What happened
Replaying the ONUS December 2021 intrusion
- 1
Log4Shell on the payment server
December 11 to 13, 2021Attackers exploit Log4Shell in the logging library bundled with the Cyclos payment software on an ONUS server, before Cyclos notifies its customers, and run a backdoor that tunnels to their command server.
- 2
A cloud key in a file
Not datedThrough the backdoor, the attackers read an AWS access key with full Amazon S3 permissions from the Cyclos configuration file; a backup script on the system holds the database host name and credentials.
- 3
S3 with the stolen key
Deletion confirmed on December 23, 2021; first use of the key not statedThe AWS API accepts the key, from a place the sources do not state, and the user data in ONUS's S3 buckets is deleted; ONUS confirms the deletion on December 23.
- 4
User data out, ransom
Not dated; ransom on 24 and leak on December 25, 2021The attackers get the information of about 2 million users, from the database backups in S3 or from the database itself (the sources do not say which), demand 5 million USD and post the data on a hacking forum after ONUS refuses.
The user data in ONUS's S3 buckets was deleted, and the information of about 2 million users, with eKYC data, personal information and password hashes, was taken and posted on a forum after ONUS refused a 5 million USD ransom; ONUS said no assets were affected, and whether the deleted data was recovered is not stated.
Where AWS controls fit
No AWS control refuses the Log4Shell request, the backdoor or the read of the configuration file: the vendor's patched release owns the flaw, and the sources do not say where the server ran. AWS can act once the key reaches its API. A service control policy that refuses calls by IAM users without MFA, or calls from outside your networks, bounds where such a key works, though the sources do not say that this key belonged to an IAM user of a member account or where it was used from. A service control policy that keeps S3 deletes to your storage administrators' roles bounds who can delete. S3 Object Lock in compliance mode keeps locked versions through the delete calls where your buckets have versioning; AWS Backup for Amazon S3 was only in public preview in December 2021. A resource control policy that limits S3 reads to your networks dates from November 2024, after the incident. The ransom demand and the leak happen outside every cloud.
Could this have been prevented?
In hindsight, no control would have stopped it. 7 controls would have limited how far it went. 4 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.
- 0
- Prevented
- 7
- Contained
- 4
- Not covered
How it could have been prevented
The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.
Replaying the ONUS December 2021 intrusion
1 · Log4Shell on the payment server
2 Not covered2 · A cloud key in a file
1 Not covered3 · S3 with the stolen key
5 Contained6 on other clouds4 · User data out, ransom
2 Contained1 Not covered3 on other cloudsKey facts
- The Log4Shell flaw was published on December 9, 2021; attackers exploited it on an ONUS Cyclos server between December 11 and 13, before Cyclos notified ONUS with patch instructions on December 14
- CyStack found Log4j 2.14.1 bundled as the logging module of Cyclos 4.14.9; Cyclos versions before 4.14.15 were affected, and 4.14.15 or later is the fix
- The AWS access key in the Cyclos configuration file carried the AWS managed policy for full Amazon S3 access, which CyStack called ONUS's most serious mistake
- A periodic script backed up the ONUS database to S3; its files held the database host name, user name and password, and the backup SQL files
- On December 23, 2021 CyStack detected abnormal activity, ONUS confirmed that the user data in S3 had been deleted, and the access keys tied to the affected buckets were deactivated shortly after
- The attackers demanded 5 million USD on December 24, 2021; ONUS refused, and the data of about 2 million users was posted on a hacking forum with a claim of 395 database tables
Sources
Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.
- 1.The attack on ONUS – A real-life case of the Log4Shell vulnerabilityCyStack · Dec 28, 2021 · ResearchTimeline, entry vector, backdoor, AWS key and its S3 permission, database credentials and backups in S3, deletion in S3, key deactivation, ransom, leaked data, recommendations
- 2.Cyclos < 4.14.15 – Remote code executionCyStack · Jan 4, 2022 · ResearchAffected Cyclos versions, bundled Log4j version, fixed version, HTTP-reachable entry
- 3.Crypto Platform Suffers Log4j-Related Ransomware AttackInformation Security Media Group (BankInfoSecurity) · Dec 29, 2021 · NewsONUS statements, data fields, Cyclos reaction, ONUS remediation
- 4.Fintech firm hit by log4j hack refuses to pay $5 million ransomBleepingComputer · Dec 29, 2021 · NewsForum listing, sample contents, ONUS disclosure channel, sandbox server, refusal to pay
The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of attack stages; the victim's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the incident. They are not an assessment of the victim's security program.