What happened
Replaying the Federated IT December 2016 intrusion / a departing administrator of an Army system on AWS
- 1
Sole control of the AWS account
Dec 7, 2016Warned of his termination, the engineer signs in to the AWS Management Console with a password from the shared password file and deletes every other user and administrator account.
- 2
The domain and the project files
Dec 7–8, 2016He moves the registrant of the system's website domain to a business name of his own, deletes 19 project files and downloads two that hold AWS service account information and network diagrams.
- 3
After termination
Dec 8, 2016After he is told of his termination, sixteen backup machine images are shared with an AWS account he owns, and a command run on a server of the web application erases all its data while he is the only administrator; logs also show his login to the SharePoint application.
Every other user and administrator account of the AWS console was deleted, leaving him sole control; sixteen backup machine images valued above $5,000 were shared with his own AWS account; a server was erased and a student training course was disrupted; the Justice Department estimated about $1.1 million in damage.
What bounds an administrator who is leaving
The engineer used passwords he had been given, the day before his termination, so no AWS setting told his sign-in from a current administrator's. What bounds an administrator is a policy his own access cannot change: a service control policy that keeps your IAM user deletions and your image sharing with a role he does not hold, an AWS Sign-In policy that accepts console sign-in only from your office network, and AWS Backup Vault Lock in compliance mode, which keeps your recovery points through a wipe if the server was backed up into a locked vault first. The service control policies bind only a member account of an AWS organization whose management account he did not hold, and each of these AWS controls was released after December 2016. The domain registrar and the contractor's project files sat outside AWS, and a command typed inside a server makes no AWS request to refuse.
Could this have been prevented?
In hindsight, no control would have stopped it. 4 controls would have limited how far it went. 4 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.
- 0
- Prevented
- 4
- Contained
- 4
- Not covered
How it could have been prevented
The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.
Replaying the Federated IT December 2016 intrusion / a departing administrator of an Army system on AWS
1 · Sole control of the AWS account
2 Contained1 Not covered6 on other clouds2 · The domain and the project files
2 Not covered3 · After termination
2 Contained1 Not covered6 on other cloudsKey facts
- On December 7, 2016 the engineer, warned of his coming termination, used the master password of an encrypted file holding every other system password to delete all user and administrator accounts but his own from the AWS Management Console, and refused the contractor's request for the password (statement of facts)
- On December 7 and 8 he changed the registrant of the system's website domain to a business name at his own address; on the morning of December 8 he deleted 19 project files and downloaded two that held AWS service account information and network diagrams
- He was told of his termination at 13:30 local time on December 8; that evening sixteen backup machine images of the web application, valued above $5,000, were shared with an AWS account he owned
- The same day, while he was the only person with access, a command run against a server of the web application erased all the information on it; engineers rebuilt a test server, and a training course for Chaplain Corps students was disrupted
- News reports said he attacked the system after his dismissal: The Register reported denial-of-service attacks in the following weeks, and CyberScoop, citing an FBI affidavit, nearly 40,000 password-guessing attacks that left one server unreachable for more than two weeks
- He pleaded guilty in May 2019 to one count of unlawfully accessing a protected computer and was sentenced in September 2019 to two years in prison and restitution of $49,233.09; the Justice Department estimated the damage at about $1.1 million, a figure the defense called overblown
Sources
Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.
- 1.United States v. Anthony, Case No. 1:19-cr-166, Statement of Facts (Document 26)US District Court, Eastern District of Virginia (US Attorney's Office filing, copy hosted by ISMG) · May 21, 2019 · AdvisoryThe contract and the AWS-hosted SharePoint application, the master password and the deleted console accounts, the refused password, the domain registrant change, the deleted and downloaded project files, the termination time, the sixteen shared machine images and their value, the erased server, the login after termination, the disrupted training course, the dates
- 2.Former Army Contractor Gets Prison Term for Insider AttackGovInfoSecurity (ISMG) · Sep 30, 2019 · NewsThe guilty plea to one count, the two-year sentence, the Justice Department's damage estimate of about $1.1 million
- 3.Holy smokes! Ex-IT admin gets two years prison for trashing Army chaplains' serversThe Register · Sep 30, 2019 · NewsThe outage and the disrupted course of 19 students, the sentence and the restitution of $49,233.09, the defense's view of the damage estimate, the later denial-of-service claim
- 4.Former U.S. Army contractor sentenced to prison for destroying IT systemCyberScoop · Sep 27, 2019 · NewsThe reported count and effect of the later password-guessing attacks, citing an FBI affidavit, the loss figure, the sentencing date
The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of attack stages; the victim's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the incident. They are not an assessment of the victim's security program.