What happened
Replaying the Ubiquiti December 2020 intrusion / an insider with cloud administrator access
- 1
An administrator key from home
Dec 10, 2020An admin key is downloaded over the employee's home connection, checked from a VPN exit, and data is taken from AWS with his cloud administrator credentials.
- 2
Logs cut to one day
December 2020, through at least Dec 26; renames Dec 22–26, 2020On a day no source gives, certain AWS logs are set to a one-day lifecycle retention; prosecutors say session files were also renamed to point at a coworker.
- 3
Source code out of GitHub
Dec 21–22, 2020GitHub repositories are cloned over SSH through a VPN to the employee's home computer; the logs show his home IP address alternating with the VPN exit.
- 4
Ransom and a false whistleblower
Jan–Mar 2021While on the team investigating the incident, the employee sends a ransom note posing as an outside attacker; after an FBI search of his home he poses as an anonymous whistleblower.
Data taken from the AWS environment and source code from GitHub, counted at sentencing as over 1,400 AWS task definitions files and over 1,100 GitHub code repositories (prosecutors); certain AWS logs cut to a one-day retention; a ransom of 50 Bitcoin demanded and not paid; Ubiquiti says outside experts found no evidence that customer information was accessed.
Where cloud-provider controls fit an insider
The employee used access he legitimately held, so a control that grants that access does not refuse him. What bounds an insider is a policy he cannot change: a service control policy that keeps log settings with people other than your cloud administrators, a locked retention on the log bucket, a key policy or permissions boundary that keeps your administrators away from the data they run, and a network condition that makes administrator credentials work only from your corporate network. Each holds only where the administrator has no role in the management account that sets it. GitHub, the ransom email and the false story sat outside every cloud provider.
Could this have been prevented?
In hindsight, no control would have stopped it. 12 controls would have limited how far it went. 4 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.
- 0
- Prevented
- 12
- Contained
- 4
- Not covered
How it could have been prevented
The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.
Replaying the Ubiquiti December 2020 intrusion / an insider with cloud administrator access
1 · An administrator key from home
8 Contained1 Not covered7 on other clouds2 · Logs cut to one day
3 Contained6 on other clouds3 · Source code out of GitHub
1 Contained1 Not covered4 · Ransom and a false whistleblower
2 Not coveredKey facts
- On December 10, 2020 an admin key was downloaded from AWS over the employee's home connection, and about two minutes later it called GetCallerIdentity from an IP address linked to the VPN provider Surfshark (the indictment and prosecutors, as reported by The Register)
- The employee applied one-day lifecycle retention policies to certain logs on AWS, the court documents say; the sentencing memo places it through at least December 26, 2020 and dates the renaming of at least 18 AWS sessions December 22 to 26, 2020; which logs, and on which day, is not stated
- On December 21 and 22, 2020 he took data from the company's GitHub; the indictment, as The Register reads it, says around 155 repositories were cloned over SSH, and prosecutors at sentencing counted over 1,100 GitHub code repositories and over 1,400 AWS task definitions files
- In January 2021, while on the team investigating the incident, he sent an anonymous ransom note asking 50 Bitcoin, about $1.9 million then (SecurityWeek); Ubiquiti says it did not pay
- After investigators searched his home on March 24, 2021, he posed as an anonymous whistleblower; a story ran on March 30, 2021, and the DOJ says market capitalization fell by over $4 billion
- He pleaded guilty to three counts on February 2, 2023 and was sentenced to six years in prison
Sources
Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.
- 1.Ubiquiti dev charged with knocking $4bn off firm's value after insider threat spreeThe Register · Dec 2, 2021 · NewsAdmin key download over a home connection and its time, the GetCallerIdentity call from a VPN-linked address, one-day log retention, the GitHub clone of around 155 repositories, the VPN evidence, the ransom note, the false whistleblower story
- 2.Former Ubiquiti dev charged for trying to extort his employerBleepingComputer · Dec 1, 2021 · NewsAWS and GitHub dates, use of cloud administrator credentials, one-day lifecycle retention policies on certain AWS logs, charges
- 3.Former Ubiquiti employee charged with hacking and extorting companyThe Record by Recorded Future News · Dec 2, 2021 · NewsWork-assigned credentials, log retention changes, VPN and payment evidence, the March 24, 2021 search, the ransom refused and law enforcement contacted
- 4.Former Employee Accused of Being Behind Ubiquiti HackSecurityWeek · Dec 2, 2021 · NewsThe DOJ's December 2020 to March 2021 window, administrative access, gigabytes of data, the 50 Bitcoin ransom of January 2021, the employee on the investigating team
- 5.Former Ubiquiti dev pleads guilty to trying to extort his employerBleepingComputer · Feb 2, 2023 · NewsGuilty plea, the court documents' wording on one-day lifecycle retention of certain AWS logs, the DOJ's market value figure
- 6.Ex-Ubiquiti dev jailed for 6 years after stealing internal corp data, extorting bossesThe Register · May 12, 2023 · NewsOver 1,400 AWS task definitions files and over 1,100 GitHub code repositories, renamed session files, the home IP address during the clone, the sentence
- 7.Former Ubiquiti dev who extorted the firm gets six years in prisonBleepingComputer · May 11, 2023 · NewsThe DOJ's wording on credentials and the false whistleblower, the three counts pleaded to, the sentence
- 8.Government's Sentencing Memorandum Regarding Defendant Nickolas SharpU.S. Attorney's Office, SDNY (filing in United States v. Sharp, 21 Cr. 714 (KPF); copy hosted by Ars Technica) · undated · AdvisoryAWS key access and its UTC times, GetCallerIdentity, the GitHub account shared among developers and the SSH clone, log retention, the dated session renames, the cloud administrator role
- 9.Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2021Ubiquiti Inc. (SEC filing) · Aug 27, 2021 · Vendor reportSystems at a third-party cloud provider improperly accessed, source code and credentials compromised, a payment demand not paid, access-control remediation
- 10.Networking giant Ubiquiti alerts customers of potential data breachBleepingComputer · Jan 11, 2021 · NewsThe customer notice of January 11, 2021, the disclosure date
- 11.Ubiquiti confirms extortion attempt following security breachBleepingComputer · Apr 1, 2021 · NewsUbiquiti's statement that outside experts found no evidence that customer information was accessed, the extortion attempt
The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of attack stages; the victim's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the incident. They are not an assessment of the victim's security program.