What happened
Replaying the UTA0355 April 2025 intrusion
- 1
An official invitation
Early Apr 2025UTA0355 emails the target from a compromised Ukrainian Government account and follows up over Signal or WhatsApp with a conference pretext.
- 2
The code handed back
Apr 2025, day not statedThe victim signs in on Microsoft's real page for a Microsoft first-party client that requests the Device Registration Service, and sends back the address that holds the authorization code.
- 3
A device and a second factor
Apr 2025, day not statedShortly after, the actor registers a new Windows-named device to the victim's Microsoft Entra ID through a nearby proxy, then has the victim approve a 2FA request.
- 4
The mailbox
The following day, Apr 2025The following day the actor downloads the victim's email through a session tied to the registered device, from the same nearby proxy network.
The actor downloaded the victim's email and held a device registered in the victim's Microsoft Entra ID; how much email was taken is not stated.
Where Microsoft Entra controls fit
A Conditional Access policy that blocks the Device Registration Service for all but the administrators who enroll devices would have bounded whose sign-in yields access to it, though Microsoft lists Conditional Access support for all Microsoft apps as generally available in June 2025, after the incident. Closing device registration and join to those administrators would have bounded who could add the device; for both, the source does not say whether the victim's account was among those administrators. A policy that requires the Phishing-resistant MFA authentication strength would have bounded which methods can meet the second-factor requirement; the source does not say which factor the approval used or which sign-in prompted it. A policy that requires a compliant device would have capped which devices reach mail; the source does not say whether the device was enrolled. The lure sits outside every cloud control. Check who in your tenant may register or join devices, whether a policy targets the Device Registration Service, and which authentication strength your policies require.
Could this have been prevented?
In hindsight, no control would have stopped it. 4 controls would have limited how far it went. 1 step has no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.
- 0
- Prevented
- 4
- Contained
- 1
- Not covered
How it could have been prevented
The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.
Replaying the UTA0355 April 2025 intrusion
1 · An official invitation
1 Not covered2 · The code handed back
1 Contained3 · A device and a second factor
2 Contained4 · The mailbox
1 ContainedKey facts
- Volexity identified the UTA0355 campaign in early April 2025 and assessed it as Russian with medium confidence; it said the activity may overlap with its earlier device code campaigns
- The lure was an email from a compromised Ukrainian Government account, followed up over Signal or WhatsApp with a conference pretext
- The victim signed in on Microsoft's real page for a Microsoft first-party client that requested the Device Registration Service, and sent back the address that held the authorization code
- Shortly after, a new device with a Windows-style name was registered to the victim's Microsoft Entra ID through a proxy network geolocated near the victim
- The victim approved a 2FA request under a conference SharePoint pretext, which let the actor pass the organization's additional requirements for email; which factor was used is not stated
- The following day the actor downloaded the victim's email through a session tied to the registered device; how much email was taken is not stated
Sources
Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.
- 1.Phishing for Codes: Russian Threat Actors Target Microsoft 365 OAuth WorkflowsVolexity · Apr 22, 2025 · ResearchLure channels, the authorization code handover, the requested resource (Device Registration Service), the device registration, the 2FA approval, the email download, the proxy location, attribution hedges, recommended controls
- 2.Entra ID OAuth Phishing DetectionElastic Security Labs · Jun 25, 2025 · ResearchHow the technique works in general (client, resource, device registration, Primary Refresh Token), from a lab emulation rather than the victim
The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of attack stages; the victim's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the incident. They are not an assessment of the victim's security program.