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DemonstrationAWS
2 min read

An AWS red-team exercise exposed two separate IAM risks

Environment
An unnamed AWS customer assessed by Unit 42
When
Exercise conducted in spring 2020Disclosed Oct 8, 2020
Entry
The customer supplied a developer role. Unit 42 demonstrated that its delegated permissions allowed administrator access in the development environment.

The customer supplied a developer role. Unit 42 demonstrated that its delegated permissions allowed administrator access in the development environment. Unit 42 independently found a production role with broad trust and demonstrated access to sensitive resources. This was a separate test from the development finding.

What the demonstration did

Researcher
Unit 42
Internet
Development
Production
Developer role
Production role

AWS accounts / Unit 42 research

  1. 1

    Development permissions exceeded the intended role

    Spring 2020

    The customer supplied a developer role. Unit 42 demonstrated that its delegated permissions allowed administrator access in the development environment.

  2. 2

    Production role trust extended outside the organization

    Spring 2020

    Unit 42 independently found a production role with broad trust and demonstrated access to sensitive resources. This was a separate test from the development finding.

Impact

In an authorized exercise, Unit 42 demonstrated administrator access in development and separately accessed sensitive production resources through an overly broad role trust policy. The two findings arose in different accounts.

Would the controls have stopped it?

Limit who can assume and delegate roles

In production, restrict the role’s trust policy to its approved principals. In development, restrict which roles developers may delegate. Each change addresses a separate finding in the authorized exercise.

Incident control assessments

2
Prevented
0
Contained
0
Not covered

How it could have been prevented

The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.

Researcher
Unit 42
Internet
Development
Production
Developer role
Production role

AWS accounts / Unit 42 research

1 · Development permissions exceeded the intended role

1 Prevented

2 · Production role trust extended outside the organization

1 Prevented

Key facts

  • The customer requested the exercise in spring 2020.
  • The customer had four AWS accounts and nearly 1,000 roles.
  • Unit 42 began the development test with a role supplied by the customer.
  • After the development finding, investigators reviewed logs and found no successful malicious use of that misconfiguration.

Sources

Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.

  1. 1.
    Unit 42 Cloud Threat Report: Misconfigured IAM Roles Lead to Thousands of Compromised Cloud WorkloadsPalo Alto Networks Unit 42 · Oct 8, 2020 · ResearchFirst-hand account of the finding, its scope and the response.
  2. 2.
    Permissions boundaries for IAM entitiesAWS · undated · Vendor reportExplicit denies and identity-based maximum permissions.
  3. 3.
    Grant a user permissions to pass a role to an AWS serviceAWS · undated · Vendor reportRestricting which roles a caller may delegate.
  4. 4.
    Update a role trust policyAWS · undated · Vendor reportHow a role trust policy identifies trusted principals.

The estate in the replay follows the researchers' description of their own test environment. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the run. They are not an assessment of any company's security program.

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