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ExposureAWS
2 min read

Hortonworks build credentials exposed alongside public downloads

Owner
Hortonworks, part of Cloudera
When
Reported to Cloudera July 27, 2020 – Aug 9, 2020Disclosed Aug 24, 2020
Entry
Hortonworks used Amazon S3 to distribute software. Internal build material, including a Jenkins backup, was present alongside files meant to be public.

Hortonworks used Amazon S3 to distribute software. Internal build material, including a Jenkins backup, was present alongside files meant to be public.

What was exposed

Independent discovery
UpGuard
Internet
Amazon S3 storage
Release storage

Hortonworks, part of Cloudera exposure

  1. 1

    Public release storage

    Opening date unknown

    Hortonworks used Amazon S3 to distribute software. Internal build material, including a Jenkins backup, was present alongside files meant to be public.

  2. 2

    Build material readable

    Reported to Cloudera July 27, 2020

    UpGuard sampled files from a public bucket and found credentials in build material. The researchers did not try those credentials. Their validity and any access they could have granted remain unknown.

  3. 3

    Found and closed

    August 9, 2020

    Cloudera initially reported removing three files and intended to keep downloads available. On August 9, UpGuard found public access to the primary bucket had been removed. Some other buckets remained public.

Impact

Internal build credentials were available alongside public software downloads. UpGuard reported finding the material but did not test the credentials or establish that anyone used them.

Could this have been prevented?

Separate internal build material from public releases

Keep backups and credentials in a private location distinct from your public release files. AWS introduced resource control policies on November 13, 2024, four years after this exposure. Today, if you can identify the private S3 objects in a member account, a resource control policy can deny anonymous reads of those objects while leaving approved public downloads available. Unclassified files outside that scope remain exposed.

Incident control assessments

0
Prevented
1
Contained
2
Not covered

How it could have been prevented

The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.

Independent discovery
UpGuard
Internet
Amazon S3 storage
Release storage

Hortonworks, part of Cloudera exposure

1 · Public release storage

1 Not covered

2 · Build material readable

1 Contained

3 · Found and closed

1 Not covered

Key facts

  • UpGuard began notifying Cloudera after sampling public files.
  • Cloudera said it had removed three potentially confidential files by July 30, 2020.
  • Cloudera initially told the researchers that the distribution buckets would stay open for public downloads.
  • Cloudera initially reported removing three files and intended to keep downloads available. On August 9, UpGuard found public access to the primary bucket had been removed. Some other buckets remained public.

Sources

Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.

  1. 1.
    Enterprise Scale: How Public Storage Buckets Leaked Private CredentialsUpGuard · Aug 24, 2020 · ResearchInvestigation, affected environment, data and response.

The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of the exposure; the owner's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the data is exposed. They are not an assessment of the owner's security program.

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