloud storage as August 12 to October 26, 2022; the actor copied backups of customer account data and encrypted vaults.

What happened

External Parties
Plex
GoTo
LastPass Customers
+ 2 more
Internet
AWS APIaccess key
Employee Computers
Shared Backup Storage · AWS S3
+ 14 of 200 repositories
+ internal system secrets
+ encrypted SSE-C key
Development Environment
+ shared folders
+ AWS access key
+ backup decryption key
LastPass Corporate Vault
Developer's MacBook Pro
Plex Media Server
Engineer's Home Computer
S3 Production Backups
GoTo Product Backups
Cloud IAM Roles

Replaying the LastPass August 2022 intrusion

  1. 1

    Development environment

    Aug 2022

    Through a developer's compromised laptop the actor acts as the developer and takes source code with secrets; per the ICO findings as reported, the code held the encrypted SSE-C key, and an access-management change it tries is refused on a day not given.

  2. 2

    Engineer's home computer

    Aug 12, 2022, as reported

    The actor exploits an earlier, unpatched Plex Media Server (as relayed) on a senior DevOps engineer's home computer and installs a keylogger that captures the engineer's master password.

  3. 3

    Corporate vault

    Aug 2022; key theft Aug 20, as reported

    With the captured master password the actor opens the engineer's corporate vault and, as reported, exports it, taking the AWS access key and the decryption key for the S3 backups.

  4. 4

    S3 backups copied

    Aug 12–Oct 26, 2022, as relayed

    The AWS access key from the vault is accepted and the backups are copied. LastPass's activity window, as relayed, opens on August 12, before the August 20 key theft the ICO findings give; its data page, as Almost Secure relays it, dates the five shards August 20 to September 16 and the copying September 8 to 22, 2022.

  5. 5

    Alerts and aftermath

    From Oct 15, 2022

    The actor tries cloud IAM roles and raises AWS GuardDuty alerts that reach a list with one LastPass member; researchers later link cryptocurrency thefts to the stolen vaults, without proof.

Impact

Backups copied from the cloud storage LastPass shared with its affiliate GoTo: customer account information and metadata, customer vault data with URLs unencrypted and credentials, notes and form data encrypted under each user's master-password key, configuration data, API secrets, third-party integration secrets and the MFA/Federation database backup with its decryption key; GoTo lost encrypted backups of five products and an encryption key for a portion of them. Whether any vault was decrypted later is unconfirmed.

Outcome

Where cloud-provider controls fit

A service control policy that refuses calls signed without MFA refuses an IAM user's long-term access key on first use; the sources do not say which kind of identity the stolen key belonged to. A resource control policy refuses S3 reads from outside your networks, and SSE-KMS under a key policy that names only the restore role keeps the backup key inside AWS KMS, so no copy sits in code or in a vault. Trust policies and a service control policy with network conditions refuse role use from outside your networks; where the actor's requests came from is not stated. The home computer, the media server, the password manager vault and the offline attack on copied vaults stay outside every cloud provider's policy: you own your device rules, your vault policy and where your keys live.

Could this have been prevented?

In hindsight, no control would have stopped it. 10 controls would have limited how far it went. 7 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.

0
Prevented
10
Contained
7
Not covered

How it could have been prevented

The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.

External Parties
Plex
GoTo
LastPass Customers
+ 2 more
Internet
AWS APIaccess key
Employee Computers
Shared Backup Storage · AWS S3
+ 14 of 200 repositories
+ internal system secrets
+ encrypted SSE-C key
Development Environment
+ shared folders
+ AWS access key
+ backup decryption key
LastPass Corporate Vault
Developer's MacBook Pro
Plex Media Server
Engineer's Home Computer
S3 Production Backups
GoTo Product Backups
Cloud IAM Roles

