What was exposed
Replaying the BroadSoft July 2017 exposure
- 1
Configured: two buckets set to allow public access
Not stated; before July or August 2017Two S3 buckets tied to BroadSoft are set to allow public access, open to anyone on the internet and to any Authenticated Users member; which setting, who set it and when are not stated.
- 2
Reachable: more than 600 GB with an anonymous request
Until after August 29, 2017; start not statedAnyone can download more than 600 GB from the buckets with an anonymous request: SQL dumps, access logs, code with access credentials and more than 4 million subscriber records.
- 3
Found and closed: secured after notices to BroadSoft and Charter
July 2017 to September 1, 2017Kromtech finds the buckets by testing bucket names and notifies BroadSoft engineers on August 29; one bucket closes almost at once, the second after a notice to people tied to Charter.
SQL database dumps, access logs, internal emails, code with access credentials and a profile dump of more than 4 million Time Warner Cable subscriber records, more than 600 GB in all, could be downloaded by anyone until the buckets were secured, by September 1, 2017 per BroadSoft; when the exposure began is not stated, BroadSoft says its core systems were not exposed, Charter sees no sign its systems were affected, and whether anyone besides the finder read the data or used the credentials is not stated.
Where cloud-provider controls fit
Amazon S3 Block Public Access on the account, or set for every account by an organization policy, would have refused the ACL grant or the bucket policy that opened the buckets. Object Ownership would have closed the ACL path only, and the sources do not say whether an ACL or a bucket policy opened them; a service control policy would have kept the write to approved administrators. While the setting stood, a resource control policy that keeps your buckets to your organization's principals, or the same block, would have refused the anonymous download. Each of these, in the form described, dates from after this exposure, and each had to be set in the AWS account or organization that held the buckets, which the sources do not name; your settings do not reach a bucket that another account holds for you. Azure and Google Cloud refuse the same opening with the anonymous-access setting and the public access prevention constraint, and Oracle Cloud with a Security Zone. Finding a public bucket and closing it stay the owner's job: the provider's checks report a public bucket rather than refuse it.
Could this have been prevented?
In hindsight, not as a whole. 1 control would have refused a step outright, and 4 controls would have limited one. 3 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.
- 1
- Prevented
- 4
- Contained
- 3
- Not covered
How it could have been prevented
The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.
Replaying the BroadSoft July 2017 exposure
1 · Configured: two buckets set to allow public access
1 Prevented2 Contained3 on other clouds2 · Reachable: more than 600 GB with an anonymous request
2 Contained3 on other clouds3 · Found and closed: secured after notices to BroadSoft and Charter
3 Not coveredKey facts
- Two Amazon S3 buckets tied to BroadSoft were set to allow public access, which the finder called a change from the AWS default that was never closed; anyone on the internet, and any member of the Authenticated Users group, could download the files, and an anonymous request was enough
- Which S3 setting opened the buckets, who set it and when were not stated; BroadSoft said a cloud storage site run by a third party held the data, and Kromtech, per The Register, said freelancers left it open
- The buckets held more than 600 GB: SQL database dumps, access logs, internal emails, code with access credentials and a User Profile Dump of more than 4 million Time Warner Cable subscriber records dated November 26, 2010 to July 7, 2017
- Charter said 4 million records did not mean 4 million unique customers and that the unique count was not yet known as of September 1, 2017
- Kromtech found the buckets by testing '-test' variants of a WWE test bucket name, in July 2017 per Threatpost and on August 24 per Gizmodo, and downloaded their contents for verification; it notified BroadSoft engineers on August 29, 2017, and an engineer replied that the contact did not belong to them
- One bucket closed almost at once after the notice and the second after a notice to people tied to Charter; BroadSoft said on September 1, 2017 that it had secured the buckets and did not believe anyone with malicious intent accessed the data, and Charter saw no sign its systems were affected; what the credentials reached, and whether anyone else read the data, was not stated
Sources
Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.
- 1.22 Data Breaches We Found and Reported in 2017MacKeeper (Kromtech research) · Feb 19, 2026 · Researchtwo public S3 buckets tied to BroadSoft, more than 600 GB, found through '-test' name variants after a WWE test bucket, public access changed from the AWS default and never closed, readable by anyone on the internet and by any Authenticated Users member, anonymous login, SQL dumps, access logs, code with access credentials, User Profile Dump of more than 4 million records (November 26, 2010 to July 7, 2017), notice to Bangalore engineers on August 29, 2017, engineer's denial, one bucket closed almost at once, second secured after notice to Charter-related people, contents downloaded for verification, other access unknown
- 2.Four Million Time Warner Cable Records Left on Misconfigured AWS S3Threatpost · Sep 5, 2017 · Newsabout 600 GB in two S3 buckets open to anyone, configured to allow public access, found in July 2017 after a WWE domain, '-test' suffix variants, profile dump mostly from the MyTWC app, notice to Bangalore engineers, second bucket secured after notice to Charter, Kromtech's announcement, BroadSoft statement on the third-party storage site and its core systems, Charter statement
- 3.Millions of Time Warner Cable Customer Records Exposed in Third-Party Data LeakGizmodo · Sep 1, 2017 · Newsdiscovered August 24, 2017, two S3 buckets, more than 600 GB, roughly four million records with duplicates, internal emails, code with credentials for external systems, no password protection per BroadSoft, BroadSoft secured the buckets and does not believe a malicious actor accessed the data, Charter statement
- 4.Charter Communications is assessing damage in 'massive' 600gb data leakCyberScoop · Sep 1, 2017 · Newsabout 600 GB and 4 million records, two S3 buckets with no password protection, found in August, data from November 2010 to July 2017, Charter on records versus unique customers
- 5.Yet another AWS config fumble: Time Warner Cable exposes 4 million subscriber recordsThe Register · Sep 5, 2017 · Newsspotted in late August, set to allow public access, freelancers who handled TWC web applications left the bin open, anonymous login, 2010 to 2017 records, Charter: vendor removed the data, no Charter system affected, Charter notifying affected customers
The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of the exposure; the owner's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the data is exposed. They are not an assessment of the owner's security program.