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IntrusionMicrosoft Entra · SaaS · On-premises
7 min read

Silk Typhoon reaching downstream tenants through stolen provider keys and cloud trust

Victim
Unnamed state and local government, IT sector and other organizations, mostly in North America; neither source names a victim
When
Late 2024 per Microsoft; no day is statedDisclosed Mar 5, 2025
Entry
Stolen API keys and credentials of IT providers (privileged access management, cloud application and cloud data management), plus leaked and sprayed passwords, used to reach the providers' downstream customers; in two CrowdStrike cases an Entra application secret and a cloud solution provider's delegated admin rights. How the keys were stolen is unconfirmed.

Microsoft reported on March 5, 2025 that, since late 2024, the actor it tracks as Silk Typhoon abused stolen API keys and credentials of IT providers to reach their downstream customers, and also used password spraying and leaked passwords. CrowdStrike, describing activity it calls MURKY PANDA that aligns with Silk Typhoon, described a SaaS provider case, in which an application secret almost certainly opened customer Microsoft Entra tenants, and a cloud solution provider case, in which delegated admin rights did. How the keys were stolen is not stated.

What happened

External Parties
Covert Device Network
Internet
Microsoft Entra IDcustomer tenant sign-in
Customer Entra and Microsoft 365 Tenant
+ provider API keys
+ application secret
+ delegated admin rights
IT Provider Environments
+ Active Directory
+ Entra Connect servers
+ key vault passwords
Customer On-Premises Directory
Delegated Admin Access
Service Principals and OAuth Apps
Mail, OneDrive, SharePoint

Replaying the Silk Typhoon intrusion reported in 2025

  1. 1

    Stolen keys and passwords

    Since late 2024; no day stated

    Leaked and sprayed passwords are used, and stolen API keys of IT providers reach the providers' downstream customers.

  2. 2

    Trust into customer tenants

    Since late 2024; no day stated

    A SaaS provider's application secret and a cloud solution provider's delegated admin rights open downstream Microsoft Entra tenants.

  3. 3

    Admin apps and mailboxes

    Dates not stated

    New secrets are added to existing apps and service principals, which then read mail, OneDrive and SharePoint through Microsoft Graph and Exchange Web Services.

  4. 4

    On-premises pivot and cleanup

    Dates not stated

    After an on-premises compromise the actor dumps Active Directory, targets Entra Connect servers, runs web shells and clears the logs of its own actions.

Impact

Downstream customers of compromised IT providers, largely in state and local government and the IT sector, had email, OneDrive and SharePoint data exfiltrated and their devices surveyed, per Microsoft. Microsoft names no victim and no count; CrowdStrike lists government, technology, academia, legal and professional services in North America.

Outcome

Where cloud-provider controls fit

The first steps happened inside IT providers, where the key and its scope belong to the vendor. Once the actor reached a customer tenant, Microsoft Entra controls could limit the application secret, the partner's rights and the unscoped mailbox access. Neither source says how the keys were stolen or names a victim.

Could this have been prevented?

In hindsight, no control would have stopped it. 9 controls would have limited how far it went. 4 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.

0
Prevented
9
Contained
4
Not covered

How it could have been prevented

The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.

External Parties
Covert Device Network
Internet
Microsoft Entra IDcustomer tenant sign-in
Customer Entra and Microsoft 365 Tenant
+ provider API keys
+ application secret
+ delegated admin rights
IT Provider Environments
+ Active Directory
+ Entra Connect servers
+ key vault passwords
Customer On-Premises Directory
Delegated Admin Access
Service Principals and OAuth Apps
Mail, OneDrive, SharePoint

Replaying the Silk Typhoon intrusion reported in 2025

1 · Stolen keys and passwords

2 Contained1 Not covered3 on other clouds

2 · Trust into customer tenants

2 Contained1 Not covered3 on other clouds

3 · Admin apps and mailboxes

4 Contained3 on other clouds

4 · On-premises pivot and cleanup

1 Contained2 Not covered

Key facts

  • Microsoft has tracked the actor since 2020 and dates the stolen-key abuse to late 2024, without a day
  • In January 2025 the actor exploited an Ivanti Pulse Connect VPN zero-day, CVE-2025-0282
  • CrowdStrike describes at least two SaaS provider cases and one cloud solution provider case
  • In one SaaS provider case CrowdStrike says the actor almost certainly obtained the Entra application registration secret, then used the application's service principals in downstream tenants to reach customers' email
  • In the partner case a user in the delegated-admin Admin Agent group, which carries Global Administrator rights in downstream tenants, was used to create a temporary backdoor user
  • Microsoft and CrowdStrike name no victim and give no count

Sources

Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.

  1. 1.
    Silk Typhoon targeting IT supply chainMicrosoft Threat Intelligence · Mar 5, 2025 · Vendor reportinitial access, stolen API keys, downstream tenants, service principals and OAuth apps, Graph access, persistence, anti-forensics, victim sectors, mitigations
  2. 2.
    MURKY PANDA: A trusted-relationship threat in the cloudCrowdStrike · Aug 21, 2025 · Vendor reporttrusted relationship, SaaS provider compromise, Entra application secret, delegated admin privileges, backdoor user, service principals, anti-forensics, recommendations

The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of attack stages; the victim's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the incident. They are not an assessment of the victim's security program.

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