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IntrusionMicrosoft Entra · SaaS
6 min read

Jingle Thief phishing into Microsoft 365 with rogue Entra devices for gift card fraud

Victim
Unnamed global enterprises in retail and consumer services that issue gift cards
When
April and May 2025 wave; no step is datedDisclosed Oct 22, 2025
Entry
Phishing and smishing that led staff to counterfeit Microsoft 365 sign-in pages, then direct sign-in with the harvested credentials.

Unit 42 reported on October 22, 2025 that a financially motivated group it tracks as CL-CRI-1032, or Jingle Thief, phished staff of gift card issuers to counterfeit Microsoft 365 sign-in pages and then signed in to Microsoft 365 directly with the harvested credentials, without malware. Inside the tenants the actor read SharePoint and OneDrive documents, phished colleagues from compromised mailboxes, forwarded gift card and ticketing mail with inbox rules, and kept access by registering its own authenticator apps, resetting passwords through self-service flows and enrolling its own devices in Entra ID. It then tried to issue high-value gift cards; Unit 42 names no victim and does not say a card was issued.

What happened

External Parties
Compromised web servers
Attacker-controlled addresses
Internet
Microsoft Entra ID
Microsoft 365 tenant
+ gift card issuance
+ approval workflows
+ sign-in not stated
Gift card issuance apps
Compromised mailboxes
SharePoint and OneDrive
Authentication methods
Registered devices

Replaying the Jingle Thief wave of April and May 2025

  1. 1

    Phished credentials

    April and May 2025 wave; not dated

    Phishing and text messages lead staff to fake Microsoft 365 sign-in pages, and the actor signs in directly with the captured passwords.

  2. 2

    Inside mail and files

    Not dated

    As the compromised users, the actor reads gift card documents, phishes colleagues, forwards gift card mail out and hides what it sent.

  3. 3

    Persistence in Entra ID

    Not dated

    The actor registers its own authenticator apps, resets passwords through self-service flows and enrolls its own devices in Entra ID.

  4. 4

    Gift card fraud

    Not dated

    With the compromised identities, the actor tries again and again to issue high-value gift cards; no issued card is reported.

Impact

The actor held long-lived access to Microsoft 365 tenants of gift card issuers, collected mail and documents, phished colleagues and tried to issue high-value gift cards; no issued card is reported.

Outcome

Where Microsoft Entra controls fit

A Conditional Access policy that requires the Phishing-resistant MFA authentication strength for all users would have refused the sign-ins with the phished passwords, though a session token stolen after such a sign-in is a different path. Every other Microsoft control here bounds a step instead of refusing it: a sign-in limited to trusted networks or compliant devices, SharePoint access only from managed devices, outbound recipient limits, external forwarding turned off, registration of new methods limited by location and method, self-service password reset off and device registration restricted. Each holds only as far as the open facts allow, such as whether the actor's own devices were compliant. The lures, the fake pages and your gift card applications sit outside every cloud provider's controls.

Could this have been prevented?

In hindsight, not as a whole. 1 control would have refused a step outright, and 8 controls would have limited one. 3 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.

1
Prevented
8
Contained
3
Not covered

How it could have been prevented

The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.

External Parties
Compromised web servers
Attacker-controlled addresses
Internet
Microsoft Entra ID
Microsoft 365 tenant
+ gift card issuance
+ approval workflows
+ sign-in not stated
Gift card issuance apps
Compromised mailboxes
SharePoint and OneDrive
Authentication methods
Registered devices

Replaying the Jingle Thief wave of April and May 2025

1 · Phished credentials

1 Prevented1 Contained1 Not covered3 on other clouds

2 · Inside mail and files

3 Contained1 Not covered

3 · Persistence in Entra ID

4 Contained6 on other clouds

4 · Gift card fraud

1 Not covered

Key facts

  • Unit 42 published its account on October 22, 2025 and attributed the cluster, CL-CRI-1032, to financially motivated Morocco-based attackers active since 2021, the start year at moderate confidence
  • In April and May 2025, the actor ran a coordinated wave against multiple global enterprises in retail and consumer services that issue gift cards; no victim was named
  • Phishing and smishing messages led staff to counterfeit Microsoft 365 sign-in pages, and the actor then signed in to Microsoft 365 directly, almost exclusively from IP addresses in Morocco, with no malware
  • In one enterprise the actor kept access for about 10 months and compromised over 60 user accounts, per Unit 42's report of October 22, 2025
  • The actor read SharePoint and OneDrive documents on gift card workflows, phished colleagues from compromised mailboxes, forwarded gift card and IT ticketing mail with inbox rules, and moved sent phishing and replies to Deleted Items
  • It registered rogue authenticator apps, reset passwords through self-service flows and enrolled its own devices in Entra ID, then tried to issue high-value gift cards; Unit 42 did not say a card was issued

Sources

Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.

  1. 1.
    Jingle Thief: Inside a Cloud-Based Gift Card Fraud CampaignPalo Alto Networks Unit 42 · Oct 22, 2025 · ResearchActor cluster and origin, the April and May 2025 wave, phishing and smishing, direct sign-in to Microsoft 365, SharePoint and OneDrive reconnaissance, internal phishing, inbox forwarding rules, mailbox concealment, authenticator app registration, self-service password reset, Entra ID device enrollment, gift card issuance attempts, dwell time and account count

The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of attack stages; the victim's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the incident. They are not an assessment of the victim's security program.

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