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IntrusionAWS · SaaS
13 min read

Credentials in GitHub to Drizly's production database

Victim
Drizly
When
early July 2020Disclosed Jul 28, 2020
Entry
The FTC alleges a malicious actor logged in to an executive's GitHub account with a password reused from an unrelated breach, with no multifactor authentication. The account still had access to Drizly's repositories from a 2018 hackathon, and those repositories held AWS and database credentials.

The FTC alleges an executive's GitHub account, left with access to Drizly's repositories after a 2018 hackathon, was opened in early July 2020 with a password reused from an unrelated breach. The repositories held AWS and database credentials; the intruder used them to modify Drizly's AWS security settings and exfiltrated the User Table, more than 2.5 million records, from the production environment on Amazon RDS. In 2018, AWS credentials an employee posted to a public GitHub repository had been used to mine cryptocurrency on Drizly's AWS servers.

What happened

External Parties
Public GitHub repo
Dark web forums
Media reports
+ 1 more
Internet
AWS APIstored credentials
Drizly GitHub Organization
Amazon RDS
Drizly AWS Production
Executive's GitHub Account
Drizly Repositories
AWS Security Settings
Production Database
AWS Servers

Replaying the Drizly July 2020 intrusion

  1. 1

    2018: cloud credentials on public GitHub

    2018, month not stated; before the 2020 breach

    The FTC alleges a Drizly employee posted Drizly AWS credentials to a personal public GitHub repository, and Drizly's AWS servers mined cryptocurrency until Drizly changed the credentials.

  2. 2

    A reused password opens GitHub

    Access from Apr 2018; login early Jul 2020

    Per the FTC, an executive's GitHub account kept the repository access of an April 2018 hackathon; in early July 2020 a password reused from an unrelated breach opens it, with no multifactor authentication, and Drizly's repositories hold AWS and database credentials.

  3. 3

    AWS credentials to the production database

    In or around Jul 2020, day not stated

    The FTC alleges the intruder used the AWS credentials to modify Drizly's AWS security settings, reached the production environment on Amazon RDS and exfiltrated the User Table, more than 2.5 million records.

  4. 4

    Sold, then reported

    Jul 2020; customers told Jul 28, 2020

    The data is offered for sale on two dark web forums. The FTC alleges Drizly learned of the breach from media and social media reports; Drizly said it discovered the hack on July 13, 2020 and emailed its customers on July 28, 2020.

Impact

The FTC alleges the intruder exfiltrated Drizly's User Table, more than 2.5 million records, and that the data was offered for sale on two dark web forums. Drizly said up to 2.5 million accounts were affected; its customer email named email addresses, dates of birth, bcrypt-hashed passwords and some delivery addresses, and it said no financial information was compromised. The FTC alleges Drizly learned of the breach from outside reports, and that the 2018 credential posting had put it on notice two years earlier.

Outcome

Where cloud-provider controls fit

The executive's account, the repositories and the stored credentials sat in GitHub, outside every cloud provider. The FTC says multifactor authentication, regular access reviews or scanning repositories for credentials would each likely have prevented the breach. The chain met AWS when credentials from a repository were presented to the AWS API. The complaint does not say what kind of credentials they were, from which network they were used or which settings were changed, so each AWS control here bounds a step and none is certain to have refused it. On your clouds you can use service control policies to bind credentials to your own networks, deny the creation of long-lived keys and deny changes to security settings for every identity but your administrators. A database password still opens a database once a network path is open; on Azure you can turn SQL password logins off. The FTC alleges the intruder took more than 2.5 million records and that Drizly learned of the breach from outside reports.

Could this have been prevented?

In hindsight, no control would have stopped it. 13 controls would have limited how far it went. 8 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.

0
Prevented
13
Contained
8
Not covered

How it could have been prevented

The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.

External Parties
Public GitHub repo
Dark web forums
Media reports
+ 1 more
Internet
AWS APIstored credentials
Drizly GitHub Organization
Amazon RDS
Drizly AWS Production
Executive's GitHub Account
Drizly Repositories
AWS Security Settings
Production Database
AWS Servers

Replaying the Drizly July 2020 intrusion

1 · 2018: cloud credentials on public GitHub

4 Contained1 Not covered3 on other clouds

2 · A reused password opens GitHub

3 Contained4 Not covered6 on other clouds

3 · AWS credentials to the production database

6 Contained1 Not covered11 on other clouds

4 · Sold, then reported

2 Not covered

Key facts

  • The FTC alleges that in 2018 a Drizly employee posted Drizly AWS credentials to a personal public GitHub repository, and Drizly's AWS servers were used to mine cryptocurrency until Drizly changed the credentials
  • In April 2018 Drizly gave an executive access to its GitHub repositories for a one-day hackathon and did not remove it, per the FTC
  • In early July 2020 a malicious actor logged in to that executive's GitHub account with credentials reused from an unrelated breach; the account had a seven-character password and no multifactor authentication, per the FTC
  • The FTC alleges the actor found AWS and database credentials in Drizly's repositories, modified Drizly's AWS security settings and exfiltrated the User Table, more than 2.5 million records
  • Drizly said it discovered the hack on July 13, 2020 and emailed customers on July 28, 2020; the FTC alleges it learned of the breach from media and social media reports of accounts for sale on dark web forums
  • The FTC issued its final order on January 9, 2023; Drizly and its CEO neither admitted nor denied the allegations

Sources

Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.

  1. 1.
    In the Matter of Drizly, LLC, et al.: Complaint (FTC File No. 2023185)Federal Trade Commission · Oct 24, 2022 · AdvisoryAWS RDS hosting, the 2018 credential posting and cryptomining, the hackathon access, the executive's password and missing MFA, the AWS and database credentials in the repositories, the AWS security-settings change, the User Table exfiltration and its record count, detection through outside reports and the dark web forums
  2. 2.
    In the Matter of Drizly, LLC, et al.: Decision and Order (proposed)Federal Trade Commission · Oct 24, 2022 · AdvisoryThe respondents neither admitting nor denying the allegations, and the order's requirements on stored credentials, MFA, inbound IP restriction, logging and exfiltration monitoring
  3. 3.
    In the Matter of Drizly, LLC, et al.: Complaint and Decision and Order (Docket No. C-4780)Federal Trade Commission · Jan 9, 2023 · AdvisoryThe final order's issue date of January 9, 2023
  4. 4.
    Alcohol delivery service Drizly confirms data breachTechCrunch · Jul 28, 2020 · NewsDrizly's customer email of July 28, 2020, the data types it named and the spokesperson's count of up to 2.5 million accounts
  5. 5.
    Drizly Data Breach: 2.5 Million Accounts May Have Been HackedCNN (wire story republished by CBS Boston) · Jul 30, 2020 · NewsDrizly's statement that it discovered the hack on July 13, 2020 and tightened security
  6. 6.
    Drizly Data BreachHave I Been Pwned · Jul 28, 2020 · ResearchThe data set's sale online and redistribution, with 2.5 million unique email addresses

The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of attack stages; the victim's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the incident. They are not an assessment of the victim's security program.

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