What happened
Replaying Storm-1283 intrusions reported in December 2023
- 1
A subscription owner's account
Not stated · before Dec 12, 2023The actor signs in to Microsoft Entra ID through a VPN with a compromised user account that holds an ownership role on an Azure subscription; how the account was taken is not stated.
- 2
Application credentials
Not stated · before Dec 12, 2023With the account, the actor creates a single-tenant OAuth application with a set of secrets and adds credentials to existing line-of-business applications.
- 3
Contributor on the subscription
Not stated · before Dec 12, 2023Using the account's ownership role, the actor grants the new application the Contributor role on one active subscription.
- 4
Cryptomining VMs
Not stated · before Dec 12, 2023One of the existing applications deploys a small set of mining VMs, and the actor later returns to deploy more with the new application; targeted organizations pay 10,000 to 1.5 million USD in compute fees.
Cryptomining VMs deployed in compromised Azure subscriptions in two waves, with compute fees of 10,000 to 1.5 million USD per targeted organization. Microsoft blocked the OAuth applications and informed the affected organizations. The post describes no access to data and gives no count of tenants, subscriptions or VMs.
Where cloud-provider controls fit
In your Azure subscriptions, an Azure Policy assignment at the management group that denies VM creation to every identity outside an approved list would have refused the second wave, because an application the actor created sits on no such list. The other steps are bounded rather than refused, because the post does not say how the account was taken, which roles it held or where the applications signed in from. In your Microsoft Entra tenant, Conditional Access with a phishing-resistant authentication strength narrows who can sign in, an app management policy refuses client secrets and caps certificate lifetimes, and the Users can register applications setting limits who creates an application. An Azure Policy assignment on role assignments and Privileged Identity Management for the Owner role narrow who can grant the Contributor role, and Conditional Access for workload identities keeps application tokens to named locations.
Could this have been prevented?
In hindsight, not as a whole. 1 control would have refused a step outright, and 9 controls would have limited one. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.
- 1
- Prevented
- 9
- Contained
- 0
- Not covered
How it could have been prevented
The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.
Replaying Storm-1283 intrusions reported in December 2023
1 · A subscription owner's account
1 Contained3 on other clouds2 · Application credentials
3 Contained6 on other clouds3 · Contributor on the subscription
2 Contained3 on other clouds4 · Cryptomining VMs
1 Prevented3 Contained8 on other cloudsKey facts
- The compromised user account held an ownership role on an Azure subscription and let Storm-1283 sign in through a VPN; how the account was compromised, and whether it had MFA, is not stated
- The actor created a single-tenant OAuth application in Microsoft Entra ID, named like the tenant domain, and added a set of secrets to it; whether they were client secrets or certificates is not stated
- The actor added an additional set of credentials to existing line-of-business OAuth applications that the compromised account had access to
- With the compromised account, the actor granted the Contributor role on one of the active subscriptions to the new application
- The actor first deployed a small set of VMs with one of the existing applications and started cryptomining, then returned to deploy more VMs with the new application; the VMs were named after the tenant's domain name, the zone name and a digit
- Targeted organizations incurred compute fees of 10,000 to 1.5 million USD, per Microsoft, which blocked the OAuth applications with the Microsoft Entra team, informed the affected organizations and published its account on December 12, 2023
Sources
Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.
- 1.Threat actors misuse OAuth applications to automate financially driven attacksMicrosoft Threat Intelligence (Microsoft Security Blog) · Dec 12, 2023 · ResearchCompromised account with an ownership role on an Azure subscription, VPN sign-in, single-tenant OAuth app creation and secrets, added credentials on existing LOB apps, Contributor role assignment to the app, two waves of VM deployment, VM naming, compute fees, Microsoft response, mitigations, detection advice
The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of attack stages; the victim's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the incident. They are not an assessment of the victim's security program.