What happened
Replaying the Imperva October 2018 intrusion
- 1
A test snapshot and an exposed instance
Before October 2018 (date not stated)A database snapshot of customer data is created for testing, and an internal instance that holds an administrative AWS API key is reachable from the internet.
- 2
Instance compromised, key stolen
On or before October 2018 (date not stated)The instance is compromised and the AWS API key it holds is stolen; how and when are not stated.
- 3
The key reaches the snapshot
October 2018The AWS API accepts the stolen administrative key in a production account, and the key reaches the test snapshot; the data leaves.
- 4
A bug bounty request and the response
Aug 20 to Oct 10, 2019A third party sends Imperva the dataset and asks for a bug bounty; Imperva resets passwords and asks customers to rotate API keys and certificates.
Email addresses and hashed and salted passwords of a subset of Cloud WAF customers with accounts through September 15, 2017, and for a subset of them API keys and customer-provided TLS certificates, left in October 2018; the number of affected customers was not disclosed.
Where cloud-provider controls fit
VPC Block Public Access, set on the account or held by an AWS Organizations declarative policy, refuses internet gateway traffic to an instance in a VPC; where this instance ran is not stated. An IAM role in place of a stored administrative key would have left only credentials that expire, and a deny on network condition keys in a service control policy bounds a key to the networks it admits. A service control policy that denies sharing, copying, export and restore of an Amazon RDS snapshot, or a permissions boundary on the key's identity, bounds what the key can do with such a snapshot. None of these is shown to stop a step, because each depends on facts the sources leave open: where the instance ran, the key type, the snapshot type, the network the calls came from and whether the account belonged to an AWS organization. The decision to copy customer data for testing, the software on the instance and the detection stay with you on every cloud.
Could this have been prevented?
In hindsight, no control would have stopped it. 8 controls would have limited how far it went. 5 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.
- 0
- Prevented
- 8
- Contained
- 5
- Not covered
How it could have been prevented
The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.
Replaying the Imperva October 2018 intrusion
1 · A test snapshot and an exposed instance
2 Contained1 Not covered6 on other clouds2 · Instance compromised, key stolen
1 Contained2 Not covered6 on other clouds3 · The key reaches the snapshot
5 Contained6 on other clouds4 · A bug bounty request and the response
2 Not coveredKey facts
- Imperva migrated the Cloud WAF user database to Amazon RDS in 2017; its database activity monitoring product did not support RDS at the time
- An internal compute instance was reachable from the internet and held an administrative AWS API key; how the instance was compromised is not stated
- The key was used without authorization in a production AWS account in October 2018 to access a test snapshot with data as of September 15, 2017
- Imperva learned of the exposure on August 20, 2019, when a third party sent the dataset and requested a bug bounty
- Customers changed more than 13,000 passwords, rotated more than 13,500 SSL certificates and regenerated more than 1,400 API keys, per Imperva's October 10, 2019 update
- Imperva did not disclose how many customers were affected
Sources
Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.
- 1.Imperva Security UpdateImperva · Oct 10, 2019 · Vendor reportThe RDS migration, the test snapshot, the internet-reachable instance and its administrative AWS API key, the October 2018 key use and exfiltration, the August 20, 2019 bug bounty request, the data types, the customer action counts and the remediation
- 2.Cybersecurity Firm Imperva Discloses BreachKrebs on Security · Aug 27, 2019 · NewsThe August 27, 2019 customer notice, the August 20 discovery through a third party and what exposed API keys and certificates let an attacker do
- 3.Imperva Alerts Customers About 'Security Incident'Information Security Media Group (GovInfoSecurity) · Aug 28, 2019 · NewsThe undisclosed number of affected customers
- 4.Imperva breach update puts blame on exposed AWS API keysTechTarget SearchSecurity · Oct 14, 2019 · NewsThe October 2018 key use in a production AWS account, the forced password resets, the direct contact with customers about keys and certificates, and the undisclosed customer count
The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of attack stages; the victim's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the incident. They are not an assessment of the victim's security program.