What was exposed
Replaying the Verizon and NICE June 2017 exposure
- 1
Configured: a vendor's call-log bucket open to anyone
Not stated; before June 8, 2017A NICE Systems S3 bucket of Verizon call-center logs is configured to allow public access; which setting opened it, and when, is not stated.
- 2
Reachable: six months of call logs at a public address
Until June 22, 2017; start not statedAnyone who enters the bucket's address can download it, with no credential named: call logs with Verizon customer names, addresses, phone numbers and account PINs.
- 3
Found and closed: secured nine days after the notice
June 8–22, 2017An UpGuard researcher finds the bucket and UpGuard notifies Verizon on June 13; the bucket is secured on June 22, and who made the change is not stated.
Call-center logs from January to June 2017 with Verizon customer names, addresses, phone numbers and account PINs, unmasked in some records, plus files of Orange S.A., were downloadable by anyone with the bucket's address until June 22, 2017; when the exposure began is not stated, and Verizon says no one other than the finder accessed it, which no independent source confirms.
Where cloud-provider controls fit
Amazon S3 Block Public Access on the account, or set for every account by an organization policy, would have refused the ACL or bucket policy that opened the bucket. Object Ownership would have closed the ACL path only, and the sources do not say whether an ACL or a bucket policy opened the bucket. A service control policy would have kept the write to approved administrators. While the grant stood, a resource control policy or the same block would have refused the anonymous download. Each of these had to be set in the AWS account or organization that held the bucket, which the sources do not name; an account setting reaches only the buckets its own account owns, so your settings do not reach a bucket that another account holds for you. Azure and Google Cloud refuse the same opening with the anonymous-access setting and the public access prevention constraint, and Oracle Cloud with a Security Zone. Finding a public bucket and closing it stay the owner's job: the provider's checks report a public bucket rather than refuse it.
Could this have been prevented?
In hindsight, not as a whole. 1 control would have refused a step outright, and 4 controls would have limited one. 2 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.
- 1
- Prevented
- 4
- Contained
- 2
- Not covered
How it could have been prevented
The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.
Replaying the Verizon and NICE June 2017 exposure
1 · Configured: a vendor's call-log bucket open to anyone
1 Prevented2 Contained3 on other clouds2 · Reachable: six months of call logs at a public address
2 Contained3 on other clouds3 · Found and closed: secured nine days after the notice
2 Not coveredKey facts
- The bucket, owned and operated by NICE Systems and administered by one of its engineers, was configured to allow public access; Verizon said the vendor's employee incorrectly set the AWS storage to allow external access
- Which setting opened the bucket, and when, was not stated; the call logs began in January 2017
- The bucket held six monthly folders of call-center logs, January to June 2017, with text files up to 23 GB unzipped; account PINs were masked in many records and unmasked in others, and one file held six thousand unmasked PINs
- UpGuard estimated as many as 14 million US customers; Verizon put the count at about 6 million unique customers
- An UpGuard researcher found the bucket on June 8, 2017, UpGuard notified Verizon on June 13, and the bucket was secured on June 22, nine days after the notice; one news report dated the notice to the end of June
- Verizon said no one other than UpGuard accessed the storage, and NICE called the data part of a demo system; no independent source confirmed the first claim
Sources
Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.
- 1.Cloud Leak: How A Verizon Partner Exposed Millions of Customer AccountsUpGuard · Jul 12, 2017 · ResearchPublic access by the S3 address, owner NICE Systems and its administering engineer, six monthly folders of call logs, data fields and unmasked PINs, Orange S.A. files, discovery on June 8, 2017, notice to Verizon on June 13, 2017, closure on June 22, 2017, estimate of up to 14 million customers
- 2.Verizon Customer Data Exposed by NICE SystemsMacRumors · Jul 12, 2017 · NewsVerizon's statement on the vendor employee and the external-access setting, its authorization of the vendor's AWS storage, Verizon's count of 6 million
- 3.Verizon Downplays Leak of Millions of Customer RecordsSecurityWeek · Jul 13, 2017 · NewsVerizon's count of 6 million, no access other than the finder as Verizon puts it, no Social Security numbers or voice recordings, the PINs authenticate wireline call-center callers
- 4.Millions of Verizon Customer Records Exposed through Open Amazon S3 BucketData Center Knowledge (IT Pro Today) · Jul 13, 2017 · NewsNICE's statement on a demo system and no other customer affected, its continued investigation, Verizon's statement of no evidence of compromise, a notice date at the end of June
- 5.AWS S3 bucket leak exposes millions of Verizon customers' dataTechTarget SearchSecurity · Jul 14, 2017 · NewsAccess by anyone who knew the bucket's address, no reported attacker access
The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of the exposure; the owner's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the data is exposed. They are not an assessment of the owner's security program.