What happened
Replaying the Microsoft intrusion of late November 2023
- 1
Password spray into a legacy test tenant
Late November 2023 (day not stated)A low-volume password spray from residential proxies takes over a legacy, non-production test tenant account that has no MFA.
- 2
A legacy test application into the corporate tenant
Not stated; after the late-November 2023 footholdFrom the foothold the actor compromises a legacy test OAuth application with elevated access to the corporate environment; how is not stated by Microsoft, and the added credential and the sign-in as its service principal are inferences by Wiz and SpecterOps.
- 3
Malicious applications granted mailbox access
Not stated; after the late-November 2023 footholdThe actor creates malicious OAuth applications and a new user account that consents to them, and uses the legacy application to grant them the Office 365 Exchange Online full_access_as_app role.
- 4
Corporate mailboxes read through EWS
Beginning in late November 2023, until access was removed on or about January 13, 2024The malicious applications authenticate to Exchange Online and read a very small percentage of corporate email accounts through Exchange Web Services; some emails and attached documents are taken.
- 5
Eviction, and the stolen email put to use
Detected January 12, 2024 (one sentence of the March update says January 19); mailbox access removed on or about January 13; use of the email seen in the weeks before March 8, 2024Microsoft finds the activity in Exchange Web Services audit logs and removes the actor's access to the mailboxes; information from the stolen email is used to gain, or attempt to gain, access to source code repositories, internal systems and customer systems, and password sprays rise by as much as 10-fold in February 2024.
Some emails and attached documents taken from a very small percentage of Microsoft corporate email accounts, members of the senior leadership team and employees in cybersecurity, legal and other functions among them; the actor used, or tried to use, information from them against some source code repositories, internal systems and customer systems. No source gives a count, and as of March 8, 2024 Microsoft reported no material impact on its operations.
Where cloud-provider controls fit
If you require MFA in Microsoft Entra Conditional Access for every account, test and legacy accounts included, a sprayed password does not complete the sign-in. Disabling the enterprise application of a test application your tenant no longer uses bounds the later steps: your tenant issues that application no token, but only on the path SpecterOps and Wiz infer, which Microsoft does not confirm. Conditional Access for workload identities bounds your single-tenant applications to your named locations; where the malicious applications were registered, and where they authenticated from, is not stated. Which mailboxes an application with full_access_as_app opens stays with Exchange Online, and Microsoft's response came after the fact.
Could this have been prevented?
In hindsight, not as a whole. 1 control would have refused a step outright, and 9 controls would have limited one. 4 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.
- 1
- Prevented
- 9
- Contained
- 4
- Not covered
How it could have been prevented
The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.
Replaying the Microsoft intrusion of late November 2023
1 ยท Password spray into a legacy test tenant
1 Prevented4 on other clouds2 ยท A legacy test application into the corporate tenant
3 Contained1 Not covered9 on other clouds3 ยท Malicious applications granted mailbox access
2 Contained6 on other clouds4 ยท Corporate mailboxes read through EWS
1 Contained1 Not covered5 ยท Eviction, and the stolen email put to use
3 Contained2 Not covered7 on other cloudsKey facts
- Beginning in late November 2023, a password spray aimed at a limited number of accounts and sent from residential proxies compromised a legacy, non-production test tenant account that had no MFA; Microsoft gave no day
- From that foothold the actor compromised a legacy test OAuth application with elevated access to the corporate environment; Microsoft did not say which permissions it held, and SpecterOps and Wiz inferred different ones
- The actor used the legacy application to grant malicious OAuth applications the Office 365 Exchange Online full_access_as_app role and read a very small percentage of corporate email accounts through Exchange Web Services; Microsoft gave no count
- Microsoft's January post and Form 8-K dated the detection to January 12, 2024, and one sentence of its March 8, 2024 update dated it to January 19; per the 8-K, access to the email accounts was removed on or about January 13
- On March 8, 2024 Microsoft said the actor had used information from the email to gain, or attempt to gain, access to some source code repositories and internal systems, and that password sprays rose by as much as 10-fold in February
- CISA's Emergency Directive 24-02, issued on April 2, 2024, said federal agencies' correspondence with Microsoft had been exfiltrated, authentication details included; it gave no count of agencies or emails
Sources
Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.
