What happened
Replaying the Storm-1167 intrusion, reported June 2023
- 1
An email from a trusted vendor
Date not statedAn email from a compromised trusted vendor reaches the targets, and its link leads through a fake document preview to the phishing page.
- 2
Password, code and session taken, then replayed
Date not stated; the replay a few hours laterThe phishing page relays the password and the MFA code into the attacker's own sign-in and captures the session; hours later the session is replayed and opens the mail and the documents.
- 3
A new MFA method and a hiding rule
Date not statedWith the replayed session the attacker adds a phone method to the account and creates an inbox rule that archives and marks read all incoming mail.
- 4
More than 16,000 emails and a second AiTM wave
Date not statedThe mailbox sends more than 16,000 phishing emails and the attacker hides the replies; internal recipients who click are caught by a second AiTM wave.
Accounts at banking and financial services organizations were opened with a session the attacker built from a relayed password and MFA code; one mailbox sent more than 16,000 phishing emails while an inbox rule hid the replies, and a second AiTM wave caught internal recipients. The source does not state the number of organizations or accounts, the dates, or any financial loss.
Where cloud-provider controls fit
In Microsoft Entra ID, a Conditional Access policy that requires the Phishing-resistant MFA authentication strength would have refused the sign-in the attacker completed with your user's relayed password and code, in the first wave and in the second. It refuses a new token to a session built that way; it does not govern what a session that already holds a token does in the mailbox. Trusted locations and compliant devices cap the reach of a session only where the attacker's address and device fall outside them, which the source does not state. Disabling SMS and voice in the Authentication methods policy refuses a phone method, and an outbound spam filter policy cuts a run of mail short. The vendor's email, the inbox rule itself and the replies and deletions in your user's own mailbox stay outside the provider's reach.
Could this have been prevented?
In hindsight, not as a whole. 2 controls would have refused a step outright, and 8 controls would have limited one. 3 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.
- 2
- Prevented
- 8
- Contained
- 3
- Not covered
How it could have been prevented
The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.
Replaying the Storm-1167 intrusion, reported June 2023
1 · An email from a trusted vendor
1 Not covered2 · Password, code and session taken, then replayed
1 Prevented3 Contained6 on other clouds3 · A new MFA method and a hiding rule
3 Contained1 Not covered3 on other clouds4 · More than 16,000 emails and a second AiTM wave
1 Prevented2 Contained1 Not covered3 on other cloudsKey facts
- Microsoft Threat Intelligence published the report on June 8, 2023; it gives no calendar date for any stage, only relative times, and names no victim
- The first email came from a compromised trusted vendor of the target organizations, and at some of them a policy that allowed the vendor's mail automatically let it past detections; how the vendor was compromised is not stated
- The kit used an indirect proxy: the attacker used the typed password in its own session with the real sign-in service, relayed the target's MFA code and captured the session token
- A few hours later the stolen cookie was replayed from an IP address based in the United States; the attacker read mail and cloud documents, added a phone-based MFA method, which by default needed no re-authentication, and created an inbox rule that archived and marked read all incoming mail
- The mailbox sent more than 16,000 phishing emails to contacts and distribution lists, and the attacker deleted bounces, out-of-office replies and its answers to recipients who questioned the email
- Internal recipients who clicked were caught by another AiTM attack, and one newly compromised mailbox started a second campaign until Microsoft revoked its session cookie; the source gives no count of accounts and no loss
Sources
Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.
- 1.Detecting and mitigating a multi-stage AiTM phishing and BEC campaignMicrosoft Threat Intelligence · Jun 8, 2023 · Vendor reportActor, targets, trusted-vendor entry, indirect-proxy AiTM, session cookie replay, MFA method addition, inbox rule, phishing volume, BEC tactics, second-stage AiTM, containment, mitigations
The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of attack stages; the victim's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the incident. They are not an assessment of the victim's security program.