What was exposed
Replaying the CloudPets December 2016 exposure
- 1
Configured: open databases, recordings readable by path
Not stated; open by December 25, 2016The MongoDB databases at Linode accept internet connections with no password, and the voice recordings and photos they point to download from Amazon S3 by path.
- 2
Reachable: records copied, then ransomed
December 25, 2016 – January 13, 2017, time zone not statedUnauthorized parties copy the open databases many times, then delete them and leave three ransom notes; anyone with a path can download a recording from S3.
- 3
Found and closed: warnings unanswered, closed by January 13
December 30, 2016 – January 13, 2017Finders warn the company and Linode with no answer the sources record; by January 13, 2017 no database answers, and whether the S3 objects stay readable is not stated.
The CloudPets MongoDB databases at Linode were open with no password from at least December 25, 2016 until about January 13, 2017, holding about 821,000 user records with email addresses and bcrypt password hashes and the records of about 2.2 million voice messages; the recordings and photos they pointed to downloaded from Amazon S3 by path with no authorization; the databases were copied many times, then deleted and ransomed three times from January 7, 2017; the company says no recordings were stolen, and whether anyone other than the researcher read recordings from S3 is not stated.
Where cloud-provider controls fit
The open databases ran on a server at Linode, outside AWS, Azure, Google Cloud and Oracle Cloud, so no cloud-provider control reached the reads, the deletes or the ransom notes: whether a database asks for a password is your setting, on any host. For the recordings in Amazon S3, Block Public Access on the account, or set for every account by an organization policy, would have refused the ACL or bucket policy that opened them, and Object Ownership would have closed the ACL path only, and the sources do not say whether an ACL opened them. While a grant stood, a resource control policy or the same block would have refused the anonymous download. Azure and Google Cloud refuse the same opening with the anonymous-access setting and the public access prevention constraint, and Oracle Cloud with a Security Zone. Each of these controls dates from after this exposure.
Could this have been prevented?
In hindsight, not as a whole. 1 control would have refused a step outright, and 3 controls would have limited one. 4 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.
- 1
- Prevented
- 3
- Contained
- 4
- Not covered
How it could have been prevented
The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.
Replaying the CloudPets December 2016 exposure
1 · Configured: open databases, recordings readable by path
1 Prevented1 Contained1 Not covered3 on other clouds2 · Reachable: records copied, then ransomed
2 Contained2 Not covered3 on other clouds3 · Found and closed: warnings unanswered, closed by January 13
1 Not coveredKey facts
- The production, staging and test MongoDB databases shared one server at Linode and accepted internet connections with no password; Shodan first recorded them open on December 25, 2016, the limit of its history
- The databases held 821,296 user records with email addresses and bcrypt password hashes and 2,182,337 voice message records; the GDI Foundation researcher counted 821,396 registered users
- The voice recordings and profile photos sat in Amazon S3 and downloaded by path with no credential; the researcher confirmed it with his own uploaded files, and which setting opened them was not stated
- Unauthorized parties accessed the data many times; from January 7, 2017 the original databases were gone, and three ransom notes appeared in their place
- Finders warned the company from December 30, 2016 and Linode on January 4, 2017; by January 13, 2017 no database answered on the address, and the company dated its fix to January 9
- Spiral Toys said no voice recordings were stolen and that it never received the warnings; whether anyone other than the researcher read recordings from S3 was not stated
Sources
Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.
- 1.Data from connected CloudPets teddy bears leaked and ransomed, exposing kids' voice messagesTroy Hunt · Feb 27, 2017 · ResearchMongoDB open with no password, Linode as host, production, staging and test on one host, record counts, S3 objects read by path with no authorization, Shodan dates from December 25, 2016 to January 13, 2017, warnings of December 30, 2016, December 31, 2016 and January 4, 2017, three ransom notes, repeated unauthorized access, bcrypt hashes and no password rules, the company's statements
- 2.Internet of Things Teddy Bear Leaked 2 Million Parent and Kids Message RecordingsMotherboard (Vice) · Feb 27, 2017 · Newscounts attributed to the GDI Foundation researcher, no firewall or password on the database, voice messages in an S3 bucket with no authentication, overwritten twice in early January, wipe on January 12, 2017 per the same researcher, no response from Spiral Toys
- 3.Two million recordings of families imperiled by cloud-connected toys' crappy MongoDBThe Register · Feb 28, 2017 · Newsdatabase address also the app backend, built by an outside developer, Linode host, S3 files without authentication, removal from the internet in mid-January, Spiral Toys says it learned on February 22, 2017 and calls the store a development staging database
- 4.Smart teddy bears involved in a contentious data breachNetwork World · Feb 27, 2017 · NewsCEO statements, server management outsourced, changes made in January, the GDI Foundation researcher found the database and warned in late December
The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of the exposure; the owner's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the data is exposed. They are not an assessment of the owner's security program.