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ExposureAWS
6 min read

9,402 TigerSwan job applicant files in a public Amazon S3 bucket

Owner
TigerSwan (files left by its former recruiting vendor TalentPen, as TigerSwan states)
When
start not stated; public by July 20, 2017 – Aug 24, 2017Disclosed Sep 2, 2017
Entry
An Amazon S3 bucket holding 9,402 resumes and application forms for TigerSwan jobs was readable by any internet user with its address; TigerSwan says its former recruiting vendor set it up for a file transfer and never removed the files.

An Amazon S3 bucket held 9,402 resumes and application forms submitted for jobs at TigerSwan, with names, home addresses, driver's license and passport numbers, clearance details and at least partial Social Security numbers, readable by any internet user with its address. TigerSwan says its former recruiting vendor, TalentPen, set the bucket up for a file transfer in February 2017 and never removed the files; Gizmodo could not confirm TalentPen's involvement, and which setting opened the bucket, and when, is not stated. An UpGuard researcher found the bucket on July 20, 2017 and UpGuard notified TigerSwan the next day; the files were not secured until August 24, and whether anyone else read them is not stated.

What was exposed

External Parties
UpGuard
TigerSwan
TalentPen
Internet
Applicant Resume Bucket · Amazon S3
Public S3 Bucket
Applicant Files · 9,402
ID and Clearance Details
Reference Contacts

Replaying the TigerSwan July 2017 exposure

  1. 1

    Configured: an applicant-file bucket open to anyone

    Not stated; files from February 2017

    An S3 bucket of job applicant files from February 2017 is configured for public access; TigerSwan says its former recruiting vendor set it up for a transfer, and which setting opened it, and when, is not stated.

  2. 2

    Reachable: 9,402 documents for anyone with the address

    Until August 24, 2017; start not stated

    Anyone who accesses the bucket's address can read the folder, with no credential named: resumes and application forms with home addresses, passport numbers, clearance details and at least partial Social Security numbers.

  3. 3

    Found and closed: 34 days from notice to closure

    July 20 – August 24, 2017

    An UpGuard researcher finds the bucket and UpGuard notifies TigerSwan, which says it took the warnings for phishing and had no access to the bucket; the files are secured on August 24, by its former vendor as TigerSwan tells it.

Impact

9,402 resumes and application forms for TigerSwan jobs, with names, home addresses, phone numbers, driver's license and passport numbers, clearance details and at least partial Social Security numbers, were readable by any internet user with the bucket's address until August 24, 2017; when the bucket became public is not stated, and whether anyone other than UpGuard read the files is not stated.

Outcome

Where cloud-provider controls fit

Amazon S3 Block Public Access on the account, or set for every account by an organization policy, would have refused the ACL or bucket policy that opened the bucket, and Object Ownership would have closed the ACL path, if an ACL is what opened it; a service control policy would have kept the write to approved administrators. While the grant stood, a resource control policy or the same block would have refused the anonymous read. Each of these acts in the AWS account or organization that holds the bucket: TigerSwan says the bucket was its former vendor's and that it had no access to it, so your own settings do not reach a bucket that a vendor holds for you. Azure and Google Cloud refuse the same opening with the anonymous-access setting and the public access prevention constraint, and Oracle Cloud with a Security Zone. Every one of these controls came later than this exposure: they show what the providers refuse today. Finding a public bucket and closing it stay the owner's job: the provider's checks report a public bucket rather than refuse it, and no control ends a public grant on its own.

Could this have been prevented?

In hindsight, not as a whole. 1 control would have refused a step outright, and 4 controls would have limited one. 2 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.

1
Prevented
4
Contained
2
Not covered

How it could have been prevented

The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.

External Parties
UpGuard
TigerSwan
TalentPen
Internet
Applicant Resume Bucket · Amazon S3
Public S3 Bucket
Applicant Files · 9,402
ID and Clearance Details
Reference Contacts

Replaying the TigerSwan July 2017 exposure

1 · Configured: an applicant-file bucket open to anyone

1 Prevented2 Contained3 on other clouds

2 · Reachable: 9,402 documents for anyone with the address

2 Contained3 on other clouds

3 · Found and closed: 34 days from notice to closure

2 Not covered

Key facts

  • The bucket held a folder of 9,402 resumes and application forms, last backed up or uploaded in February 2017, with names, home addresses, phone numbers, driver's license and passport numbers, clearance details and at least partial Social Security numbers
  • UpGuard's analysis counted 295 resumes that claimed a Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information clearance; files of Iraqi and Afghan translators were among them, at least 4 of each by UpGuard's count and 15 to 20 by Gizmodo's report
  • Which setting opened the bucket, who set it and when were not stated; the files dated from February 2017, and how long the bucket stood open was unconfirmed
  • TigerSwan said its former recruiting vendor TalentPen set up the bucket for a transfer that ran from February 6 to 10, 2017, secured by an access key pair, and never removed the files; Gizmodo could not confirm TalentPen's involvement, and how that fits the public access the finder saw was not stated
  • An UpGuard researcher found the bucket on July 20, 2017; UpGuard notified TigerSwan by email on July 21 and by phone on July 22 and August 10, and TigerSwan said it took the warnings for phishing
  • The files were secured on August 24, 2017, 34 days after the first notice; TigerSwan said TalentPen removed them after AWS informed it, and no source said whether anyone other than UpGuard read the files

Sources

Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.

  1. 1.
    Insecure: How A Private Military Contractor's Hiring Files LeakedUpGuard · Sep 2, 2017 · ResearchPublic access by the bucket's address, a folder of 9,402 documents last uploaded in February 2017, the data fields and keyword counts, the notification sequence from July 20 to August 24, 2017, TigerSwan's attribution to a former recruiting vendor
  2. 2.
    Data Breach Exposes Thousands of Job Seekers Citing Top Secret Government Work [Updated]Gizmodo · Sep 4, 2017 · NewsNo password on the bucket, mid-February file timestamps, TigerSwan's statement, TalentPen unreachable and its involvement unconfirmed, the emails TigerSwan forwarded, the unconfirmed duration, the count of Iraqi and Afghan applicants as reported
  3. 3.
    Leaky S3 bucket sloshes deets of thousands with US security clearanceThe Register · Sep 4, 2017 · NewsTigerSwan's statement that AWS informed TalentPen in August and that TalentPen removed the files on August 24, 2017, TalentPen's acknowledgment after August 31
  4. 4.
    TigerSwan data leak: Thousands of military and intelligence personnel files exposed in cloud storage errorIBTimes UK · Sep 4, 2017 · NewsTigerSwan's statement on the February 2017 transfer and the files left in the bucket, that it did not control the site, the July 21 email taken for possible phishing, its contact with AWS in August
  5. 5.
    Amazon S3 Security Gaffe Exposes Thousands of Vets, Intelligence PersonnelAWS Insider · Sep 6, 2017 · NewsThe transfer site's lifespan of February 6 to 10, 2017 and the access key pair TigerSwan says secured it, the bucket set up by TalentPen in February as TigerSwan tells it
  6. 6.
    Details of U.S. 'Top Secret' Clearance Holders Leaked OnlineSecurityWeek · Sep 5, 2017 · NewsTigerSwan's account that it took UpGuard's warnings for phishing and recognized them on August 31, 2017, the hotline for applicants of 2008 to 2017

The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of the exposure; the owner's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the data is exposed. They are not an assessment of the owner's security program.

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