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IntrusionAWS
7 min read

OneLogin AWS key compromise

Victim
OneLogin
When
May 31, 2017Disclosed May 31, 2017
Entry
A set of AWS keys, used against the AWS API from an intermediate host at another, smaller US service provider; how the keys were obtained and their type are not stated.

On May 31, 2017, from around 2 am PT, an actor used a set of AWS keys from an intermediate host at another, smaller US service provider to reach the AWS API, created instances in OneLogin's AWS environment and could access database tables with information about users, apps and various types of keys. OneLogin encrypts certain sensitive data at rest but said it could not rule out that the actor also obtained the ability to decrypt data. Staff were alerted to unusual database activity around 9 am PT and shut down the affected instance and the AWS keys within minutes; how the keys were obtained is not stated.

What happened

External Parties
Intermediate host
US data center customers
Security firm
+ 2 more
Internet
AWS APIa set of AWS keys
Compute in OneLogin's AWS environment
Database of the US data region
Instances the actor created
Tables: users, apps, keys
Secrets encrypted at rest

Replaying the OneLogin May 2017 intrusion

  1. 1

    AWS keys from an intermediate host

    May 31, 2017, around 2 am PT

    A set of AWS keys reaches the AWS API from an intermediate host at another, smaller US service provider; how the keys were obtained is not stated.

  2. 2

    Instances for reconnaissance

    May 31, 2017, between about 2 am and 9 am PT

    Through the AWS API the keys create instances in OneLogin's AWS environment to do reconnaissance; the count differs between the 2017 and 2018 accounts.

  3. 3

    Database tables and keys

    May 31, 2017, between about 2 am and 9 am PT

    Database tables with information about users, apps and various types of keys are reached, and the actor may have obtained the ability to decrypt data.

  4. 4

    Alert and shutdown

    May 31, 2017, around 9 am PT

    Staff are alerted to unusual database activity and shut down the affected instance and the AWS keys within minutes.

Impact

Database tables with information about users, apps and various types of keys in OneLogin's US data region were accessible for about seven hours; OneLogin said all customers served by its US data center were affected and could not rule out that the actor obtained the ability to decrypt data.

Outcome

Where cloud-provider controls fit

A service control policy that denies calls from outside OneLogin's networks, or one that refuses IAM user keys without MFA, would have bounded where and how the keys work. A service control policy on instance launches, or a permissions boundary sized to the key's purpose, would have bounded who can launch instances. A security group that admits only the application tier would have capped which instances reach the tables, an AWS KMS key policy would have kept the encrypted secrets sealed to other principals, and an egress firewall would have bounded a copy. Each of these depends on facts the sources leave open: the key type, whether the account was a member account of an AWS organization, the networks the key was meant for, the database service and where the decryption keys were held. The database logins, the application's encryption design and finding the activity stay with you on every cloud.

Could this have been prevented?

In hindsight, no control would have stopped it. 9 controls would have limited how far it went. 3 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.

0
Prevented
9
Contained
3
Not covered

How it could have been prevented

The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.

External Parties
Intermediate host
US data center customers
Security firm
+ 2 more
Internet
AWS APIa set of AWS keys
Compute in OneLogin's AWS environment
Database of the US data region
Instances the actor created
Tables: users, apps, keys
Secrets encrypted at rest

Replaying the OneLogin May 2017 intrusion

1 · AWS keys from an intermediate host

4 Contained3 on other clouds

2 · Instances for reconnaissance

2 Contained3 on other clouds

3 · Database tables and keys

3 Contained2 Not covered6 on other clouds

4 · Alert and shutdown

1 Not covered

Key facts

  • The attack started on May 31, 2017 around 2 am PT, with a set of AWS keys used from an intermediate host at another, smaller US service provider
  • Through the AWS API the actor created instances to do reconnaissance: 'several' per the 2017 blog update, 'a new instance' per a 2018 interview
  • The actor could access database tables with information about users, apps and various types of keys
  • OneLogin could not rule out that the actor obtained the ability to decrypt data; no source says any data was decrypted
  • Staff were alerted to unusual database activity around 9 am PT, about seven hours after the start, and shut down the affected instance and the AWS keys within minutes
  • OneLogin said all customers served by its US data center were affected; how the keys were obtained was not stated

Sources

Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.

  1. 1.
    OneLogin security chief delivers new security modelTechTarget SearchSecurity · Aug 16, 2018 · Newsactor obtained a key, key had access to much more infrastructure than needed, new instance launched with the key, attempt to copy data, not certain what was exposed, temporary session tokens, YubiKey MFA to get a token, external audit, attacker not named
  2. 2.
    OneLogin: Breach Exposed Ability to Decrypt DataKrebsOnSecurity · Jun 1, 2017 · NewsOneLogin's blog update as quoted: the set of AWS keys, the intermediate host at a smaller US service provider, the 2 am start, the instances for reconnaissance, the 9 am alert and the shutdown within minutes, the database tables with users, apps and keys, and the decryption it could not rule out
  3. 3.
    OneLogin Shares More Details on Breach, Customer ImpactSecurityWeek · Jun 2, 2017 · NewsThe compromised AWS keys and intermediate host, the start time and the shutdown about seven hours after the attack began
  4. 4.
    Password manager OneLogin hacked, exposing sensitive customer dataZDNet (reposted on the BreachExchange list) · Jun 1, 2017 · NewsAll customers served by the US data center affected, the 2 am start, the alert about seven hours later, the shutdown within minutes and the database tables
  5. 5.
    OneLogin security chief reveals new details of data breachZDNet (reposted on the BreachExchange list) · Jun 7, 2017 · NewsA single secret key as the foothold, which data is encrypted, no master key, the authorized key's use mostly unnoticed, and data stolen per the article
  6. 6.
    OneLogin Data Breach Poses Worrisome Questions About Cloud UseFortune · Jun 2, 2017 · NewsThe set of AWS keys, the 2 a.m. PT start and the alert about seven hours later
  7. 7.
    OneLogin Breach Compromised Customer Data, Ability to Decrypt Encrypted DataThreatpost · Jun 1, 2017 · NewsThe May 31, 2017 blog post and customer email, and all customers served by the US data center affected
  8. 8.
    OneLogin security chief delivers new security modelTechTarget SearchSecurity · Aug 16, 2018 · NewsThe key's access beyond its need, a new instance launched with the key and an attempt to copy data, and the move to temporary session tokens with YubiKey MFA
  9. 9.
    How OneLogin responded to its breach and regained customer trustCSO Online · Apr 16, 2019 · NewsAbout seven hours of activity and YubiKey MFA for AWS after the breach
  10. 10.
    May 31, 2017 Security Incident (UPDATED June 8, 2017)OneLogin · Jun 8, 2017 · Vendor reportOneLogin's own post, archived copy: the AWS keys, the intermediate host, the instances, the database tables with users, apps and keys, and what the post does not say about the keys and the database service

The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of attack stages; the victim's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the incident. They are not an assessment of the victim's security program.

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