What was exposed
Replaying the Pocket iNet October 2018 exposure
- 1
Configured: one folder of a bucket left downloadable
Before Oct 11, 2018; start not statedPocket iNet's 73 GB Amazon S3 bucket is exposed to the internet and one folder in it is downloadable; which setting opened it, who set it and when are not stated.
- 2
Reachable: root passwords and AWS keys in one folder
Until Oct 19, 2018The folder downloads from the internet, by the finder's account: plaintext root and admin passwords for network devices, employee AWS secret keys, diagrams and configurations; only the finder's read is reported.
- 3
Found and closed: seven days from notice to closure
Oct 11–19, 2018UpGuard finds the bucket on October 11, 2018 and notifies Pocket iNet by phone and email that day; the exposure is secured on October 19, and how is not stated.
One folder of Pocket iNet's 73 GB Amazon S3 bucket was downloadable from the internet until October 19, 2018, and the CTO said the bucket had been open for six months; the folder held plaintext root and admin passwords for Pocket iNet's firewalls, core routers and switches, servers and wireless access points, AWS secret keys for employees, network diagrams and device configurations; whether anyone other than the finder read it, or used the passwords or the keys, is not stated.
Where cloud-provider controls fit
Amazon S3 Block Public Access on the account would have refused the ACL or bucket policy that opened the folder, whichever it was. S3 Object Ownership set to bucket owner enforced closes the ACL path only, and no source says whether an ACL or a bucket policy opened the folder; a service control policy limits who can write such a grant. While a grant stood, a resource control policy, or the Block Public Access settings that ignore an existing grant, would have kept readers outside your organization or account from the files. Azure, Google Cloud and Oracle Cloud refuse the same opening with the anonymous-access setting, the public access prevention constraint and a Security Zone. Every one of these controls dates from after this exposure. The finder's notice and the time your fix takes stay outside the provider's controls: a public grant has no expiry, and closing the folder does not revoke passwords or keys already read from it.
Could this have been prevented?
In hindsight, not as a whole. 1 control would have refused a step outright, and 4 controls would have limited one. 2 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.
- 1
- Prevented
- 4
- Contained
- 2
- Not covered
How it could have been prevented
The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.
Replaying the Pocket iNet October 2018 exposure
1 · Configured: one folder of a bucket left downloadable
1 Prevented2 Contained3 on other clouds2 · Reachable: root passwords and AWS keys in one folder
2 Contained3 on other clouds3 · Found and closed: seven days from notice to closure
2 Not coveredKey facts
- The bucket held 73 GB of data; not all of it was downloadable, and one folder of technical files was
- The folder held plaintext password lists for firewalls, core routers and switches, servers and wireless access points, most under root or admin accounts, and AWS secret keys for Pocket iNet employees, with no count and no word on whether the keys were valid
- It also held network diagrams, device configuration files, inventory lists, photographs of racks and towers and a list of priority customers, by UpGuard's account; Pocket iNet called the folder historical non-customer network data
- UpGuard found the bucket on October 11, 2018 and notified Pocket iNet by phone and email the same day; the exposure was secured on October 19, seven days later by UpGuard's count, and how it was secured was not stated
- Pocket iNet's CTO told TechCrunch the bucket had been open for six months; a company email said it had been secured days earlier, which TechCrunch reported was not true
- Pocket iNet said the folder was publicly accessible to Amazon administrative users, a phrase no source explained; no source reported that anyone other than the finder read the data or used the passwords or the keys
Sources
Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.
- 1.Out of Pocket: How an ISP Exposed Administrative System CredentialsUpGuard · Oct 23, 2019 · ResearchDiscovery, exposure of the bucket, downloadable folder, size, contents, notification, closure, regulators contacted
- 2.A Washington ISP exposed the 'keys to the kingdom' after leaving a server unsecuredTechCrunch · Oct 23, 2018 · NewsExposure length as the CTO stated it, delayed closure, CEO confirmation, no customer data
- 3.An ISP Left Corporate Passwords, Keys, and All its Data Exposed on the InternetVICE (Motherboard) · Oct 23, 2018 · NewsPocket iNet statement, folder reach as the owner stated it, network review, no reported access by others
- 4.Pocket iNet Leaves 73 GB of Sensitive Data ExposedInfosecurity Magazine · Oct 24, 2018 · NewsClosure date, first-call account as reported
The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of the exposure; the owner's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the data is exposed. They are not an assessment of the owner's security program.