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IntrusionMicrosoft Entra
3 min read

OAuth consent phishing with fraudulent Microsoft verified publisher badges

Victim
Unnamed organizations, mainly in the UK and Ireland
When
First seen Dec 6, 2022; set up days or weeks earlier – Dec 27, 2022Disclosed Jan 31, 2023
Entry
Users consented to OAuth apps whose publishers the actors had verified through fraudulent Microsoft partner accounts.

In December 2022 actors who had enrolled in the Microsoft Cloud Partner Program as impersonations of real companies used those partner accounts to add a verified publisher to three OAuth apps. Users in organizations mainly in the UK and Ireland granted the apps delegated access to their mail with offline access, and Microsoft says the apps were used to exfiltrate email. How the lure reached the users, how many organizations consented and which mail was read are not stated.

What happened

External Parties
Microsoft Cloud Partner Program
Impersonated companies
Lookalike domains and lure files
Internet
Microsoft Entra IDconsent and delegated tokens
The actors' tenants and partner accounts
Victim Microsoft Entra tenants
+ mail
+ mailbox settings
+ calendars and meetings
Exchange Online mailboxes
Three OAuth apps
Targeted users
Delegated permission grants

Replaying the verified publisher December 2022 intrusion

  1. 1

    A verified badge on the actors' apps

    Before Dec 6, 2022; date not stated

    Fraudulent partner accounts that impersonate real companies add a verified publisher to app registrations the actors created.

  2. 2

    Consent to read mail

    Dec 6–27, 2022

    Lure files lead users to the Microsoft consent prompt, and users grant the apps delegated access to mail with offline access.

  3. 3

    Mail read through the grants

    Dec 6–27, 2022; individual dates not stated

    With the delegated grants and long-lived refresh tokens, the apps are used to exfiltrate email without further user action.

Impact

Users in an unstated number of organizations, mainly in the UK and Ireland, granted three malicious apps delegated access to their mail, and Microsoft says the apps were used to exfiltrate email. Which mail was read is not stated.

Outcome

Where a tenant setting fits

The verified badge came from Microsoft's partner program, which no setting of your tenant reaches, and the apps used the grants they were given. The decision that is yours is the consent itself. Microsoft Entra user consent turned off, with the admin consent workflow on, sends a user's request to an administrator instead of granting it. Allowing user consent for verified publishers does not refuse apps like these by itself, because their publishers were verified.

Could this have been prevented?

In hindsight, not as a whole. 1 control would have refused a step outright. 3 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.

1
Prevented
0
Contained
3
Not covered

How it could have been prevented

The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.

External Parties
Microsoft Cloud Partner Program
Impersonated companies
Lookalike domains and lure files
Internet
Microsoft Entra IDconsent and delegated tokens
The actors' tenants and partner accounts
Victim Microsoft Entra tenants
+ mail
+ mailbox settings
+ calendars and meetings
Exchange Online mailboxes
Three OAuth apps
Targeted users
Delegated permission grants

Replaying the verified publisher December 2022 intrusion

1 · A verified badge on the actors' apps

1 Not covered

2 · Consent to read mail

1 Prevented1 Not covered

3 · Mail read through the grants

1 Not covered

Key facts

  • Proofpoint first observed the malicious apps on December 6, 2022, and the campaign ended on December 27, 2022, per Proofpoint.
  • Three apps from three different malicious publishers, linked to the same infrastructure, targeted the same organizations, per Proofpoint.
  • In two cases the publisher verification was granted one day after the app was created, per Proofpoint.
  • The granted refresh tokens had an expiry of over a year in most cases, per Proofpoint.
  • Microsoft became aware of the campaign on December 15, 2022 and says the actors used the apps to exfiltrate email.
  • Microsoft disabled the apps across all tenants and the actors' partner accounts and notified the customers whose users had consented; the time of the disabling is not stated.

Sources

Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.

  1. 1.
    Dangerous Consequences of Threat Actors Abusing Microsoft's "Verified Publisher" StatusProofpoint · Jan 31, 2023 · ResearchPublisher impersonation, verification timing, the three apps, delegated permissions, lure files, user consent, token lifetime, campaign dates, Microsoft's disabling of the apps
  2. 2.
    Threat actor consent phishing campaign abusing the verified publisher processMicrosoft Security Response Center · Jan 31, 2023 · AdvisoryFraudulent Cloud Partner Program enrollment, verified publisher added to app registrations, email exfiltration, UK and Ireland targeting, disabling of apps and accounts, customer notification, recommended consent settings
  3. 3.
    Microsoft disables verified partner accounts used for OAuth phishingBleepingComputer · Jan 31, 2023 · NewsMicrosoft statement, customer notification

The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of attack stages; the victim's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the incident. They are not an assessment of the victim's security program.

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