- 1.Microsoft Actions Following Attack by Nation State Actor Midnight BlizzardMicrosoft Security Response Center (MSRC) ยท Jan 19, 2024 ยท Vendor reportStart month, detection date, entry, mailboxes reached, data taken, actor's initial target, no-evidence statement, notification of employees, legacy-systems response
- 2.Form 8-K, Item 1.05 Material Cybersecurity IncidentsMicrosoft Corporation (U.S. SEC EDGAR) ยท Jan 19, 2024 ยท Vendor reportDetection date, start month, access removal date, accounts reached, law enforcement and regulator notification, materiality status
- 3.Midnight Blizzard: Guidance for responders on nation-state attackMicrosoft Threat Intelligence (Microsoft Security Blog) ยท Jan 25, 2024 ยท Vendor reportAttack chain, missing MFA, password spray method, residential proxies, legacy test OAuth application, malicious OAuth applications, new user consent, full_access_as_app grant, EWS collection, detection in audit logs, other targets notified, attribution, detections, mitigations
- 4.Update on Microsoft Actions Following Attack by Nation State Actor Midnight BlizzardMicrosoft Security Response Center (MSRC) ยท Mar 8, 2024 ยท Vendor reportFollow-on access to source code repositories and internal systems, secrets in email, customer outreach, password spray increase, customer-facing systems statement, ongoing investigation, the second detection date (January 19) in one sentence
- 5.Form 8-K/A, Item 1.05 Material Cybersecurity Incidents (amendment to the 2024-01-19 filing)Microsoft Corporation (U.S. SEC EDGAR) ยท Mar 8, 2024 ยท Vendor reportContinuing use of obtained information, possible further access, law enforcement coordination, materiality status
- 6.ED 24-02: Mitigating the Significant Risk from Nation-State Compromise of Microsoft Corporate Email System (Closed)Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) ยท Apr 2, 2024 ยท AdvisoryAgency email exfiltrated, authentication details in email, attempts on customer systems, agency actions and deadlines, Microsoft metadata to agencies, scope, closure
- 7.CISA Directs Federal Agencies to Immediately Mitigate Significant Risk From Russian State-Sponsored Cyber ThreatCybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) ยท Apr 11, 2024 ยท AdvisoryDirective issue and release dates, organizations beyond federal agencies, privileged Azure accounts, guidance to all organizations
- 8.Security above all elseโexpanding Microsoft's Secure Future InitiativeMicrosoft Security Blog ยท May 3, 2024 ยท Vendor reportSFI expansion, lessons from the incident, MFA on Microsoft's own tenants, app removal, tenant isolation goals
- 9.Microsoft's Work to Strengthen Cybersecurity Protection: Written Testimony of Brad Smith, Vice Chair and PresidentMicrosoft Corporation (written testimony to the U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security) ยท Jun 11, 2024 ยท Vendor reportAttribution by Microsoft, SFI expansion in January, acceptance of responsibility
- 10.Microsoft Breach โ What Happened? What Should Azure Admins Do?SpecterOps ยท Feb 2, 2024 ยท ResearchPossible permission paths and the cross-tenant service principal mechanism, both inferred; audit recommendations for foreign service principals
- 11.Midnight Blizzard attack on Microsoft corporate environment: a detailed analysis, detections and recommendationsWiz ยท Feb 8, 2024 ยท ResearchPossible permission paths and the added credential, both inferred; new user privileges (inferred), hunting queries, prevention recommendations
- 12.Midnight Blizzard accessed Microsoft systems, source codeTechTarget (SearchSecurity) ยท Mar 8, 2024 ยท NewsWhat the secrets were, as a Microsoft spokesperson described them; Microsoft declined further comment
- 13.CISA: Midnight Blizzard obtained federal agency emailsTechTarget (SearchSecurity) ยท Apr 12, 2024 ยท NewsAgency production environments statement, Microsoft customer assistance statement
- 14.Microsoft alerts additional customers of state-linked threat group attacksCybersecurity Dive ยท Jun 28, 2024 ยท NewsCustomer notifications, Microsoft statement on customer correspondence, no counts
The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of attack stages; the victim's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the incident. They are not an assessment of the victim's security program.