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IntrusionAWS
6 min read

UNC2903 takes AWS role keys from EC2 through an Adminer SSRF flaw

Victim
Unnamed organizations running a vulnerable Adminer on EC2 instances that allowed IMDSv1 (data theft from at least one victim)
When
June 2021; a news report says May to June 2021Disclosed May 4, 2022
Entry
A server-side request forgery flaw in internet-facing Adminer (CVE-2021-21311), on EC2 instances that allowed IMDSv1.

Mandiant reports that UNC2903 scanned the internet for Adminer pages with a known server-side request forgery flaw, on EC2 instances that still allowed IMDSv1. Through the flaw, the web server reached the instance metadata service and returned its role's temporary keys. The actor then tried the keys against S3 buckets and other cloud resources, and stole data from at least one victim; no victim is named.

What happened

External Parties
UNC2903 relay box
Telegram chat group
Internet
EC2 Metadata ServiceIMDSv1 allowed
Adminer
Internet-Facing Web Server
S3 Buckets
Adminer Database Tool
Instance IAM Role
S3 Buckets
Other Cloud Resources

Replaying the UNC2903 June 2021 intrusion

  1. 1

    Scanning for Adminer pages

    Late June 2021

    From a dedicated relay box, the actor scans the internet for Adminer pages and finds vulnerable ones. It also tests an Apache privilege escalation flaw to install a web shell; the outcome is not stated.

  2. 2

    A redirect to the metadata service

    June 2021

    Through the Adminer flaw, the web server is steered to the instance metadata service. The instance allows IMDSv1, so the service returns the role's temporary keys.

  3. 3

    Role keys used against S3

    June 2021

    The actor tries the stolen keys against S3 buckets and other cloud resources, and steals data from at least one victim. Where the calls came from, which calls were made and whether the data came from S3 at a victim are unconfirmed.

Impact

The actor stole data from at least one victim and tried to reach S3 buckets and other cloud resources with the stolen role keys. Mandiant observed no extortion or sale of the data.

Outcome

Where AWS controls fit

No AWS control fixes the flaw in Adminer; updating to version 4.7.9 is yours as the server's owner. What turned that flaw into stolen keys was a metadata service that still answered IMDSv1. Requiring IMDSv2 on the instance, or giving the server no outbound route to the internet, would have stopped the keys from coming back. A load balancer sign-in rule keeps the page out of reach of a scan that comes through the load balancer, but the sources do not say the server sat behind one. Organization policies that require IMDSv2 bound only instances launched after them. If keys still leak, a service control policy can refuse calls signed with IMDSv1 keys or made from outside the instance's VPC, but only in member accounts, and the sources do not say where the keys were used from.

Could this have been prevented?

In hindsight, not as a whole. 2 controls would have refused a step outright, and 5 controls would have limited one. 1 step has no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.

2
Prevented
5
Contained
1
Not covered

How it could have been prevented

The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.

External Parties
UNC2903 relay box
Telegram chat group
Internet
EC2 Metadata ServiceIMDSv1 allowed
Adminer
Internet-Facing Web Server
S3 Buckets
Adminer Database Tool
Instance IAM Role
S3 Buckets
Other Cloud Resources

Replaying the UNC2903 June 2021 intrusion

1 · Scanning for Adminer pages

1 Contained3 on other clouds

2 · A redirect to the metadata service

2 Prevented2 Contained1 Not covered6 on other clouds

3 · Role keys used against S3

2 Contained3 on other clouds

Key facts

  • The Adminer maintainer published the flaw on February 10, 2021, and fixed it in version 4.7.9; the affected versions were 4.0.0 to before 4.7.9 in the all-drivers bundle
  • The actor's infrastructure scanned over 2,100 IP addresses in late June 2021, per Mandiant
  • Eighteen minutes after a vulnerable page was found, a Telegram bot indexed it; Mandiant reads this as the link being shared in a chat group
  • The actor reached the metadata service 3 hours and 15 minutes after the initial access, per Mandiant
  • Mandiant observed data stolen from at least one victim; whether it came from S3 at a victim is unconfirmed, and no extortion or sale was observed
  • CISA added CVE-2021-21311 to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on September 29, 2025; the record does not tie the addition to UNC2903

Sources

Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.

  1. 1.
    Old Services, New Tricks: Cloud Metadata Abuse by UNC2903Mandiant (Google Cloud Threat Intelligence) · May 4, 2022 · ResearchActor, campaign months, scanning, exploitation of the Adminer flaw, IMDSv1 credential theft, S3 access attempts, data theft from at least one victim, detection timing, recommendations
  2. 2.
    SSRF on error page of Elasticsearch and ClickHouseAdminer (vrana/adminer on GitHub) · Feb 10, 2021 · AdvisoryVulnerability, affected versions, fix, affected bundle, workarounds
  3. 3.
    CVE-2021-21311CVE Program (record by GitHub as CNA, with a CISA ADP container) · Oct 21, 2025 · AdvisoryCVE publication, affected versions, CISA KEV addition
  4. 4.
    Hackers exploit vulnerable Adminer for AWS database theftsTechTarget SearchSecurity · May 5, 2022 · NewsCampaign months as reported, no monetization observed

The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of attack stages; the victim's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the incident. They are not an assessment of the victim's security program.

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