Replaying the LastPass August 2022 intrusion

1 · Development environment

2 Contained2 Not covered3 on other clouds

2 · Engineer's home computer

2 Not covered

3 · Corporate vault

2 Not covered1 on other clouds

4 · S3 backups copied

4 Contained6 on other clouds

5 · Alerts and aftermath

4 Contained1 Not covered3 on other clouds

Key facts

  • In August 2022 the actor took source code from 14 of 200 repositories, technical information and certain internal system secrets through a developer's compromised laptop; LastPass says the development environment held no customer data
  • Only four DevOps engineers had access to the backup decryption keys, per LastPass's support page as BleepingComputer reports it; the actor targeted one of them through vulnerable media software on the engineer's home computer
  • LastPass's support page, as reported, gives the actor's activity in the cloud storage as August 12 to October 26, 2022; the ICO findings, as The Register reports them, date the theft of the decryption key to August 20, 2022
  • Per LastPass's data page as Almost Secure relays it, the actor copied five database shards dated August 20 to September 16, 2022, and the copying took place between September 8 and 22, 2022
  • AWS GuardDuty alerts sent from October 15 to 22, 2022 went to a distribution list with one LastPass member, and the security operations center picked them up on November 2, 18 days after the first, per the ICO findings as The Register reports them
  • The ICO announced a £1.2 million fine on December 11, 2025 and counted up to 1.6 million UK users affected, as The Register reports

Sources

Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.

  1. 1.
    12-22-2022: Notice of Security IncidentLastPass · Dec 22, 2022 · Vendor reportIncident 1 scope, credentials and keys from a second employee, backup contents, vault encryption and defaults, disclosure dates
  2. 2.
    03-01-2023: Security Incident Update and Recommended ActionsLastPass · Mar 1, 2023 · Vendor reportIncident 1 scope (14 of 200 repositories), incident 2 entry, data in the backups, last activity date, remediation, actor unknown
  3. 3.
    Our Response to a Recent Security IncidentGoTo · Apr 20, 2023 · Vendor reportShared cloud storage, encrypted backups of five GoTo products and an encryption key exfiltrated
  4. 4.
    LastPass breach update: The few additional bits of informationAlmost Secure (palant.info) · Mar 5, 2023 · ResearchRelayed from LastPass's support pages: activity window, four DevOps engineers, keys in the corporate vault, shard dates and copy window, the unpatched Plex confirmation
  5. 5.
    LastPass: DevOps engineer hacked to steal password vault data in 2022 breachBleepingComputer · Feb 27, 2023 · NewsReported from LastPass's support page: keylogger, four engineers, vault export, AWS S3 backups, GuardDuty detection, activity window
  6. 6.
    LastPass: hackers breached the computer of a DevOps engineer in a second attackSecurity Affairs · Feb 27, 2023 · NewsReported from LastPass's support page: end of incident 1 and the pivot, the home computer, the activity window
  7. 7.
    CISA warns of actively exploited Plex bug after LastPass breachBleepingComputer · Mar 11, 2023 · NewsCVE-2020-5741 mechanics, the 2020 patch and its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities listing
  8. 8.
    LastPass hammered with £1.2M fine for 2022 breach fiascoThe Register · Dec 11, 2025 · NewsReported ICO findings: the AWS alert in incident 1, the SSE-C key, CVE-2020-5741, the keylogger, the AWS access key, the August 20 key theft, the GuardDuty alert routing and delay, data counts, the fine
  9. 9.
    UK ICO Fines LastPass Over 2022 Data BreachBankInfoSecurity (ISMG) · Dec 11, 2025 · NewsReported ICO findings: the August 11 initial compromise, the key rotation decision, the view on personal devices
  10. 10.
    AI Autopsy: Why the ICO fined LastPass £1.2mAssured Intelligence · Jan 15, 2026 · NewsReported ICO findings: the SSE-C key and access key structure, alert routing, later device measures
  11. 11.
    Experts Fear Crooks are Cracking Keys Stolen in LastPass BreachKrebs on Security · Sep 5, 2023 · NewsResearchers' unconfirmed link between the stolen vaults and later cryptocurrency thefts, iteration history

The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of attack stages; the victim's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the incident. They are not an assessment of the victim's security program.

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