What happened
Replaying the APT29 intrusion, reported August 2022
- 1
Entry: a guessed password
Not statedA password guessing attack against a list of mailboxes succeeds on an account that had been set up but never used.
- 2
Foothold: the actor's own MFA device
Not statedAzure AD prompts the dormant account to enrol MFA at sign-in, and the actor enrols; by default nothing checks the location or the device.
- 3
Reach: into the VPN
Not statedWith the guessed password and its own MFA device, the actor uses the account to open the organization's VPN, which relies on Azure AD for authentication and MFA.
The actor gained a working account with its own MFA device and access to the organization's VPN; the source does not say what it did next.
Where Microsoft Entra controls fit
A Conditional Access policy that requires multifactor authentication to register security information, with Temporary Access Passes from your help desk for new users, would have refused the registration of the actor's device, as long as the actor held no pass. Limiting registration to your trusted networks, and requiring a compliant or hybrid joined device for the VPN's application, would have narrowed the next steps, though the source does not say which network or device the actor used. Smart lockout and Password Protection bound password guessing but do not refuse a correct password. Make sure every active account in your tenant has at least one MFA method registered.
Could this have been prevented?
In hindsight, not as a whole. 1 control would have refused a step outright, and 4 controls would have limited one. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.
- 1
- Prevented
- 4
- Contained
- 0
- Not covered
How it could have been prevented
The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.
Replaying the APT29 intrusion, reported August 2022
1 · Entry: a guessed password
2 Contained3 on other clouds2 · Foothold: the actor's own MFA device
1 Prevented1 Contained3 on other clouds3 · Reach: into the VPN
1 Contained3 on other cloudsKey facts
- Mandiant published the case on August 18, 2022 and attributed it to APT29, which it assesses is likely sponsored by Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR)
- APT29 ran a password guessing attack against a list of mailboxes obtained by means the source calls unknown, and one guess succeeded on an account that had been set up but never used
- Because the account was dormant, Azure AD prompted it to enrol in MFA at sign-in, and the actor enrolled
- Mandiant said that in Azure AD's default configuration there were no further checks on MFA enrollment, so whoever first held the user name and password could enrol from any location and device
- The actor then used the account to access the organization's VPN infrastructure, which used Azure AD for authentication and MFA
- No source named the victim, dated the steps, counted the mailboxes or guesses, or said what followed the VPN access
Sources
Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.
- 1.You Can't Audit Me: APT29 Continues Targeting Microsoft 365Mandiant (Google Cloud) · Aug 18, 2022 · ResearchPassword guessing, the dormant account, MFA enrollment at first sign-in, VPN access through Azure AD, attribution, recommendations
- 2.How attackers use and abuse Microsoft MFAHelp Net Security · Aug 24, 2022 · NewsRe-report of the dormant-account case
The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of attack stages; the victim's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the incident. They are not an assessment of the victim's security program.