What happened
Replaying the Cloudflare November 2023 intrusion
- 1
Leaked credentials left valid
Oct 18 to Nov 14, 2023Thousands of credentials leak during the Okta compromise, which Cloudflare dates to October 18, 2023; one service token and three service accounts among them are not rotated, because they are believed unused. How they leaked is not stated.
- 2
Probing, and the AWS environment
Nov 14, 2023Logins to Cloudflare's Okta instance and to the Cloudflare Dashboard are denied, and the actor accesses an AWS environment of the Cloudflare Apps marketplace; the report gives no order for the three. The report says the access was limited to the Atlassian suite and its server, records this AWS access as well, and does not explain the difference.
- 3
Into the Atlassian suite
Nov 15–17, 2023The Moveworks token passes Cloudflare's gateway at 16:28:38 UTC on November 15, the Smartsheet service account opens the Atlassian suite, and the wiki and the bug database are searched.
- 4
Persistence and source code
Nov 16–22, 2023A look-alike Atlassian account is created on November 16. On November 22 Sliver is installed on the Atlassian server and an attempt on a São Paulo console server is denied; 76 repositories are archived from Bitbucket to the server on a date the report does not give.
- 5
Found and cut off
Nov 23–24, 2023An administrator group change at 15:58 UTC on November 23 raises an automated alert at 16:00; the accounts are deactivated that evening, and all actor access is terminated on November 24.
202 Confluence pages and 36 Jira tickets read, 120 code repositories viewed and 76 archived to the Atlassian server (exfiltration unconfirmed, treated as exfiltrated), an Atlassian account created, Sliver run on the Atlassian server, and an AWS environment of the Cloudflare Apps marketplace accessed, where what the actor did is not stated; Cloudflare says no customer data or systems were impacted.
Where cloud-provider controls fit
A service control policy that refuses access-key calls without MFA refuses a leaked IAM user key from any network; the report does not state whether the AWS service account here was an IAM user. A service control policy that refuses new access keys keeps later service accounts on roles, but a key that already exists stays valid. A network condition on the key keeps a leaked copy useless outside your networks, and a resource control policy keeps a segmented account's principals out of your other accounts. The Okta tenant, your own gateway, the self-hosted Atlassian suite and your data centers sit outside every cloud provider's policy: you own the rotation of the tokens and accounts they accept.
Could this have been prevented?
In hindsight, no control would have stopped it. 5 controls would have limited how far it went. 12 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.
- 0
- Prevented
- 5
- Contained
- 12
- Not covered
How it could have been prevented
The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.
Replaying the Cloudflare November 2023 intrusion
1 · Leaked credentials left valid
2 Contained2 Not covered3 on other clouds2 · Probing, and the AWS environment
3 Contained1 Not covered5 on other clouds3 · Into the Atlassian suite
3 Not covered4 · Persistence and source code
4 Not covered5 · Found and cut off
2 Not coveredKey facts
- After the Okta compromise, which Cloudflare dates to October 18, 2023, Cloudflare did not rotate one service token and three service accounts, out of thousands of leaked credentials, because it believed they were unused
- On November 14, 2023 the actor's logins to Cloudflare's Okta instance and to the Cloudflare Dashboard were denied, and the actor accessed an AWS environment of the Cloudflare Apps marketplace, which the report says was segmented with no access to the global network or customer data
- From 16:28:38 UTC on November 15 the actor used the Moveworks token through Cloudflare's gateway and the Smartsheet service account in the Atlassian suite; it accessed 202 of 194,100 wiki pages and 36 of 2,059,357 Jira tickets
- On November 22 the actor installed Sliver on the Atlassian server through ScriptRunner for Jira; it viewed 120 of 11,904 repositories and archived 76 to the Atlassian server, on dates the report does not give, and Cloudflare treated them as exfiltrated
- An automated alert at 16:00 UTC on November 23 reported the Smartsheet account's addition to an administrator group; all actor access was terminated on November 24, and Code Red rotated more than 5,000 production credentials
- The report says the access was limited to the Atlassian suite and its server, also records the AWS access and does not explain the difference; the 10-K says the access was cut off prior to significant impact on customer data or systems
Sources
Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.
- 1.Thanksgiving 2023 security incidentCloudflare · Feb 1, 2024 · Vendor reportUnrotated credentials, AWS environment access, Atlassian access and counts, account creation, persistence, source code, São Paulo attempt, detection, containment, Code Red, impact, attribution
- 2.How Cloudflare mitigated yet another Okta compromiseCloudflare · Oct 20, 2023 · Vendor reportThe October 18, 2023 attack through Okta's support system
- 3.Unauthorized Access to Okta's Support Case Management System: Root Cause and RemediationOkta · Nov 3, 2023 · Vendor reportOkta support-system intrusion and token revocations (context)
- 4.Cloudflare discloses breach related to stolen Okta dataTechTarget (SearchSecurity) · Feb 2, 2024 · NewsOkta's statement and its October 19 credential-rotation guidance
- 5.Annual report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2023Cloudflare (SEC Form 10-K) · Feb 21, 2024 · Vendor reportHedged customer-impact statement, materiality, link to the October 2023 breach
The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of attack stages; the victim's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the incident. They are not an assessment of the victim's security program.